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Preface
In April 1988, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued nine 
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). These standards address what 
has become known as the expectation gap—the difference between what the 
public and financial statement users believe auditors are responsible for and 
what auditors themselves believe their responsibilities are.
The expectation gap SASs ushered in significant changes in some 
fundamental and long-standing auditors’ responsibilities and audit require­
ments. Specifically, these SASs were intended to (1) increase the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect and report errors, irregularities, and illegal acts; 
(2) improve audit effectiveness; and (3) improve auditor communications 
with both financial statement users and those within an entity who are 
responsible for financial reporting.
Members of the ASB and the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Division 
recognized that SASs creating such significant and pervasive changes 
would require periodic analysis and assessment to evaluate their implemen­
tation and identify additional actions that might be necessary. Thus, on 
May 11 and 12, 1992, in Charleston, South Carolina, a conference was held 
to review the progress of the expectation gap SASs. The specific conference 
objectives were to—
• Examine implementation of the expectation gap standards from the 
perspective of practitioners and users of audit services to identify accom­
plishments and needs.
•  Identify emerging expectation gap issues.
• Stimulate research directly related to (1) the expectation gap SASs,
(2) issues that the ASB is currently considering, and (3) issues that the 
ASB will be considering in the near future.
• Provide, through publication of the conference proceedings, materials to 
enhance the quality of audit education.
The core of the conference was a series of commissioned research papers 
prepared by leading academics that address specific expectation gap SASs 
(see the table of contents). Each paper summarizes relevant research 
concerning a specific standard or standards and reviews application of the 
standard(s) in practice. Some authors conducted research pertinent to 
the standard(s) specifically for the conference and reported the results.
The papers and related issues were discussed by the participants who 
represented a broad variety of perspectives including auditing standard
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setters; national, regional, and local public accounting firms; the academic 
community; financial executives, internal auditors, regulators, and inter­
national auditing groups.
The conference proceedings identified a number of areas where the 
objectives of the expectation gap standards had been accomplished, as well 
as a number of areas on which additional efforts should be focused. In a few 
areas, sufficient time had not elapsed to provide an adequate data base for 
research. After the conference, the ASB’s Audit Issues Task Force reviewed 
each paper and related conference discussion and, where warranted, 
referred matters to the ASB or an appropriate ASB task force.
We are grateful to the conference sponsors who made this progress report 
on the expectation gap SASs possible. Without their moral and financial 
support, the conference would never have been more than another good 
idea. We particularly want to acknowledge the commitment and efforts of 
the authors of each paper. The extraordinary quality of the conference 
papers demonstrates the talent and hard work of the authors and serves as 
testimony that academic research can address audit policy and practice 
subjects in a substantive and timely manner. We deeply appreciate the 
authors’ efforts.
We also owe special thanks to those who helped organize and conduct the 
conference. Don Neebes of Ernst & Young sparked the idea for the confer­
ence and created the sponsorship group. Ray Whittington of San Diego 
State University and Gary Holstrum of the University of South Florida 
commissioned the research papers, worked closely with the authors as 
they prepared them, and spent many hours editing the papers for these 
proceedings. Jeanne Mebus-Summo, Technical Manager in the Auditing 
Standards Division, ably carried out the innumerable administrative duties 
associated with a conference of this size and devoted considerable time and 
effort to the editorial tasks involved in the publication of these proceedings.
We sincerely appreciate the contributions of the conference participants. 
Their comments, insights, and viewpoints stimulated thoughtful, objective 
analysis of the progress of the expectation gap standards. Without their 
dedication, the conference could not have accomplished its objectives.
Additional research on the implementation of the expectation gap SASs is 
sorely needed. We believe the proceedings of this conference will provide 
both stimulation and valuable perspective to those who are interested in 
conducting such research. In addition, we believe that these papers provide 
unique, informative, and readable educational materials for students of 
accounting and auditing. Through the generosity of the sponsors, com­
plimentary copies of these proceedings have been made available to each 
member of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association 
and to the head of the accounting program at virtually every college and
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university in the United States. We hope that the widespread distribution of 
these proceedings will foster continued analysis, dialogue, and research 
about the expectation gap SASs.
D a n  M. Guy 
Vice President,
Auditing Standards Division
A la n  J. W inters  
Director o f Auditing Research, 
Auditing Standards Division
June 1993
v
Expectation Gap 
Conference Participants
W. S te v e  A l b r e c h t  
Brigham Young University
A lv in  A . A re n s  
Michigan State University
W a l te r  R . B o g a n  
Price Waterhouse
E d w a rd  J. B l o c h e r  
University of North Carolina
D o u g la s  R . C a r m ic h a e l  
CUNY-Baruch College
D o n a ld  H . C h a p in  
General Accounting Office
R o b e r t  C h a r l e s w o r th  
Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales
A n th o n y  N. D a le s s io  
International Federation 
of Accountants
T im o th y  E . D u rb in  
Arthur Andersen & Co.
W illia m  L . F e l ix , J r .
University of Arizona
D a n  M . G u y , Vice President 
Auditing Standards Division, 
AICPA
D av id  J. H a t h e r l y  
Auditing Practices Board,
United Kingdom
G a r y  L . H o ls t r u m  
University of South Florida
M a r g a r e t  R . H o rv a th  
Securities and Exchange 
Commission
W ill ia m  J. I h l a n f e l d t  
Shell Oil Company
H e n ry  R . J a e n ic k e  
Drexel University
D o n a ld  E. J e f f r e y s  
Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants
Ja c k  E. K a tz e n m e y e r  
Ernst & Young
F r a n k  J. K e l l y  
Auditing Standards Board,
Canada
W ill ia m  R . K inney , J r .  
University of Texas at Austin
A.V. L a R o c c a  
LaRocca & Co., P.C.
G e o rg e  A. L ew is
Broussard, Poche, Lewis & Breaux
Jam es K . L o e b b e c k e  
University of Utah
W ill ia m  F. M e s s ie r ,  J r .  
University of Florida
Jo se p h  F. M o r a g l io  
Vice President, Federal 
Government Division, AICPA
D o n a ld  L . N ee b es  
Ernst & Young
vii
E d m u n d  R . N oonan  
KPMG Peat Marwick
E dward E . N usbaum 
Grant Thornton
J u d ith  H . O ’D ell  
AICPA Private Companies 
Practice Section
ZOE-VONNA PALMROSE 
University of Southern California
K urt J. Pany  
Arizona State University
L arry E . R ittenberg  
University of Wisconsin-Madison
D ouglas P. Sauter  
Director o f Auditing Standards, 
Auditing Standards Division, 
AICPA
J oseph  J. Schultz  
Arizona State University
Ira  So lo m o n  
University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign
Jo h n  H . Stewart 
IBM Corporation
J erry D. Sullivan 
Public Oversight Board
Jo h n  B. Sullivan  
Deloitte & Touche
J ea n n e  M. Su m m o  
Technical Manager,
Auditing Standards Division, 
AICPA
F rank  J. T anki 
Coopers & Lybrand
Wanda  A . Walla ce  
College of William and Mary
O. R ay W hittingto n  
San Diego State University
Jo h n  J. W illingha m  
KPMG Peat Marwick
A lan  J. W in ters  
Director o f Auditing Research, 
Auditing Standards Division, 
AICPA
A r n o ld  M. W right  
Boston College
D avid W. W r ight  
University of Michigan
Steph en  A . Z eff  
Rice University
viii
Contents
The New Audit Report: User Perceptions and 
Implementation Issues
H enry  R. Ja enick e  A r n o l d  W right
Reporting on Consistency
Ir a  So lo m o n  Jay S. Rich
Reporting on Uncertainties, Including Going ConcernD. R. C a r m ic h a e l  K u r t P a n y
Audit Committees: Is There an Expectations Gap?
Larry  E. Rittenberg  R. D. N air
Implementing SAS No. 55: An Interim Report
W illiam  R. Kin n e y , Jr .W illiam  L. Fe l ix , Jr .
An Evaluation of SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities
W. Stev e  A lbrecht  Jo h n  J. W illin g h a m
Auditing Complex Accounting Estimates
Wa n d a  A . Wa lla c e
Research in Analytical Procedures: Implications for 
Establishing and Implementing Auditing Standards
Edward Blocher  Ja m es  K. Lo ebbecke
ix
1
17
35
59
86
102
125
Page
177
Page
Research in the Auditor's Responsibilities Regarding 
Illegal Acts by Clients 227
ZOE-VONNA PALMROSE
D avid W right
Auditor Attestation to Management Reports on 
Internal Control—Should It Be Required? 244
W illiam  F. M essier , Jr .
O. Ray W hittington
Illegal Acts—The Current Position of the United Kingdom 256
D avid J. Hatherly 
Robert Charlesworth
Special Reports on Regulated Financial Institutions 260
Fra n k  J. Kelly 
D o n a l d  E. Jeffreys
X
The New Audit Report: 
User Perceptions and 
Implementation Issues
Henry R. Jaenicke, C.D. Clarkson Professor o f Accounting,
Drexel University
Arnold Wright, Arthur Andersen Professor,
Boston College
SAS No. 58 revised the previous audit report that had been in existence for 
more than forty years. This paper identifies the primary objectives of 
SAS No. 58 and reviews the research findings since its issuance to evaluate 
the extent to which these objectives appear to have been accomplished. 
Additionally, implementation issues of SAS No. 58 are discussed based on 
interviews with national office partners and staff. Finally, the implications 
of the findings for standard setting and future research are considered.
The research results suggest that the new report has clarified the 
respective roles o f the auditor and management. However, the audit process 
is still perceived as unclear, and the role of reasonable assurance, GAAP, 
and selective audit testing are not fully recognized and/or accepted by 
users. Future research is needed to consider the most cost-effective means 
of communicating intended auditor messages as well as identifying evolving 
issues posing a potential expectation gap between users and auditors. 
Implementation matters include choosing the appropriate opinion in 
situations involving scope limitations, uncertainties, and GAAP issues; 
other reporting issues; and providing additional information in the 
standard report.
Introduction
SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA, Profes­
sional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508), prescribed a new form of the 
auditor’s standard report. The most significant changes from the previous 
report were the addition of (1) an introductory paragraph differentiating 
management’s and the auditor’s responsibilities, (2) language that explicitly
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acknowledged that an audit provides reasonable assurance about whether 
the financial statements are free from material misstatements, and (3) a 
brief explanation of what an audit entails. The objective of the changes was 
to improve user understanding of the auditor’s role by requiring that the 
standard report explicitly address the responsibility the auditor assumes, 
the procedures the auditor performs, and the assurance the auditor 
provides. This paper has three purposes—
1. To summarize the research findings to date regarding the extent to 
which the new auditor’s report has achieved its objectives.
2. To identify problems that practitioners may have in implementing the 
new report.
3. To suggest ideas for future research in areas related to the auditor’s 
standard report.
We do not consider the treatment of consistency and uncertainty matters as 
addressed in SAS No. 58, since these issues are examined in separate 
reports prepared for the Expectation GAP Roundtable.1
Research Findings
This section contains a review of the findings of research studies exam­
ining the impact of the new report on the perceptions of various financial 
statement users, auditors, and accounting faculty. Although there have 
been a number of prior studies concerning the effect of various attesta­
tion reports, the focus here is on research specifically addressing SAS 
No. 58. Thus, the work is quite recent and includes both published and 
unpublished studies. The review is organized by broad issues that are 
addressed by SAS No. 58.
Responsibilities of Management and Auditors
As discussed earlier, one of the objectives of SAS No. 58 was to delineate 
more clearly the responsibilities of management and the auditor. Therefore, 
the revised report explicitly recognizes that the financial statements are the 
responsibility of management, whereas the role of the auditor is to express 
an independent opinion on these representations. Since the issuance of 
SAS No. 58, a number of research studies have compared user perceptions 
of the new and old audit reports to examine whether the report changes have 
altered the message conveyed.
1 Choosing the appropriate report in the face of possible uncertainties is, however, 
addressed in this paper.
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Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) provided a group of bankers and investors 
with either the old or the new audit report and asked for their perceptions 
on nine questions regarding areas of concern that prompted the issuance of 
SAS No. 58. The new audit report was found to communicate more clearly 
the responsibilities of management and the purpose of the audit to both user 
groups. However, the slight changes in the new report to emphasize the 
independent auditor’s report and the assertion that the financial statements 
are audited (as compared with “examined” as previously expressed) had no 
significant impact on views regarding the objectivity of auditors or that an 
audit had ocurred. Corroborating evidence is provided by Geiger (1991), 
who conducted a mail survey of banker decisions and perceptions in the 
context of a loan application accompanied by the SAS No. 58 or the old 
audit report.2 The level of confidence expressed in the auditor’s independ­
ence was not significantly different across report formats.
In a national survey of bankers, Miller, Reed, and Strawser (1990, 1991) 
also found that the new audit report increased awareness of management’s 
responsibilities and the role of the audit. Hermanson, Duncan, and 
Carcello (1991) sent a survey to members of the American Association 
of Individual Investors. Eleven questions were presented in which there 
were “correct” answers in terms of the message intended by the auditing 
profession; of interest was the percentage of respondents providing the 
appropriate answer upon receiving either the old or the new audit report. 
Participants receiving the new audit report had a significantly greater 
percentage of correct answers in evaluating the primary responsibilities of 
management and the auditor than those receiving the old report.
Zachry (1991) surveyed the views of auditing practitioners and professors 
as to whether changes in the audit report would improve user understand­
ing. There was general agreement between the two groups. Respondents 
believed users did not understand the old report and perceived that the 
new report would improve overall understandability as well as clarify 
the role of the audit. Beckman and Green (1991) and Beckman, Volk, and 
Davies (1990) report the results of a study of student perceptions (surrogates 
for investors) regarding the new and old audit reports. The findings 
revealed the belief that the new report more clearly defines management 
and auditor responsibilities.
Hatherly, Innes, and Brown (1991) examined the views of MBA students 
in evaluating the current U.K. audit report or an expanded report analogous 
to the SAS No. 58 opinion. (Participants also received a full set of financial 
statements.) The findings revealed that those provided with the expanded 
report perceived the purpose of the audit to be clearer; a higher level of 
auditor independence; and management’s responsibilities more accurately 
than those receiving the usual, short U.K. report. However, the current
2 Other opinion formats were also examined for a change in accounting method.
3
U.K. audit report is not the same as the U.S. pre-SAS No. 58 report; thus, 
the results are not directly comparable with other research studies reported.
In summary, the research to date provides consistent results indicating 
that the new audit report clarifies that the financial statements are represen­
tations by management. The role of the auditor in providing an independent 
opinion is also more clearly communicated. Therefore, the primary objec­
tives of the changes to the first paragraph of the new report appear to have 
been accomplished.
Scope of the Audit Engagement
A major objective of SAS No. 58 was to clarify the nature of the audit 
process and its limitations. Hermanson, Duncan, and Carcello (1991) found 
that investors recognize more accurately the concept of “reasonable 
assurance” with the new audit report, but there were no differences 
concerning the notions of GAAS and less than 100 percent testing. Only 
about half of the respondents realized the need for selective testing in an 
audit. In addition, those receiving the new report were less likely to realize 
that the opinion typically relates to more than one year.
Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) reported that bankers and investors perceived 
that the new report delineates more clearly audit procedures than the prior 
report. Even with the new report, however, users did not feel that audit 
procedures were clearly defined, indicating on average a response of 
“undecided” when asked to evaluate the clarity of procedures employed. 
There were no differences in views concerning the level of auditor and 
management responsibility to detect and correct material errors in the two 
audit reports, which appears to be what was desired by the Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB). The new opinion did not attempt to alter the level 
of auditor responsibilities, but rather to clarify the audit process. Miller, 
Reed, and Strawser (1991) also note that the audit report did not affect the 
perceptions of bankers regarding the scope of the audit.
Hatherly, Innes, and Brown (1991) indicate that MBA students did not 
perceive differences in the extent of audit work performed under the new 
report but did believe there was a greater degree of judgment in selecting 
audit procedures. Audit practitioners and faculty perceived that the 
SAS No. 58 opinion would improve user understanding of the audit process 
through acknowledgment of reasonable assurance and elaboration of the 
scope of the audit (Zachry 1991).
The research findings suggest that the new audit report has clarified 
the nature of the audit without altering the perceived extent of the work. 
The apparent lack of recognition by some users of auditor use of selective 
testing and responsibilities for comparative financial statements, however, 
indicate potential areas where communication of the audit process could 
be improved.
4
Assurance Provided by the Audit Report
SAS No. 58 altered the opinion paragraph by adding the provision that the 
financial statements are fairly presented “in all material r e sp e c ts ." This 
modification attempts to communicate more clearly that an audit opinion is 
subject to a materiality threshold. The new report, as noted earlier, 
intended to improve audit communications regarding assurances provided 
through the opinion without altering the perceived level of auditor liability 
and responsibility.
Hermanson, Duncan, and Carcello (1991) reported that investors 
perceived more accurately that the audited statements are free of material 
error with the new report but were less accurate in recognizing that the 
financial statements are based on generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). In contrast, Geiger (1991) found no differences between banker 
perceptions under the new and old reports regarding the level of confidence 
that GAAP had been followed and that the financial statements were free of 
material unintentional and intentional errors. More important, loan 
decisions were not affected by the report format. Kelly and Mohrweis
(1989) indicate users are marginally more accurate with the new audit 
report in properly concluding that the financial statements are not 100 
percent accurate.
In an experimental study, Anderson, Maletta, and Wright (1992) provided 
a fraud and a bankruptcy case to auditors and judges. The materiality level 
of an alleged misstatement in the financial statements was varied as either 
marginally material or highly material. Attributions by judges of auditor 
responsibility were not different across the two levels of materiality, 
whereas auditors, as expected, assigned greater responsibility in the bank­
ruptcy case when materiality was at a high level. These findings suggest 
that judges may not recognize or accept the importance of materiality in 
assessing auditor negligence for a business failure proceeding. In the fraud 
case both auditors and judges concurred that the usual level of materiality 
(e.g., 5 percent of pretax income) does not apply and a greater level of 
precision is expected of auditors. Thus, the research findings are mixed 
and not very strong regarding whether changes to the opinion paragraph 
had any substantive effect on user perceptions regarding materiality or com­
pliance with GAAP.
Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) examined whether the new audit 
report would alter perceived auditor legal liability in an alleged audit failure 
involving a management fraud. Investors participated in an experiment and 
randomly received either the new or old audit reports. Furthermore, red 
flags suggesting fraud were present or absent in the case used in the experi­
ment. The results indicated that participants receiving the new audit report 
believed the auditor was less liable than those provided with the old report. 
Investors were sensitive to the existence of red flags and attributed greater 
liability to the auditor when such factors were present. However, perceived
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liability was lower for the SAS No. 58 report under both the red flag and the 
no red flag conditions.
Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) also asked participants their views 
on three matters relating to the new audit report: (1) management respon­
sibility for the financial statements, (2) audit sampling, and (3) auditor 
responsibility for fraud. Corroborating the research discussed earlier, they 
found that investors attributed greater responsibility to management for the 
financial statements under the SAS No. 58 report than the previous report. 
However, no differences in views were present between the reports 
concerning the extent of sampling and auditor responsibilities to search for 
fraud. Investors strongly agreed that auditors cannot look at every transac­
tion and are responsible for actively searching for fraud.
Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) found that the investors sampled believed 
there was no change in the level of auditor responsibility under the old and 
new reports. Bankers, however, perceived lower auditor responsibility with 
the new report. Critics had contended that the revised report was an attempt 
by the profession to lessen perceived auditor liabilities, which the ASB 
denied. The findings of Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) and Kelly and 
Mohrweis (1989), however, suggest that the revised report may be viewed 
as a reduction in auditor responsibilities.
In examining this issue, Niles and Young (1991) argue that “responsibil­
ity” and “liability” (legal) are not equivalent and unidimensional, as 
assumed in prior research studies. They developed eight responsibility and 
liability constructs from a review of the auditing literature and then used 
these measures to examine whether perceptions vary with the old audit 
report, the 1980 proposed report, or the SAS No. 58 report.3 MBA students 
with an average of seven years of work experience participated in the experi­
ment, serving as surrogates for investors. The findings indicated that 
respondents did perceive differences between auditor and management 
responsibilities and liabilities, but beliefs did not vary significantly across 
the three audit report formats. Furthermore, reponsibility and liability were 
found to be multidimensional. For example, responsibility may encompass 
factors such as discovery of illegal acts or the design/implementation of the 
control structure. The lack of support in this study for a shift in views 
regarding management responsibility with the new audit report is contrary 
to the other studies cited earlier and may be attributable to the different 
method or user group employed. Niles and Young suggest that a careful 
study is needed of the intended messages to be conveyed by the audit 
report along with research as to the most effective means of communicating 
these messages.
3 In addition, Niles and Young investigated the effect of the presence of a management 
report on user perceptions. They found that such a report fails to alter perceived 
auditor or management responsibilities and liabilities.
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In a survey of New York and American Stock Exchange shareholders, 
Epstein (1992) solicited views on the usefulness and clarity of the auditor’s 
report as well as the desired level of auditor assurance. In 1973, a similar 
survey was conducted by Epstein, providing the opportunity to examine 
changes in perceptions from the prior report to those of the SAS No. 58 
report. A greater percentage of respondents felt that the new auditors’ report 
was “somewhat useful” for investment decisions (30 percent) than the 
previous one (13 percent).
The survey also examined shareholder views regarding the current 
desired level of auditor assurance. Despite explicit recognition in the 
SAS No. 58 report of the concept of reasonable assurance, 47 percent 
indicated the auditor should provide absolute assurance that the financial 
statements are free from material errors (51 percent responded reasonable 
assurance was appropriate). These findings suggest that the notion of 
reasonable assurance is still not widely accepted or understood by share­
holders. A very high level of auditor assurance was expected with regard 
to the detection of material misstatements resulting from fraud, with
71 percent of the participants expecting absolute auditor assurance and 
26 percent reasonable assurance.
Miller, Reed, and Strawser (1991) found that bankers perceived the relia­
bility of the financial statements and the likelihood that fraud would be 
detected by the auditor to be similar with the old and new audit reports. In 
comparing the U.K. audit report with the SAS No. 58 report, Hatherly, 
Innes, and Brown (1991) noted that the expanded report had the ability to 
influence user perceptions in several factors directly addressed by the 
revised report such as management responsibility for the financial state­
ments. However, the report also had “spill over” effects in altering views on 
factors not intended. Specifically, users indicated greater confidence with 
the SAS No. 58 report that the company is free of fraud, the auditor is 
satisfied with the financial statements, and the audit adds credibility. They 
caution that the new report, although reducing differences in views between 
users and the profession in some areas, may actually widen the expectation 
gap in others. Miller, Reed, and Strawser, therefore, suggested that the 
report should specifically mention these other important dimensions.
Bankers and auditors participated in a study by Houghton and Messier
(1990), which compared the interpreted meaning of various audit reports, 
including the previous unqualified report and the one suggested in the ASB 
Exposure Draft for SAS No. 58. The findings indicated that the proposed 
wording for the new report eliminated significant differences in meaning 
present in the earlier report and, thus, resulted in greater ‘’shared meaning” 
of communications. Houghton and Messier, however, noted that although 
fewer differences in meaning occurred, this is not to say that the bankers 
sampled were satisfied with the quality of the audit report message (e.g., 
whether additional information was desired).
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In summary, the research results are conflicting regarding the success of 
the revised audit report in clarifying auditor assurances. Two studies 
suggest that the explicit recognition of materiality has enhanced user 
appreciation of this limitation, whereas two other studies revealed no 
difference. Auditor responsibilities for detecting fraud were not perceived 
as greater in two studies, and increased expectations were found in another 
comparing the U.K. report with the SAS No. 58 report. Research regarding 
perceived auditor legal liabilities under the prior and new reports is very 
limited (two studies), with conflicting findings. Finally, the level of overall 
auditor responsibility as reflected in the opinion was not perceived by inves­
tors to have changed but, by bankers, to be lower.
Implementing the New Auditor's Report
The following discussion considers problems or issues related to imple­
menting SAS No. 58 in several areas:
• Situations involving scope limitations
• Situations involving uncertainties and other matters
• Situations involving GAAP issues
• Other reporting issues
• Expanding the information content of the standard report
National office partners and their staffs from the six largest accounting 
firms provided most of the specific implementation problems and issues.
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion 
in Situations Involving Scope Limitations
Client-Imposed Scope Limitations. Paragraph 424 states that when 
significant scope restrictions are imposed by the client, “ordinarily, the 
auditor should disclaim an opinion.” Should the requirement to disclaim be 
made absolute?
Audit o f Balance Sheet and Review o f Income and Cash Flow State­
ments. (1) May an auditor be engaged to perform an audit of the balance 
sheet but only a review of the statements of operations and cash flows? The 
authoritative literature does not address this situation, which may occur in 
a first-year audit of a previously unaudited entity. (2) If yes, what is the 
appropriate form of reporting? May the auditor present two separate reports 
(or a single, multilevel report) indicating the nature of the engagement?
4 Unless otherwise stated, all paragraph references in this paper are to SAS No. 58.
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(3) Should the response be different if the beginning and ending balance 
sheets have been audited and the intervening statements of operations 
and cash flows have been reviewed, or might readers be confused by such 
an opinion?
Disclaiming on Only Part o f the Financial Statements. A new client 
made a change in accounting principle for which a cumulative effect 
adjustment was appropriate. The lack of detailed accounting records to 
support the beginning balance and the unavailability of the prior auditor’s 
working papers prevented the client from being able to determine whether 
the beginning balance had been calculated correctly. Accordingly, the effect 
of the change on current operations could not be determined. (1) May the 
auditor conclude that this situation represents a scope limitation not 
imposed by the client? (2) Paragraphs 47 and 48 address limited reporting 
engagements (balance sheet only), but do not address the situation in which 
a complete set of financial statements is presented and must be reported on. 
The second example in paragraph 76, however, implicitly suggests that the 
appropriate way to report in that situation is to disclaim on the income 
statement and statement of cash flows. Should the reporting guidance in this 
situation be made more explicit?
GAAP Exceptions Accompanied by Scope Limitations. SAS No. 58 
does not provide examples of the form of opinion to be used when there are 
scope limitations (requiring either a qualified opinion or a disclaimer) and 
GAAP departures (requiring either a qualified or an adverse opinion). 
(This situation seems to afflict thrift institutions particularly.) Should such 
guidance be provided?
Prior-Year Scope Disclaimer/Current-Year Clean Opinion. Paragraph
72 requires that the introductory paragraph begin, “We were engaged to 
audit. . . ” when there is a scope disclaimer. Paragraph 76 provides examples 
of reporting language when there are different reports on comparative 
financial statements presented, but does not provide an example of a report 
when audited current period financial statements are presented with prior 
period financial statements on which a disclaimer of opinion has been 
expressed because of a scope limitation. Should guidance be provided for 
this situation?
Effect o f Prior-Year Scope Limitation Removed by Subsequent Evi­
dential Matter. When comparative financial statements are presented 
and the prior-year statements were qualified because of a scope limitation 
(perhaps from the inability to confirm a specific receivable) evidence 
obtained in the current year (such as the collection of the receivable) could 
permit the auditor to issue a clean opinion on the current-year statement of 
operations and cash flows. SAS No. 58 provides no guidance as to whether
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the prior-year scope qualification could be removed in the current-year 
opinion related to the comparative financial statements. Should such 
guidance be provided?
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion 
in Situations Involving Uncertainties
Distinguishing Explanatory Paragraphs for Uncertainties From 
Emphasis-of-a-Matter Paragraphs. Paragraph 37 provides for a 
voluntary emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph, and provides some examples 
of when it might be appropriate: (1) Some practitioners find the provision 
to be awkward and sometimes confusing, which may result in different 
standards being applied by individual auditors. It may also serve to 
discourage emphasis-of-a-matter paragraphs. Also, the examples in para­
graph 37 consist entirely of factual matters. Some practitioners apparently 
include comments that make the explanatory paragraph begin to look like 
an uncertainty paragraph. Is further guidance needed on when to use an 
emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph and on distinguishing its contents from 
that of an uncertainty paragraph? (2) The awkwardness and confusion 
referred to above may be particularly acute in the case of environmental 
liabilities and development-stage companies. The SEC has also expressed 
concern over the use of emphasis-of-a-matter paragraphs. In addition, the 
absence of guidance on where an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph should 
be placed is an issue. A discussion of this question follows.
Distinguishing Scope Limitations From Uncertainties. The mean­
ing of the phrase “by circumstances” in paragraph 40 creates the need to 
determine whether the absence of evidence is the result of a scope restric­
tion or of an uncertainty. Is the unavailability of evidence a “circumstance”? 
Does it make a difference if evidence does not exist, on the one hand, or if 
it exists but cannot be obtained, on the other hand? Jaenicke and Glazer
(1991) analyzed the guidance provided with respect to reports on investment 
companies and broker dealers as set forth in AICPA Statement of Position 
(SOP) Nos. 89-1 and 89-2 and concluded that if museums were required 
by GAAP to recognize their art collections using fair values, an estimate 
of fair value by museum employees, unsupported by specialists, unrelated 
to the museum, would lead to the addition of an explanatory paragraph 
to the auditor’s report because of an uncertainty. An “editors’ note” inserted 
in the Jaenicke and Glazer article stated: “The editors believe that it would 
be desirable for the auditing standards division of the AICPA to take 
a position on the circumstances in which this analogy is appropriate. For 
example, is the analogy appropriate only when there is no qualified 
third-party appraiser?”
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Language for Uncertainty Disclaimers. Paragraphs 70 to 72 provide 
an example of a disclaimer of opinion resulting from a scope limitation. 
Should a similar example be provided for a disclaimer resulting from an 
uncertainty, as provided for in footnote 11 to paragraph 13?
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion 
in Situations Involving GAAP Issues
Reporting When Pro Forma Financial Information Is Used to Disclose 
a Subsequent Event. AICPA, Professional Standards (vol. 1, AU sec. 
560.05) notes that occasionally a subsequent event may be so significant 
that disclosure can best be made by supplementing the historical financial 
statements with pro forma financial data giving effect to the event as if it had 
occurred on the date of the balance sheet. In some cases, the pro forma 
information is an integral part of the disclosure of the event. Paragraph 46 
of SAS No. 58 notes that if these disclosures are not necessary for fair 
presentation, they may be identified as “unaudited” or “not covered by the 
auditor’s report.” SAS No. 58, however, does not address auditor reporting 
when the pro forma information is both integral to disclosure of the subse­
quent event and presented in columnar form on the face of the historical 
statements: (1) Should such guidance be added to SAS No. 58? (2) Might 
this be an example where an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph describing the 
event and the purpose of the pro forma information would be useful?
Reporting on Parent Company Separate Statements. For regulatory 
or other reasons, the stand-alone financial statements of a parent company 
are sometimes required to be audited separately. Normally, these 
stand-alone financial statements would reflect a parent’s investment in its 
subsidiaries using the equity method of accounting. The separate financial 
statements may or may not be included with or as a part of the consolidated 
(i.e., general purpose) financial statements. In other circumstances, if 
investments in subsidiaries that should be consolidated are accounted for 
under the equity method, the statements would not be in conformity with 
GAAP. AICPA Technical Practice Aids (section 9410.05) indicates that a 
qualified opinion would be required in this situation unless the parent 
company’s financial statements are included with, or as part of, the general 
purpose financial statements: (1) Could an unqualified opinion also be 
expressed on the parent company’s statements if the general purpose 
consolidated financial statements are issued and readily available, although 
they are not presented with the parent company stand-alone statements? 
(2) If so, should the auditor’s report contain an explanatory paragraph 
identifying the special purpose for which the parent company’s financial 
statements are prepared and refer to the coexisting consolidated financial 
statements of the reporting entity?
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Liquidation Basis o f Accounting. Should the authoritative literature 
provide guidance on whether a liquidation basis of accounting is GAAP or 
OCBOA (other comprehensive basis of accounting)?
Reporting When the Financial Statements Are Prepared Using 
Foreign GAAP or International Accounting Standards. In the 
United States, there appears to be a growing demand for financial state­
ments that are prepared in conformity with another country’s GAAP and/or 
International Accounting Standards. Under present GAAS, a U.S. auditor 
may follow SAS No. 51, Reporting on Financial Statements Prepared for 
Use in Other Countries, and use the U.S. standard form of report modified 
as appropriate because of departures from accounting principles generally 
accepted in the United States. Alternatively, it would appear that the non- 
U.S. GAAP could be treated as another comprehensive basis of accounting 
and the U.S. auditor could issue a special report under SAS No. 62, Special 
Reports. Neither choice is attractive to issuers. Should SAS No. 58 be 
amended to permit the issuance of a standard, unmodified report on financial 
statements prepared in conformity with International Accounting Standards 
or the GAAP of a foreign country or group of foreign countries?
Other Reporting Issues
Distinguishing a Financial Statement Audit From an Examination o f 
a Forecast. Accounting estimates are often based on assumptions about 
future events and circumstances, such as future cash flows from real estate 
investments or future taxable income. Sometimes those estimates require an 
auditor to evaluate evidence about the likelihood of income much further in 
the future than would be permitted by the authoritative guidance on report­
ing on prospective financial statements. For example, paragraph 225 of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for 
Income Taxes, permits an enterprise to project the existence of taxable 
income as much as fifteen years in the future as a basis for eliminating the 
need for a deferred income tax valuation allowance, whereas paragraph 45 
of SOP No. 92-2, Questions and Answers on the Term Reasonably Objec­
tive Basis and Other Issues Affecting Prospective Financial Information, 
states that “it ordinarily would be difficult to establish that a reasonably 
objective basis exists for a financial forecast extending beyond three to five 
years. . . . ” Some practitioners believe that the line that separates an audit of 
financial statements from an examination of a forecast is becoming blurred. 
This could become more significant in the future if the auditor is asked to 
report on new forms of information, particularly forward-looking and other 
softer kinds of information such as is being considered by the AICPA’s 
special committee on financial reporting: (1) Should the standard report 
be more explicit than it is now about the “softness” of some of the estimates
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in the financial statements? (2) Would additional disclosures in the notes 
about the softness of accounting estimates be an alternative to explicit 
auditor reporting about the softness of estimates? (3) Should auditor 
reporting on “soft” or forward-looking information embedded in 
accounting estimates be as an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph or as an 
uncertainty modification?
Reissuances. Some practitioners believe that the guidance in SAS No. 58 
is limited with respect to reissuance of reports within the current period 
(e.g., treatment for the addition or resolution of uncertainties and change of 
opinion as a result of a subsequent event). Is additional guidance needed?
Location o f an Emphasis-of-a-Matter Paragraph. There is no 
guidance as to whether a voluntary emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph should 
precede or follow the opinion paragraph. An emphasis-of-a-matter 
paragraph added after the opinion paragraph to disclose the loss of a 
major customer after year end, for example, might lead users to assume 
that the paragraph raised a question about an uncertainty or perhaps even 
about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Is more specific 
guidance needed?
Including Additional Information 
in the Standard Report
Including the Partner's Name in the Signature. Should SAS No. 58 
provide specific guidance on whether, in response to a client’s request, it 
would be appropriate to provide the engagement partner’s name below the 
firm’s name?
Explaining the Work Done to Assess Control Risk in the Scope Para­
graph. The issue of whether the scope paragraph should include an 
explanation of the auditor’s responsibility with respect to the client’s control 
structure was debated at the time SAS No. 58 was issued. It was considered 
again in 1991. On each occasion the ASB’s decision was not to change the 
standard report; nevertheless, the issue remains. (A major justification for 
not including language with respect to the control structure in the scope 
paragraph is that it was preferable not to enumerate any specific auditing 
procedures; otherwise, it would be difficult to know where to draw the line 
in such an enumeration.) Some practitioners have suggested that certain 
other procedures, such as obtaining client and attorney representation 
letters, are so significant that they, too, should be enumerated in the 
auditor’s report.
Reporting on Management's Assertions About Internal Control. If 
management reports on its system of internal control over financial
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reporting, should the standard report be modified to allow the auditor to 
combine, in one report, the report on the financial statements and the report 
on management’s assertions about internal control? That is, would one 
combined report be preferable to two separate reports.
Implications of the Research
The research, in aggregate, does suggest that the revised audit report has 
improved communications between the auditor and the users. The strongest 
effect has been to indicate more clearly the responsibility of management 
for the financial statements and the role of the auditor. The concept of 
reasonable assurance has been conveyed more clearly as well as the broad 
nature of audit procedures. Furthermore, the perceived extent of audit work 
has not been altered. All of these effects of the new audit report were 
intended in SAS No. 58.
However, research findings suggest areas where improvements in com­
munications may be possible or where additional research is warranted. 
The notion of less than 100 percent testing in auditing is still not appreciated 
by users as fully as the fact that the financial statements are based on GAAP. 
Future revisions to the audit report could serve to clarify these areas. In 
addition, users indicated that although the new report delineated more 
clearly the nature of audit procedures, the audit process is nonetheless seen 
as ambiguous. Perhaps this confusion is inevitable given the technical 
aspects of auditing and the inherent limitations present in describing the 
audit process in a brief audit report. Educational materials provided by the 
profession that describe audit procedures in further detail may be useful in 
reducing the level of user ambiguity in this area.
The conflicting research results regarding preceived auditor responsibili­
ties and legal liability under the SAS No. 58 report as compared with the 
earlier report indicate that this is an important area for future study. Thus 
far, the research on this issue is limited and exploratory. It is unclear, for 
instance, whether different opinion formats affect user expectations regard­
ing auditor responsibilities for the detection of fraud or the appropriate 
application of accounting methods. How will the courts interpret concepts 
introduced in the new audit report such as reasonable assurance and 
management representations? Last, there appears to be either a lack of 
understanding or consensus regarding the notion of “reasonable assurance” 
in defining the auditor’s overall responsibility for ensuring that the financial 
statements are free of material error. Further research is needed to examine 
whether misunderstanding or low consensus explain investor views on 
this matter.
Another issue concerns the most effective means to continue to refine and 
adapt the audit report in the future. Previously the auditing profession has
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largely considered modifications to the current report with limited or no 
advance research. Another approach would be to identify the paramount 
intended messages and then consider the most efficient and effective man­
ner of communication based on auditor/user field research and opinions. In 
some instances, user education may be the optimal approach rather than 
revising the audit report, whereas in other cases alteration of the report may 
be preferred. User involvement is essential to ensure that communications 
are accurate and that the audit report is reflective of changing societal 
expectations. Research can play a vital role in examining the efficacy of 
proposed revisions to the audit report or efforts to improve user education. 
In addition, research that identifies expectation gaps between auditors and 
users provides an opportunity to consider revisions in auditing standards 
and reports and/or efforts to educate or lobby user groups.
An additional issue worthy of future research is the impact of the 
SAS No. 58 report on user decisions. Only two of the studies reviewed 
examined whether revisions to the auditor’s report are significant enough to 
alter user decisions; the focus has been predominately on perceptions. 
Although user perceptions are important, ultimately it is vital to determine 
whether changes in the audit report would have any impact on actions 
(what has been referred to by some as having “practical significance”) 
—for example, research investigating bankers granting loans, investors 
purchasing stock, or the courts evaluating auditor culpability.
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Reporting on Consistency
Ira Solomon, KPMG Peat Marwick Distinguished Professor
of Accountancy, University of Illinois
Jay S. Rich, Doctoral Candidate, University of Illinois
In this paper, we describe the history o f financial reporting consistency and 
discuss the attendant audit reporting requirements. An overview is also 
presented o f four streams o f accounting research relevant to financial and 
audit reporting on consistency: (1) investigations o f auditees’ motivations 
for accounting changes, (2) studies o f reactions of capital markets to 
accounting changes, (3) studies that investigate how economic advisors 
(e.g., financial analysts) and decision makers employ accounting change 
information, and (4) studies that investigate auditing issues including how 
auditors make materiality judgments when evaluating the impact of an 
accounting change and among-firm differences in audit consistency report­
ing policies. Subsequently, issues o f policy setting and research attention 
are identified. Noteworthy among these issues are the meaningfulness of 
the distinction between comparability and consistency, the utility of and 
conceptual basis for exception reporting with respect to consistency, how 
auditors evaluate the adequacy o f auditees ’ disclosed justifications for 
accounting changes, and various aspects o f audit materiality judgments 
including among-firm differences and audit judgment policies when there is 
an accounting change with an insignificant current effect, but a potentially 
“substantial effect” in future years.
Statement on Auditing Standard No. 58 (AICPA 1988) mandated numer­
ous changes to the auditor’s standard report. One such change involved 
the so-called consistency exception. Specifically, before SAS No. 58, 
the auditor made an explicit statement in the opinion paragraph of the 
standard report concerning consistent application of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). This statement was required whether the 
auditor concluded that GAAP was consistently applied or inconsistently 
applied. Post-SAS No. 58, however, the auditor is required to report in an
We would like to acknowledge the comments of our colleagues, Ivan Bull, Frederick L. 
Neumann, and Richard E. Ziegler.
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explanatory paragraph, following the opinion paragraph, on an exception 
basis; that is, the auditor makes an explicit statement about consistency only 
when the conclusion is that GAAP was inconsistently applied and the 
current financial statement impact of the change is material. The auditor’s 
statement that consistency has not been maintained (i.e., taking exception 
to consistency) still is not, by itself, to be regarded as an opinion qualifica­
tion. Furthermore, it still is the case that if financial statement disclosure 
of a material accounting change is inadequate, an opinion qualification 
is required.
Using the changes introduced by SAS No. 58 as points of departure, we 
discuss in this paper a variety of issues concerning consistency reporting. 
The next two sections provide background by briefly reviewing, from both 
financial and audit-reporting perspectives, the history of consistency and 
scholarly research related to consistency. The fourth section identifies 
several current issues of potential policy-setting concern as well as issues 
that profitably could be the focus of future research. The fifth section 
completes the paper by providing concluding remarks.
Background
Financial Reporting
As with many accounting issues, the history of consistency can be traced 
to England. The corporate form of business had been restricted by the Bubble 
Act of 1720, which was stimulated by widespread management speculation 
and concomitant investor losses during the early 1700s. With the passage 
of the Companies Act in 1844, however, corporations experienced a 
resurgence. One provision of this later act, which was intended to provide 
investors with some measure of control over management, required that 
stockholders receive an audited balance sheet. Much of the demand for 
consistently applied accounting principles has been attributed by historians 
to extant and prospective owners’ increased desire to monitor manage­
ment’s actions attendant with the rise of the corporate form of business 
(see Chatfield 1974).
In the United States, prior to the crash of 1929, there was little regulation 
of the content and presentation of financial reporting. Therefore, manage­
ment could disguise unfavorable information by changing the underlying 
accounting methods and procedures or, in extreme situations, omitting 
unfavorable information. The potential for harm from these management 
options was recognized, at this time, by many organizations, including the 
American Institute of Accountants, the New York Stock Exchange, the 
Investment Bankers Association of America, and the Federal Reserve Board 
(see Chatfield 1974) and, with respect to accounting changes, was thought 
to be greatest when time-series data were analyzed (Hendricksen 1982).
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Accountants, however, were split with respect to how to address this 
problem. Behind this split was a controversy concerning what type of con­
sistency was necessary. To illustrate, three different types of “consistency” 
are distinguishable from the writings of the time: (1) usage of the same 
accounting procedures and methods for related items by a given firm, 
(2) usage of the same accounting procedures and methods from period to 
period by a given firm, and (3) usage of the same accounting procedures 
and methods by all firms (Hendricksen 1982). Some accountants felt 
that “type 3” consistency (e.g., all inventories must be accounted for on 
a first-in, first-out (FIFO) basis; all depreciation must be calculated on a 
straight-line basis) was needed. Obviously, adoption of this position 
renders many related issues moot, since any inconsistencies also would 
imply “inappropriate” accounting.
Other accountants felt that given the variety of circumstances surround­
ing different companies, the diversity of current practice and the variety of 
uses of financial information, the auditee should be given some latitude to 
select appropriate methods or procedures from those deemed acceptable as 
long as the methods or procedures selected were disclosed. In 1932, the 
American Institute of Accountants’ Special Committee on Cooperation 
with Stock Exchanges brought closure to this debate by recommending 
the latter position (Chatfield 1974). Thereafter, “types 1 and 2” became the 
foci of financial-reporting consistency, whereas type 3 became known as 
“uniformity,” and was excluded from the consistency umbrella. Although the 
consistency concept was refined as a consequence of this recommendation, 
at this time, neither interperiod consistency nor disclosure of accounting 
procedures or methods was made a financial-reporting requirement.1
Policy-setting bodies did not devote significant attention to financial- 
reporting consistency again until the 1970s. Specifically, in 1971, the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) released Opinion No. 20 (FASB 1985) 
that prescribes GAAP for accounting changes. This pronouncement first 
defined different types of accounting changes (e.g., estimates, reporting 
entity, principle) and then focused on changes in accounting principle. 
Such accounting principle changes were limited to substitutions of 
one generally accepted procedure or method (which is preferred) for 
another generally accepted procedure or method. Since the early 1970s, 
therefore, if material changes were not accounted for and disclosed as 
prescribed, the resulting financial statements would not conform to GAAP. 
Furthermore, APB Opinion No. 22 set forth requirements for disclosure of 
significant accounting policies in financial statement notes (FASB 1985). 
Approximately forty years passed, therefore, between refinement of the
1 Curiously, George O. May was the chair of both the committee that recommended 
types 1 and 2 be the foci of financial-reporting consistency and the American Institute 
of Accountants’ Committee on Accounting Procedures, which failed to adopt such 
consistency as a requirement for financial reporting (see Chatfield 1974).
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consistency concept and adoption of companion requirements for financial- 
reporting disclosure.2
The Auditor's Report
Despite some early examples of acceptable reports provided by the 
Federal Reserve Board in 1917 and 1929, the U.S. auditor’s report was 
unstandardized until 1933. The first standardized report incorporated the 
phrase “.. .in accordance with accepted principles of accounting con­
sistently maintained by the company during the year under review” (see 
Chatfield 1974).3 Further, as with financial-reporting requirements, the 
American Institute of Accountants (1934) excluded “uniformity” from the 
audit concept of consistency by stating:
Without the doctrine of consistency and with alternative accounting 
procedures available, a company—like a juggler—may increase 
periodic income in lean years and decrease it in fat years by select­
ing from the alternative methods available the method which 
produces the periodic income management wants. It is to prevent 
company manipulation smoothing of periodic income that the 
doctrine of consistency is directed.
Although significant changes were made to the standard auditor’s report 
in 1939, 1941, and 1948, the requirement to report on consistency effectively 
was invariant during the approximately fifty-year period leading up to 
SAS No. 58.4 The pre-SAS No. 58 second reporting standard of generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) describes this requirement: The report 
shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in the 
current period in relation to the preceding period (AICPA 1987).
With SAS No. 58, the second reporting standard of GAAS was modified 
to reflect the exception-reporting responsibility described in the opening 
paragraph of this paper: The report shall identify those circumstances in
2 In addition, note that consistency has received attention from the Financial Account­
ing Standards Board in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Qualitative 
Characteristics o f Accounting Information, FASB 1980).
3 We were unable to find an explicit rationale for including consistency in the standard 
auditor’s report. However, the financial-reporting environment of the time and 
specifically, the aforementioned absence of a requirement for consistency, may 
provide the best explanation.
4 It should be noted that, as discussed further below, the Auditing Standards Board did 
attempt to change the treatment of consistency in the auditor’s report in 1980 but 
ultimately withdrew the proposal. The proposal, at that time, was based on logic 
similar to that behind SAS No. 58 and called for complete elimination of consistency 
exceptions in the auditor’s report (see AICPA 1981; Geiger 1989).
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which such principles have not been consistently observed in the current 
period in relation to the preceding period (AICPA 1991). Again, such a 
statement, by itself, is not considered to be a qualified opinion and to make 
this position more salient, the consistency exception now is made in an 
explanatory paragraph rather than commingled with the opinion. However, 
if the auditor is not satisfied with the appropriateness of the method or 
procedure to which the auditee changed, with management’s disclosed 
justification for making the change, or any other aspect of compliance 
with APB No. 20 (FASB 1985), a qualified or an adverse opinion should 
be issued.
The motivations for this audit report change (and concomitant change to 
GAAS) seem to have been twofold. First, as suggested by the Commission 
on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1978), any reference to consistency in the 
auditor’s report effectively may be viewed as the origination, rather than 
evaluation, of a financial statement assertion. Such assertion origination is 
inconsistent with the role of the auditor as an attester to financial statement 
assertions. Second, the audit report reference would seem to be redundant 
in light of the GAAP requirement to disclose accounting changes and their 
impact (Landsittel 1987).
Nonetheless, as with the failed attempt to change the auditor’s report in 
1980 (see footnote 3) the SEC favored maintenance of the status quo, 
apparently for two reasons.5 First, the SEC feared that removing the 
reference to consistency from the standard auditor’s report might result in 
a diminution of audit attention to consistency issues. Second, the SEC felt 
that the consistency exception served as a “red flag” for financial statement 
users. Eventually, however, the SEC agreed to remove the consistency 
reference from the standard auditor’s report, but insisted on the exception 
reporting contained in SAS No. 58. Interestingly, this change could be 
instituted without modification of Regulation S-X.
Accounting Research
Four streams of accounting research seem relevant to the issue of 
consistency and are discussed in this section. The largest of these literature 
streams contains investigations of auditees’ motivations for accounting 
changes. The most prevalent finding has been that changes are made to 
increase net income (e.g., Neumann 1968; Cushing 1969; Frishkoff 1970; 
Shank and Copeland 1973; Bremser 1975; Schwartz 1982; Johnson and 
Dhaliwal 1988; Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1989) or as a response to
5 These explanations were obtained by personal communication in January 1992 with 
Dr. Robert W. Rouse, an SEC Research fellow.
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poor performance trends (e.g., Bremser 1975; Lilien, Mellman, and 
Pastena 1988). Other studies, however, suggest that accounting changes are 
motivated by a variety of factors including an intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., 
Sorter, Becker, Archibald, and Beaver 1964) and a desire for tax savings 
(e.g., Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch and Pincus 1988).
Similarly, studies motivated from a positive accounting theory perspec­
tive have reported that accounting changes are introduced to increase 
management compensation (e.g., Eggleton, Penman, and Twombly 1976; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Abdel-khalik 1985; Harrison and Grudnitski 
1987; Healy, Kong and Palepu 1987; Abdel-khalik, Chi and Ghicas 1987), 
to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 
Dhaliwal 1980; Holthausen 1981; Daley and Vigeland 1983; Hunt 1985; 
Harrison and Grudnitski 1987; Johnson and Dhaliwal 1988; Johnson and 
Ramanan 1988) and to mitigate political or regulatory costs (e.g., Gosman 
1973; Cushing and Deakin 1974; Bremser 1975; Eggleton, Penman and 
Twombly 1976; Warren 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Morse and 
Richardson 1983; Ricks 1986).
A second stream of research has investigated the reaction of capital 
markets to accounting changes. This study assumed a model for market 
efficiency (Fama 1970) with the capital asset pricing model as a framework 
(Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965) to investigate the effect of accounting changes 
on firms’ market returns. Initial studies tested the information content of 
accounting change disclosures themselves and concluded that little infor­
mation was conveyed therein (Comiskey 1971; Kaplan and Roll 1972; 
Archibald 1972; Ball 1972; Baskin 1972).6 Research interest subsequently 
shifted to changes involving last-in, first-out (LIFO) since these changes 
affected cash flows. For example, Sunder (1973) concluded that firms that 
switched from FIFO to LIFO experienced positive cumulative abnormal 
returns in the switch years. However, this intuitively appealing result has 
not been replicated consistently, as some subsequent studies have reported 
no or even negative abnormal returns for firms that switched to LIFO 
(e.g., Abdel-khalik and McKeown 1978; Brown 1980; Ricks 1982, 1986) 
whereas others (e.g., Biddle and Lindahl 1982; Stevenson 1987) supported 
the initial finding of positive abnormal returns.
One study has investigated the informativeness of audit report con­
sistency exceptions rather than the effect of accounting changes on firms’ 
market returns. Specifically, Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1989) 
examined the ability of consistency exceptions to signal firm failure. For 
two of the three models tested, they reported that consistency exceptions 
were correlated with future firm failure. Although these authors did not 
offer a theory that would explain their results, it may be that such results are
6 However, this conclusion is based on failure to reject the null hypothesis.
22
simply further evidence that changing firms generally are less successful 
than nonchangers (see Lilien, Mellman, and Pastena 1988).
A third stream of accounting change research more directly adopted the 
perspective of financial statement users. In an early study, McCosh (1967) 
described a computer simulation investigating the value of consistency for 
time-series comparability. Using a dynamic, multiperiod model that 
employed both economic and cash flow data (e.g., units of raw material 
purchased, average price of raw material, number of labor hours, average 
sales price) and accounting policy data (e.g., inventory pricing, inventory 
costing, depreciation, management bonuses) McCosh (1967) studied 
eamings-per-share (EPS) numbers produced from the same set of 
economic data for two different sets of accounting policy data. Using 
perfect comparability (i.e., the same accounting policy data for both sets) 
as the baseline, six different levels of consistency were simulated to 
determine how much of the variance in the EPS numbers of one set could 
be explained by the EPS numbers for the other set. The results indicated 
that consistent application, no matter how diverse the accounting methods 
may be, resulted in EPS numbers that explained the vast majority of the 
variance in the other set’s EPS numbers (97.12 percent in this simulation). 
Furthermore, the ability to explain the variance of the EPS figures of 
another set rapidly declined as the accounting policy data were applied 
more and more inconsistently. Consistent application of accounting 
methods, therefore, would appear to capture a great deal of the effect of 
environmental factors on the firm.
More recently, a number of studies have reported that financial analysts 
experience relatively greater difficulty in forming forecasts in the presence 
of accounting changes than they do when changes are not present 
(e.g., Ricks and Hughes 1985; Hughes and Ricks 1986; Biddle and Ricks 
1988; Elliott and Philbrick 1990). Ricks and Hughes, for example, inves­
tigated situations in which firms changed from the cost to the equity method 
of accounting for long-term investments and found that analysts’ forecasts 
displayed systematic errors. Furthermore, these errors were positively 
correlated with the current-year earnings effect of the change. Hughes and 
Ricks and Biddle and Ricks reported similar results for firms adopting 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 34 (FASB 1979) and firms 
changing to LIFO, respectively. Similarly, in a study covering a wide 
variety of accounting changes and employing a research design in which a 
given firm, in a nonchange period, acted as its own control, Elliott and 
Philbrick noted that, in change periods, the absolute forecast error and 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts were significantly greater than in non­
change periods. Furthermore, the within-year dispersion was correlated 
with the absolute value of the income effect of the accounting change.
Researchers have also addressed the possibility that users of accounting 
information become functionally fixated and thus, do not properly adjust 
their decision processes when accounting changes are made. Both changes
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in inventory flow (Dyckman 1964a, b; Bruns 1965; Dopuch and Ronen 
1973) and costing assumptions (Ijiri, Jaedicke, and Knight 1966; Ashton 
1976; Swieringa, Dyckman, and Hoskin 1979; Dyckman, Hoskin, and 
Swieringa 1982; Barnes and Webb 1986) have been investigated primarily 
with inexperienced, student subjects.7 Each study can be interpreted as 
suggesting that decision makers exhibit some degree of functional fixation. 
These studies typically require the use of one decision process over a 
number of trials and then observe the extent of failure to alter the process 
when data are presented that are based on different accounting methods or 
procedures (e.g., cost of goods sold calculated under full instead of direct 
costing of inventories). In practice, however, financial statement users 
would appear to possess at least two advantages over these experimental 
subjects that may enhance one’s ability to avoid functional fixation. First, in 
practice, users should be more cognizant of the impact of inconsistent data 
on decision inputs. Second, accounting changes, in practice, are high­
lighted by disclosures that, typically, have been rather limited in these 
studies. The study by Swieringa, Dyckman, and Hoskin is the only one that 
investigated the effect that disclosures of method changes may have on the 
decision processes of information users. Unfortunately, design weaknesses 
made the results of the study difficult to interpret. Consequently, additional 
research is needed with respect to the ability of method change disclosures 
to mitigate such functional fixation.
A final stream of change research focused on auditing issues. A number 
of studies, for example, addressed the materiality thresholds associated 
with consistency exceptions. Results indicate a lack of consensus among 
auditing firms (Neumann 1969) with some firms apparently using material­
ity thresholds as high as 25 percent of net income, whereas others used very 
small materiality thresholds (Frishkoff 1970).8 In a more recent study, 
Morris and Nichols (1988) reported evidence that consistency exception 
materiality decision models vary considerably among CPA firms and that 
such decisions are of significantly differential predictability. On a more 
positive note, another recent study by Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989) 
noted that few audit reports were issued without a consistency exception 
when accounting changes affected net income by more than 4 percent. 
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler also noted that discretionary changes (those 
made absent of a regulatory stimulus) were more likely to result in 
consistency exceptions than were nondiscretionary changes.
7 The study by Barnes and Webb (1986) is a notable exception, using actual business 
managers as subjects.
8 These results should be interpreted with caution because they may be a function 
of low net incomes. This possibility is supported by studies (e.g., Lilien, Mellman, 
and Pastena 1988) indicating that change firms tend to be less successful than 
nonchange firms.
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Other studies attempted to investigate if audit firms have differential 
propensities to include consistency exceptions in their reports. Both 
Gosman (1973) and Cushing and Deakin (1974) concluded that Coopers & 
Lybrand issued significantly fewer consistency exceptions than several 
other auditing firms.9 Interestingly, although both of these studies suggested 
that CPA-firm client portfolio differences may account for this finding, no 
evidence was reported to support that attribution. In a follow-up study, 
Warren (1977) failed to identify any significant auditor differences using a 
similar analysis. Consequently, at present there is not closure with respect 
to CPA-firm propensities to issue consistency exception reports.
Current Issues
The preceding discussion of the evolution of financial and audit reporting 
requirements and accounting and auditing research related to consistency 
suggests numerous issues of contemporary import. In this section, a sample 
of these issues is described from the policy-setting and research perspectives.
Perhaps the most striking issue relates to the objective of the standard 
itself and the distinction drawn in APB Opinion No. 20 (FASB 1985) 
between comparability and consistency. APB Opinion No. 20 distinguishes 
between comparability and consistency by stating that all accounting 
changes that affect consistency also affect comparability, but some account­
ing changes affect comparability but not consistency. For example, some 
accounting changes were described as a normal part of the accounting 
process (e.g., changes in estimates of useful lives of depreciable assets) and 
thus, were deemed to be outside of the domain of financial-reporting 
consistency. If, however, the primary objective of accounting consistency is 
to facilitate users’ abilities to make within-firm intertemporal comparisons, 
the comparability-consistency distinction may be meaningless. To the 
extent that changes affecting comparability but not consistency are treated 
differently, the potential for harm exists. For example, if higher materiality 
thresholds were used for changes that affect comparability relative to 
changes that affect consistency, holding the income effect of the change 
constant, some of the former type may not be disclosed, whereas disclosure 
would be made if the change were of the latter type. Attempting to legislate 
that some accounting changes effectively “do not matter” or matter less 
because, for example, they are a normal part of the accounting process, 
seems to miss the point. If information produced by accounting methods 
or procedures that have materially changed is employed, irrespective
9 Note that the studies by Gosman (1973) and Cushing and Deakin (1974) were based 
on the same data set.
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of the motivation for and nature of such changes, users need to be able to 
identify their effect or users’ intertemporal decision making could be 
adversely affected.
Interestingly, two surveys (Bird 1969; Carpenter and Strawser 1972) have 
suggested that one class of users (financial analysts) would like the scope of 
the consistency standard to be extended. These survey results suggest that 
there is a demand for retroactive restatements of the financial statements for 
all material changes (i.e., change in principle, change in estimate, change 
in entity, and correction of error) rather than just those changes that APB 
Opinion No. 20 identifies as affecting consistency. Admittedly, however, 
these survey results are twenty years old and it would seem appropriate for 
them to be updated. There is also some potential for harm associated with 
the comparability-consistency distinction to the extent that financial state­
ment users do not fully understand it. It is our view that some of the wording 
within the applicable professional standards may contribute to a lack of such 
understanding. For example, SAS section 420 (AICPA 1991) uses the term 
“comparability” when referring both to the objectives of the consistency 
standard and to audit reporting with respect to consistency. Subsequently, in 
the same pronouncement, however, changes that impact comparability, 
only, are defined to be outside of the scope of audit consistency.
Research may have a further role to play in better defining the needs of 
users of financial statements with respect to consistency. To elaborate, in the 
early 1970s, it was not uncommon to hear calls to develop better descrip­
tions of financial statement users’ decision models (AICPA 1973). At that 
time, however, behavioral research tools to elucidate judgment and decision 
models were considerably more primitive than they are today. Consequently, 
one potentially fruitful avenue for future research is to investigate by con­
temporary behavioral methods (e.g., by analysis of verbal data [Ericsson 
and Simon 1985] or in-depth task analysis techniques [Peters 1990]) the 
models of financial statements users so that their consistency needs can be 
determined scientifically rather than by a political process.
Another striking issue concerns the current exception-reporting require­
ment (under SAS No. 58). Specifically, assuming that the aforementioned 
logic (i.e., post-APB Opinion No. 20, GAAP requires consistency or 
adequate disclosure of the effect of material changes) was the reason for 
eliminating the audit-reporting requirement when consistency has been 
maintained, the reporting requirement also should have been eliminated 
when consistency has not been maintained. This symmetry argument rests 
on the observation that, assuming adequate disclosure of the change, the 
auditee has followed GAAP in both situations. In addition, when there is 
inadequate disclosure of accounting changes, the consistency exception 
would seem to contain little new information since inadequate disclosure is 
a violation of GAAP, which is recognized by issuance of a qualified or 
adverse auditor’s opinion. Even under SAS No. 58, therefore, the auditor is
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required to make what is a seemingly redundant disclosure. Further, the 
auditor’s role as assertion attester still is somewhat intertwined with the 
auditee’s role as asserter. SAS No. 58, therefore, did not fully address 
the convoluted audit-reporting requirements related to consistency that 
have been documented and so characterized for at least fifteen years (see 
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 1978).
As noted earlier, the cause of the asymmetric treatment is apparently 
the SEC’s contention that the explanatory paragraph acts as a red flag 
to financial statement users. Thus, for example, the exception taken as to 
consistency in the auditor’s report is not a redundant disclosure, but instead 
a signal by the auditor that, although he or she is not issuing a qualified or 
adverse opinion, the user should proceed with caution. At first it may seem 
that the auditor has little discretion with respect to including a consistency 
exception in his or her report when an accounting change affecting 
consistency has been made. However, because only material accounting 
changes require such inclusion and materiality remains largely a judgmen­
tal matter, considerable discretion is possible (see the related comments 
below). This interpretation would be analogous to the one of Banks and 
Kinney (1982) with respect to their findings on issuance of qualified opinion 
audit reports in the presence of loss contingency footnote disclosures. It is 
also consistent with the findings of Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 
(1989) for pre-SAS No. 58 consistency exceptions. Accordingly, research 
extending Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler to post-SAS No. 58 con­
sistency exception reporting would seem to be of value.
Another possibility is that, irrespective of the redundancy issue, at least 
some auditors value the ability to draw attention to material accounting 
changes in audit reports. One potential source of such value is that it may 
be perceived as a means of increasing the auditor’s leverage with the auditee 
(i.e., to induce the auditee not to make accounting changes) whereas 
another source may be that it enhances the auditor’s ability to protect 
himself or herself in the legal arena (i.e., it may make the auditor’s judg­
ments more defensible). The SEC’s posture with respect to the SAS No. 58 
exposure draft seems to provide some evidence that regulators share the 
view that attention-directing paragraphs have utility (see Holstrum 1988; 
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1990). This view coupled with the research 
finding that change firms are more troubled than nonchange firms also 
may explain why some auditors have issued pre-SAS No. 58 consistency 
exception reports even when the impact of the change was less than 4 
percent of net income or even zero (Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1990).
Given the many possibilities, it would seem that researchers would be 
interested in explaining the demand for this seemingly redundant dis­
closure. Interestingly, many of the comment letters provided in response to 
the two recent attempts (in the early 1980s and in the later 1980s in connec­
tion with the SAS No. 58 exposure draft) to eliminate consistency from the
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audit report, were negative (see Geiger 1989).10 In particular, three of the 
seven then Big-Eight CPA firms who responded to the SAS No. 58 exposure 
draft indicated disagreement with the proposals and twenty-five of the 
sixty-one total respondents who commented on the consistency issue 
expressed disagreement, even though some persons regarded the changes as 
“editorial” in nature (Elliott and Jacobson 1987). Unfortunately, the stated 
reasons for the disagreement are varied and not informative with respect to 
the genesis of the demand for audit report consistency exceptions.
Another interesting issue involves the judgment that an auditor must 
make under APB Opinion No. 20 concerning the auditee’s justification of 
an accounting change. Although controversy has surrounded this issue for 
at least fifteen years (see Revsine 1977), we are unaware of any research 
describing how auditors evaluate the auditee’s stated accounting change 
justification. Although many accounting changes apparently are made 
because of changes in regulatory requirements (e.g., a new FASB 
pronouncement) and thus, are “preferred” by definition, other changes are 
discretionary and, as noted earlier, are associated with a variety of circum­
stances. Research would seem to have a significant role to play in elucidat­
ing the factors that auditors consider when evaluating an auditee’s stated 
motivations for making discretionary accounting changes. For example, is 
there reasonable justification if an auditee makes an accounting change 
(e.g., from FIFO to LIFO) to minimize taxes or, alternatively, must an audi­
tee be able to justify the change primarily on conceptual grounds even 
though there would be a positive income effect?
A final set of issues concern the application of materiality within the 
context of consistency. First, there is something of an inarticulation within 
extant professional standards in that SAS No. 58 seems to preclude issuance 
of a consistency exception explanatory paragraph when the effect of an 
accounting change is judged to be immaterial in the current period. AU sec­
tion 420 (AICPA 1972, paragraph 19), however, seems to suggest that such 
an exception is permissible when the accounting change is reasonably 
certain to have a substantial effect in a later year. It would seem that clarify­
ing what is and is not required or permissible in this respect would be of 
considerable import. Also, little is known about how auditors make these 
“substantial effect” judgments.
Second, studies have suggested that when evaluating accounting changes, 
there is considerable diversity in terms of the materiality thresholds 
employed both within and among CPA firms. In addition, there seems to be 
substantial variability in terms of the decision models used among CPA 
firms and in the extent to which consistency exception decisions are predict­
able. Perhaps such variability is not unique to accounting changes but is a
10 A news item in the Journal o f Accountancy (AICPA, April 1981) suggested that 
the proposed changes were withdrawn in the early 1980s because of cost-benefit 
considerations.
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reflection of the general subjectivity of reporting materiality judgments. 
Alternatively, it may be that the “problem” is more pronounced for 
accounting changes. Researchers would seem to have a role to play here in 
bringing evidence to bear on this issue. Indeed, perhaps this should be a 
high priority since, in many respects, materiality may be the Achilles’ heel 
of the financial and audit-reporting requirements on accounting changes.
Concluding Comments
In this paper we have described the evolution of the accounting 
consistency standard from the perspectives of financial and audit reporting. 
We also have provided an overview of extant research of relevance. On the 
basis of these discussions, we subsequently derived issues of potential 
contemporary interest to policy-setting entities such as the Auditing 
Standards Board and to researchers. Major themes of our discussion are 
that the distinction between comparability and consistency as well as the 
auditor’s exception-reporting requirements under SAS No. 58 should be 
reconsidered. The former recommendation follows from recognition that 
financial statement users may well benefit from comparability rather than 
mere consistency. That is, intertemporal decisions may be hindered by the 
lack of information about accounting changes that affect comparability but 
not consistency.
The latter recommendation arises from the asymmetry in treatment for 
situations in which: (1) no material accounting change has been made, and 
(2) a material accounting change has been made but is fully disclosed. In 
both situations GAAP has been followed, but in the second situation the 
auditor would be required to include a consistency exception in his or her 
report. This requirement also continues to cloud the distinction between the 
auditor and the auditee as some may feel that it effectively puts the auditor 
in the role of an asserter. The potential contribution that research could 
make to each of these issues also has been discussed. For example, the 
needs of financial statement users with respect to consistency could be 
elucidated by using contemporary behavioral research methods. Such a 
systematic and scientific approach would seem to be better suited to that end 
than a political approach. Last, research also could help to explain the 
demand for seemingly redundant disclosures and provide insights into 
how and how well auditors make accounting change materiality (and 
“substantial-effect”) judgments.
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Reporting on Uncertainties, 
Including Going Concern
D. R. Carmichael, Department o f Accountancy,
School of Business and Public Administration,
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Kurt Pany, School o f Accountancy, College of Business,
Arizona State University
Appropriate auditor responsibility for evaluating and reporting on uncer­
tainties, including the “going-concem status ” o f a client, has long been 
debated. Most recently, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) Nos. 58 and 
59 were issued and deal with this area. In this paper we discuss the histori­
cal development o f auditor responsibility for reporting on uncertainties, 
summarize relevant research, discuss implementation issues, and suggest 
future research.
In summary, our historical review reveals an increasing extent o f formali­
zation o f standards on uncertainties in the United States, especially those 
relating to a client’s going-concern status. Consistent with the auditing 
profession’s attention to the topic, several studies seem to indicate that 
investors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. Yet, 
especially in the area o f going-concern uncertainties, many companies 
continue to receive a report not modified for going-concern status the year 
prior to filing for bankruptcy. In addition, terminology used in the stan­
dards (e.g., “going concern” and “substantial doubt”) currently may be 
interpreted in varying manners by CPAs. Also, a number o f difficulties 
involved in implementing the new standards are presented.
In this paper we discuss and analyze research related to SAS No. 58 and 
No. 59 on uncertainties, including doubt about going-concern status. First, 
we discuss the background of auditor responsibility in this area. Second, we 
summarize relevant research related to uncertainties; our goal is to describe 
the general nature of research approaches and the findings, rather than to
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments provided by Jim McKeown 
and Jane Mutchler.
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provide a comprehensive literature review.1 In the third section, we discuss 
implementation issues based on discussions with practitioners and obser­
vation of practice. Fourth, we discuss limitations and implications related 
to the information presented. Finally, we suggest future research issues 
and conclude.
Historical Background
The auditor’s role and responsibilities in evaluating and reporting on 
uncertainties, including the “going-concern status” of a client, have been 
debated for some time. The evaluation issue relates to whether auditors are 
better equipped than users of financial statements to identify circumstances 
likely to impair a client’s ability to continue as a going concern or to identify 
when an unfavorable outcome to other uncertainties is likely. The primary 
reporting issue concerns whether, and, if so, under what circumstances an 
auditor who is aware of an uncertainty should modify the audit report when 
that uncertainty has been properly presented and disclosed in the financial 
statements. Any audit report modification would then serve only the role of 
providing a “red flag” concerning the company’s potential future problems.
Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 15 represents the AICPA’s 
first effort to consider formally the effects of uncertainties, including going- 
concern uncertainties, on the audit report. SAP No. 15 suggested that the 
cumulative effect of uncertainties may be so great as to create a situation in 
which an auditor’s report might require an exception, or in which it might 
not be possible to render an opinion. Subsequently, the SEC’s Accounting 
Series Release No. 90 and SAP No. 33 required that the phrase “subject to” 
be used to introduce a qualification of opinion when the financial statements 
were materially affected by uncertainties. In 1974, the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee, the predecessor of the Auditing Standards Board, in 
SAS No. 2, concluded that an uncertainty concerning ability to continue 
should be reported on in the same manner as any other uncertainty.
In 1978, the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (Cohen Commis­
sion) recommended elimination of report modifications for uncertainties, 
including going-concern uncertainties. The Commission concluded that a 
responsibility to evaluate whether an uncertainty should lead to a qualified 
opinion was not compatible with the auditor’s basic role. The auditor 
should evaluate whether uncertainties are properly presented and disclosed 
in conformity with GAAP and not attempt to reduce uncertainty by predict­
ing the outcome.
1 Asare (1990) and Boritz (1991) provide very detailed summaries of the available 
research on going-concern uncertainties.
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In March 1981, SAS No. 34 was issued. SAS No. 34 accepted the premise 
that audit reports should be modified for going-concern uncertainties and 
provided operational guidance to auditors on assessing a client’s likely 
continued existence. Thus, rather than eliminate the “subject to” qualifica­
tion, the Auditing Standards Board’s solution was an attempt to improve 
practice by providing additional guidance. SAS No. 34 stated that although 
an auditor does not search for evidential matter relating to an entity’s 
continued existence, when an auditor becomes aware of information that is 
contrary to continued existence, modification of the audit report might 
become necessary. It also established procedures to be followed when such 
questions arose.
One year later, in March 1982, the Auditing Standards Board, issued a 
proposed SAS that, if adopted, would have eliminated the subject to qual­
ification. The argument for elimination was based largely on the belief, 
previously articulated by the Cohen Commission, that an audit report 
should not be modified when the financial statements adequately present 
and disclose an uncertainty in conformity with GAAP. In June of that year, 
before making the change, the Auditing Standards Board held a public 
meeting to obtain the views of financial statement users. Users attending the 
meeting argued that the “subject to” opinion qualification was valuable, 
and that its elimination would be viewed as an attempt by auditors to avoid 
responsibility to investors. In June 1982, based largely on the views 
expressed at the public meeting, the Board delayed the release of the 
proposed SAS indefinitely. Subsequently, in 1986, the Auditing Standards 
Board dropped its efforts to eliminate such reports, despite a consensus that, 
contrary to audit reporting requirements, “a ‘subject to’ opinion is not 
appropriate if a contingency has been disclosed appropriately under FASB 
Statement No. 5” (AICPA Auditing Standards Board 1986). The Board also 
concluded that a project to reconsider the auditor’s reporting responsibility 
when a going-concern question arises might be added to the agenda.
Despite the Auditing Standards Board’s contention that properly dis­
closed uncertainties should not result in modification of the audit report, 
others have considered this to be an important function performed by 
auditors. Going-concern qualifications have received the most attention as 
necessary early warnings of impending trouble. Indeed, some have defined 
an audit failure as a situation in which an independent auditor issues an 
unqualified opinion and shortly thereafter the entity goes bankrupt or has 
major financial problems (Berton 1985). Representative John Dingell, 
chairman of the House Commerce Committee, stated succinctly, “the level 
of busted audits has been too high and too spectacular” (Berton and Ingersoll 
1985). In his remarks to Congress, Congressman Wyden (1986) stated:
In one financial disaster after another, including E. F. Hutton, 
United American Bank, Penn Square Bank, E.S.M. Government 
Securities, Home State Savings Bank of Ohio, American Savings 
and Loan of Florida, Drysdale Government Securities, Saxon
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Industries and others, the disaster struck virtually on the heels 
of clean audit certificates issued by audit firms indicating that 
the companies were financially sound. The result? Hundreds of 
thousands of investors and creditors were out hundreds of millions 
of dollars.
Although informed observers might fault the factual accuracy of this 
analysis, the popular press generally does not question assertions that 
auditors are not providing the public with adequate advance warning about 
the deteriorating finances of companies. Thus, in the mid-1980s, auditors 
faced a “political situation” in which at least two key representatives 
believed that not only were going-concern report modifications necessary, 
but that auditor performance in issuing them needed to be improved. Also, 
in 1985, one international CPA firm advocated increasing audit require­
ments to include consideration of a company’s financial condition as well as 
financial position. The distinction between position and condition was 
intended to address specifically public concerns of business failures 
occurring shortly after a company had received a report without a going- 
concern modification (Price Waterhouse 1985).
The net effect of the Auditing Standards Board’s deliberations appear in 
SAS No. 58 (all uncertainties) and No. 59 (going-concern uncertainties). 
In both cases, the “subject to” qualified opinion is replaced with an explana­
tory paragraph following the opinion paragraph. The guidance about the 
need to add a fourth (explanatory) paragraph on uncertainties directly 
tracks SFAS No. 5. When a material loss is probable, but no reasonable 
estimate of the amount is possible, an explanatory paragraph is required. 
When a material loss is reasonably possible, the auditor is to consider 
whether to add an explanatory paragraph based on the magnitude of the 
amount involved and the likelihood of occurrence.
SAS No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate whether there is substantial 
doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasona­
ble period, generally not to exceed one year beyond the date of the financial 
statements being audited. The recoverability of asset amounts and the 
amount and classification of liabilities is no longer the deciding factor in 
whether to modify the report. Substantial doubt about a client’s going- 
concern status is the critical factor.
Research
Importance of Modification
Stock Market "Information" Tests. Various studies, all dealing with 
pre-SAS No. 58 and No. 59 data, have analyzed whether an “abnormal” 
stock return reaction occurs when a “subject to” qualified opinion is issued.
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The overall approach, adapted from finance research, is one of using prior 
stock market returns to develop an “expected” return. That expected return 
is compared to the actual returns around the time of the issuance of a report 
modified for an uncertainty. If the reaction varies significantly from that 
expected, it is referred to as abnormal and the report is considered to have 
provided information to the market.
The results using this approach have been mixed. The earliest studies 
isolated no effect (Asare 1990). Several subsequent studies, however, 
concluded that “subject to” qualified opinions had information content. For 
example, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986) found a significant 
negative stock price reaction when the media disclosed that a “subject to” 
qualified opinion was to be issued. Also, Frost (1991), replicating an earlier 
study by Banks and Kinney (1982), found that a small sample of firms 
with “subject to” qualified opinions had more negative stock price reactions 
than those not receiving such audit reports, although the difference is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.
A primary limitation of this approach is that knowledge of the type of 
audit report to be issued often becomes available concurrently with the 
release of the information in the financial statements. This makes it difficult 
to isolate a true market reaction to the audit report. Because the company 
involved may be experiencing severe financial difficulties, a lack of a 
market reaction also may occur because investors expected such an audit 
report well in advance. Assessing such investor expectations is, at best, 
a difficult task.2
Survey and Experimental Research. Survey and experimental 
research on this topic either asks a respondent whether such reports are 
desirable or gathers responses to a “case” situation that manipulates one 
or more related variables. Shank and Dillard (1979) and Campbell and 
Mutchler (1988) surveyed various financial statement user groups 
and financial executives and found that they perceived the “subject to” 
qualified opinion as useful. However, when users are placed in simulated 
decision-making contexts, the results have been different. Libby (1979a, b) 
and Abdel-khalik, Graul, and Newton (1986) provided financial statement 
loan officers with financial statements that disclosed an uncertainty in the 
notes to the financial statements. One group of respondents was provided 
financial statement note information on an uncertainty, whereas the other 
group received that note description plus a report modified as to the 
uncertainty. Both studies concluded that managements’ disclosures of 
contingencies with “subject to” qualified opinions had no significant 
additional effect on bankers’ assessments of the riskiness of clients. The
2 Consistent with this limitation, studies by Mutchler (1985) and Dopuch, Holthausen, 
and Leftwich (1987) have shown that going-concern modified reports can be 
predicted relatively accurately using publicly available information.
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results of both studies are thus consistent with a conclusion that, for 
the tested populations, uncertainty qualifications were unnecessary.
Subsequently, Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) used a similar approach 
comparing SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 reporting guidelines and concluded 
that for their (student) subjects, the new audit report format is primarily 
a change in the form of auditor communication rather than a change in 
the substance of the information being communicated. However, they 
also report that the SAS No. 59 approach may have confused some of 
the subjects.
In summary, prior research on uncertainties and going concern provide 
limited direction for standards setting. Research relating to the usefulness of 
“subject to” report modification is not conclusive. The available studies con­
sidering the new reporting requirements would seem to imply that a similar 
situation is likely to exist relating to the expectation gap requirements.
Relationship to Bankruptcy
Comparison to Models. The relationship between subsequent bank­
ruptcy of a client and the issuance of a modified audit report has received 
research attention, all of it using pre-SAS No. 59 data. One significant 
limitation of such an analysis is that professional standards make clear that 
going-concem-related report modification decisions are not equivalent to 
bankruptcy prediction. The law literature has no parallel to a going concern 
(American Bar Association 1987). SAS No. 59 provides examples of condi­
tions and events that may raise doubt about whether an entity is a going 
concern but, as explained in more detail later, does not explicitly define one.
Figure 1, adapted from Boritz (1991) presents the typical stages of business 
failure in an enterprise. A “severe cash shortage” might lead the auditor to 
conclude that a going-concern modification is necessary. Yet, subsequently, 
management’s rescue actions may succeed and the company may regain 
financial health. In such a situation, most would not consider it incorrect to 
have decided that substantial doubt existed about the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern. Similarly, a company might fail due to a 
sudden event subsequent to the audit. Bearing these limitations in mind, 
a summary by McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1990) may be used 
to measure auditor performance in this area. The results of that study 
approximate and extend those of a number of earlier studies (Asare 1990). 
As table 1 indicates, the authors divided their sample into “stressed” and 
“nonstressed” clients.3
3 A “stressed” company exhibited at least one of the following: (1) negative working 
capital in the current year, (2) a loss from operations in any of the last three years 
prior to bankruptcy, (3) a retained earnings deficit three years prior to bankruptcy, or 
(4) a net loss in any of the last three years prior to bankruptcy.
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TABLE 1 McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1990) Sample
Panel A : Companies That Entered Bankruptcy
Stressed Nonstressed Totals
Modified 54 0 54
(46%) (40%)
Nonmodified 64 16 80
(54%) (60%)
Total Bankrupt 118 16 134
(88%) (12%) 134
Panel B: Companies That Did N ot Enter Bankruptcy
Stressed Nonstressed Totals
Modified 4 0 4
(5%)
Unmodified 76 80 156
(95%)
Total Nonbankrupt 80 80 160
Totals 198 96 294
In short, table 1 indicates that auditors modified their reports depending 
on whether the company had substantial doubt about going-concern status 
46 percent of the time for 134 companies the year before they filed for 
bankruptcy. On the other hand, using a random sample of 160 companies 
that did not file for bankruptcy, auditors modified their reports only four 
times. Similar to the research on the information content of report modifi­
cations, these results relate to the time period in which SAS No. 34 was in 
effect. We are unaware of any such analysis subsequent to SAS No. 59.
These auditor success rates are also lower than a number of studies 
that used bankruptcy prediction models (Asare 1990). The stress conditions 
considered in this study are similar to those conditions and events that 
SAS No. 59 suggests might indicate substantial doubt as to the company’s 
ability to continue as a going concern. In a subsequent study, Hopwood, 
McKeown, and Mutchler (1991) consider separately stressed and 
nonstressed companies and the actual failure rate in the population of all 
companies. Their results indicate that under those circumstances, the 
auditors’ opinions are comparable indicators of bankruptcy as compared 
with statistical models.
Self-fulfilling Prophecy. Some have argued that the issuance of a going- 
concern modification is likely to be a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” The 
argument is that the report, rather than the condition of the entity,
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may result in the failure of the entity. The casual observation that many 
companies continue to operate after receiving such reports would seem to 
indicate that such reports do not invariably lead to business failure. Indeed, 
Altman (1982) found that in his sample, 75 percent of 213 companies 
receiving going-concern qualifications between 1972 and 1978 did not go 
bankrupt. Yet, one can visualize that for a small developmental company 
needing financing, a going-concern report modification would make capital 
acquisition more difficult.4
Going-Concern Decision Process. Recently, several researchers have 
attempted to obtain a better understanding of the actual decision process 
followed by auditors. These researchers have studied, in a going-concern 
context, such psychological constructs as temporal sequence (mixing the 
order of evidence presented to an auditor), framing (whether the original 
assumption is that the company is a going concern vs. a going-concern 
question), and considering the effect of experience on audit judgments 
(Ricchiute 1992; see also, Asare 1990 for several references). The results at 
this point are far from conclusive, but there is some indication that the order 
that evidence is presented in does affect reporting decisions at least in an 
experimental setting. Research on framing and experience effects in this 
area have been even less conclusive.
Report Modification "Trigger" Terms Used 
in SAS No. 58 and No. 59
The Auditing Standards Board struggled with identifying the point at 
which report modification for uncertainties should occur. For uncertain­
ties, SFAS No. 5 terminology, including “probable” and “reasonably 
possible,” were retained without embellishment. “Substantial doubt” was 
selected for going-concern modifications.
Probable and Reasonably Possible. SAS No. 58 suggests that the 
auditor should add an explanatory paragraph when it is probable that a 
material loss will occur, but management is unable to make a reasonable 
estimate of the amount. When a loss is reasonably possible, the auditor is 
to consider both the magnitude of the amount involved and the likelihood
4 Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the effect of an audit report modified as to 
going-concern status might be quite immediate. One of the coauthors interviewed one 
Big Six partner who recounted a situation in which he, as partner in charge of an 
audit, thought “long and hard” about issuing a “subject to” qualified report to a client 
that was seeking a loan. To his relief, the client’s management was “glad” to receive 
the report because it would make clear to the bank how essential the granting of the 
loan was. The report was issued on a Friday. The bank turned down the loan on the 
following Monday, and the client filed for bankruptcy on Tuesday.
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of occurrence. As indicated above, these terms track SFAS No. 5, which 
defines them as follows:
Probable: The event or events are likely to occur.
Reasonably possible: The chance of the future event or events 
occurring is more than remote but less than likely.
The general nature of these definitions led to studies that required respon­
dents to operationalize the terms (for example, see Schultz and Reckers 
1981; Jiambalvo and Wilner 1985; Harrison and Tomassini 1989; 
Raghunandan, Grimlund, and Schepanski 1991). These studies asked CPAs 
to interpret the numerical meaning of the terms “reasonably possible” and 
“probable.” All studies have reported significant variation in replies. 
Average responses for “reasonably possible” are between 15 percent 
(Harrison and Tomassini) and 42 percent (Schultz and Reckers). Slightly 
less variation exists for the meaning of “probable,” which typically receives 
a mean of 70 percent likely.
SFAS No. 5 does not suggest whether the consideration of likelihood of 
unfavorable outcome and estimation should be simultaneous or sequential 
in which the auditor first estimates the magnitude of potential loss, and then 
assesses the probability of its realization. The studies have, in general, found 
that auditors responding to cases generally do not follow a sequential 
process, but make decisions considering materiality and likelihood simul­
taneously and also consider “trade-offs” between the two.
SAS No. 58 explicitly includes a trade-off between probability and 
amount of loss. That is, as the amount involved becomes more material, the 
auditor is more likely to include an explanatory paragraph in the audit 
report. Raghunandan, Grimlund, and Schepanski (1991) found that auditors 
replying to cases did follow this type of a decision process.
Substantial Doubt. SAS No. 59 uses the undefined state of substantial 
doubt as the triggering point for report modification. Knapp, Wallestad, and 
Elikai (1991) tested a variety of situations asking 162 CPA respondents to 
report the numerical probability at which substantial doubt occurs. On an 
overall basis, the average reply was approximately 55 percent. Among the 
variables measured was the respondent’s perception of the “likelihood that 
an auditor of a failed firm will be sued.” Replies varied as follows based on 
that perceived risk:
Substantial Doubt
Low risk of being sued 60.4 percent
High risk of being sued 48.7 percent
Similar to the earlier results concerning SFAS No. 5 terminology, there 
were large variances in replies. (A standard deviation of approximately 18.5 
percent exists for various groups of replies.)
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These results may indicate that the general nature of the SFAS No. 5 
definition and the lack of a definition for substantial doubt lead to a 
situation in which CPAs interpret the concepts differently. Yet these studies 
have fairly significant limitations. All except Schultz and Reckers 
considered individual CPA replies rather than replies arrived at through 
group discussions comparable with the decisions of an audit team in a firm 
environment. Also, all are affected by whether CPAs in practice think 
in the quantitative terms elicited. For example, a lawyer assessing the 
outcome of litigation responds in qualitative language: “The client should 
prevail.” It is likely the auditor translates this directly to, “An unfavorable 
outcome is remote.” The auditor does not think, “Ah, 20 percent must 
be remote.”
Expert Systems, Decision Aids
Two expert systems have been described in the literature (Biggs and 
Selfridge 1988; Dillard and Mutchler 1989). The Biggs and Selfridge model 
uses current liquidity and operating performance to recognize a going- 
concern problem. The Dillard and Mutchler model uses a series of 
suggestions, rules, and methods to make the going-concern reporting 
decision. Both are at an early stage of development.
Implementation
Some implementation issues relate only to going-concern problems, 
whereas others relate to all uncertainties, including going-concern problems.
Going-Concern Uncertainties
SAS No. 59 changed existing guidance in the following key ways:
• Detection—There is now an affirmative obligation to make an assess­
ment at the conclusion of the audit of the client’s ability to continue as a 
going concern rather than to merely remain aware of the possibility that 
the assumption of continuity might not hold. However, there are still no 
required procedures that are especially or solely directed to searching for 
conditions or events that would indicate a going-concern problem.
• Time Period—The focus of the auditor’s assessment of ability to continue 
as a going concern is now tied to “a reasonable period of time” that is 
explicitly limited to a period “not to exceed one year beyond the date of 
the financial statements being audited.”
45
• Evaluation—Previously the decision to modify the audit report hinged 
on recoverability of the assets and recognition and classification of liabil­
ities. Now going-concern status is a separate issue.
• Reporting—The “subject to” qualification, as mentioned earlier, has 
been supplanted by a fourth explanatory paragraph for all material 
uncertainties including going-concern uncertainties. However, use of a 
disclaimer is still not precluded.
What implementation problems have these changes created, highlighted, 
or exacerbated?
Detection. Although SAS No. 34 read as if an auditor had to stumble 
over a going-concern problem before recognizing it, auditors generally 
were well-aware of the need to evaluate a client’s ability to continue. Thus, 
this requirement has had little effect on practice other than to increase 
documentation of the consideration. Most CPA firms have adopted a policy 
of including some routine documentation of the consideration of going- 
concern status in the workpapers. This documentation may be limited to 
checking off a box on a generalized form or including a statement in a wrap- 
up or final memorandum indicating there is no concern with the client’s 
ability to continue.
Time Period. Because the focus of the evaluation is on an explicit 
12-month period following the balance sheet date, there are certain 
implementation issues. One is generally referred to as the “15-month” 
problem. This situation arises when the client is not expected to have any 
financial difficulties for the next 12 months, but the auditor knows that 
difficulties will exist within the following few months. For example, a client 
that has recently undergone a leveraged buyout has a large balloon payment 
due shortly after the 12-month period and will have some difficulty meeting 
this requirement of the debt agreement.
SAS No. 59 does not acknowledge any need to look beyond 12 months 
and, in fact, says the reasonable period is not to exceed one year beyond the 
date of the financial statements being audited. Should that, however, be 
viewed as an impenetrable barrier to consideration of a known financial 
difficulty? Also, if auditors do begin to reach out to the next few months for 
a known matter, might that begin to erode the reasonable limit on the time 
horizon set by SAS No. 59? At this point, a practical solution generally 
adopted has been to include an emphasis of a matter paragraph in the report 
that highlights the financial difficulty problem. In this way, the financial 
statement user is alerted, but the auditor has not extended the going-concern 
evaluation into the forbidden zone.
Another implementation issue related to time period is the “dating” 
problem. This problem may arise when the auditor is asked to reissue 
an audit report. Consider the case in which an auditor is asked to reissue an
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audit report for the year ended December 31, 1991, prior to the conclusion of 
the client’s next reporting year, 1992. Under current guidance on report dat­
ing, the 1991 report is reissued with the original report date. This signals that 
no auditing procedures were applied since the date of the original report.
The problem arises when the auditor is aware of new conditions that are 
likely to result in a going-concern modification of the audit report on the 
financial statements for 1992. In other words, because the auditor is satis­
fied that the client will survive to the end of 1992 there is no requirement to 
add an explanatory paragraph to the original report. However, the audit 
report for 1992 is likely to be modified because of doubt about the client’s 
ability to survive a year beyond the current year end.
Again, a practical solution is to add an emphasis of a matter paragraph to 
the original report worded somewhat as follows:
As discussed in Note XX, “Subsequent Events,” subsequent to 
March 10, 1992 [date of original report], the Company lost its major 
customer, incurred significant operating losses, and defaulted on 
the loan agreement with XYZ Bank. If these conditions continue, 
it is likely that our report on the company’s financial statements for 
the year ending December 31, 1992, will be modified because of 
substantial doubt as to the company’s ability to continue as a going 
concern through December 31, 1993.
By including the explicit date of the period for which going-concern 
status is in doubt, the auditor provides the user of the financial statements 
with a better understanding of exactly what responsibility the auditor 
is assuming.
This raises the related issue of whether it would be appropriate to indicate 
the period of time to which the auditor’s substantial doubt relates by rou­
tinely including an explicit date. The explanatory paragraph would state 
that “there is substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as 
a going concern through December 31, 19XX.”
Evaluation. SAS No. 34 did not use the phrase “going concern.” The 
auditor was to evaluate the entity’s ability to continue. An inability to 
continue might arise from not being able to meet obligations as they 
become due without substantial disposal of assets, restructuring of debt, or 
externally forced revisions of operations, which was effectively equated 
with insolvency, or other factors not involving solvency. These “other 
factors” would be significant events such as loss of a principal customer. 
SAS No. 34 indicated that the auditor’s reason for concern with the ability 
of the entity to continue was the potential effect on the “recoverability and 
classification of recorded asset amounts, and the amounts and classification 
of liabilities.” A report modification would result only if substantial doubt 
about continued existence created sufficient uncertainty concerning 
recoverability, classification, and amounts of material assets and liabilities.
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SAS No. 59 made substantial doubt about ability to continue as a going 
concern, by itself, the triggering point for report modification.
The distinction is illustrated by the development stage company that has 
not yet produced a salable product. The company has expensed all product 
development costs. There are no receivables because there are no sales; 
likewise there is no inventory. Financing is all from equity and there are no 
employee benefit plans that would result in recording new liabilities on 
termination. As long as its productive assets have alternative uses so that 
realization is not impaired, SAS No. 34 would require no report modifica­
tion. Apparently this would be true even if the company would have to cease 
operations unless it could produce a salable product and bring the product 
to market within the next 12 months. SAS No. 59 would require a going- 
concern explanatory paragraph in the same circumstances. It is doubtful 
that a competent auditor would have failed to qualify the opinion even under 
SAS No. 34, but SAS No. 59 is an improvement.
SAS No. 59, however, elevates going-concern status to the report modifi­
cation triggering mechanism without defining a going concern. This has 
created implementation issues.
Early drafts of SAS No. 59 did include a definition, such as expected 
insolvency or bankruptcy. But these legal concepts were excluded from 
the final draft. As a result, there are conflicting views in practice on the 
meaning of the phrase going concern.
SAS No. 59 in its first paragraph states that:
Ordinarily, information that significantly contradicts the going 
concern assumption relates to the entity’s inability to continue 
to meet its obligations as they become due without substantial 
disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business, 
restructuring of debt, externally forced revisions of its operations, 
or similar actions.
Some view this as the definition of a going concern. They apparently fail 
to recognize that SASs often do not bother to define central terms. For exam­
ple, SAS No. 47 on audit risk and materiality defines audit risk, but not 
materiality. An FASB definition is quoted, but intentionally not adopted.
Others read a definition of sorts into the first paragraph of SAS No. 59 by 
noting that the first sentence states that the SAS provides guidance to the 
auditor for evaluating going-concern problems and, in a footnote, that 
sentence indicates the SAS does not apply to an audit of an entity in the 
process of liquidation. Thus, an entity would no longer be a going concern 
when it is probable the entity will be forced to liquidate.
This would mean that in evaluating going-concern status the auditor is 
assessing the likelihood of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Some, in 
fact, say that unless a company liquidates, it does continue—there are just 
new shareholders, the former creditors. However, this seems to be too
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sanguine an attitude. The shareholders are wiped out and top management 
is probably out of a job. An early warning signal that sounds only for 
imminent liquidation is not going to close any expectation gap.
One problem created by lack of a clear-cut definition is the ambiguity that 
attaches to evaluating management plans. SAS No. 59 requires that the 
auditor evaluate management’s plans for dealing with a going-concern 
problem. It defines management plans as including “plans to dispose of 
assets” and “plans to borrow money or restructure debt.” If the auditor is 
satisfied that the plans can be successfully implemented, presumably an 
unmodified report is appropriate. However, if a company is not a going 
concern when it cannot meet its obligations and they become due “without 
substantial disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business or 
restructuring of debt,” certain management plans only confirm that the 
company is not a going concern.
Some also question whether it is feasible to audit management’s plans 
that involve nonoperating actions, such as debt restructuring or disposition 
of assets outside the ordinary course of business. Normally there is no 
historical experience for the auditor to use in evaluating the likelihood of 
these actions being successful. Nevertheless, an auditor must, for example, 
audit management’s planned disposal of a segment of a business. APB 
Opinion 30 requires an estimate of loss on disposal and loss from operations 
during the period between the measurement date and disposal.
Clarification and guidance in this area would require explicit definition 
of a going concern and guidance on evaluating nonoperating actions. For 
example, the relation of going-concern status to bankruptcy and solvency 
might be clarified and guidance might be provided on auditing compliance 
with APB Opinion 30 and similar nonoperating actions. Alternatively, 
going-concern status might be defined so that plans for nonoperating 
actions would confirm substantial doubt and the auditor would consider 
only operating improvements, such as enhanced cash flow from operations, 
to alleviate substantial doubt.
Reporting. SAS No. 59 both created new reporting issues and continued 
or amplified old ones. From a user’s perspective, a significant new issue is 
the ability to distinguish emphasis of a matter paragraphs, explanatory 
paragraphs for an uncertainty, and going-concern explanatory paragraphs.
A particular problem—for example, significant investment in junk 
bonds—may be the subject of any of the three types of paragraph. A user 
is aided in distinguishing between a going-concern problem and an 
uncertainty by the new requirement added by SAS No. 64 to include the 
phrases “substantial doubt” and “going concern.” However, the only way 
to distinguish between an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph and an explana­
tory paragraph for an uncertainty may be the absence of a phrase such as 
“no provision has been made in the financial statements for this matter” in 
an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph. This issue as well as the issue of use of
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a disclaimer for an uncertainty relate to implementation of SAS Nos. 58 
and 59. Both are discussed further in the next section.
All Uncertainties
Implementation issues for all uncertainties include the type of report to be 
issued and the proper report disclosure for various types of uncertainties.
Disclaimer for Uncertainty. SAS Nos. 58 and 59 carry forward from 
SAS No. 2 the substance of a footnote that now states:
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor 
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties.
This sentence has led some to conclude that SAS Nos. 58 and 59 permit 
either a standard unqualified report with an additional explanatory 
paragraph or a disclaimer of opinion in equivalent circumstances. In other 
words, there is an option to disclaim or to add an explanatory paragraph 
in the same situation. The option chosen can have serious implications in 
practice because the SEC does not accept a disclaimer as meeting the 
requirements of the 1933 Act for certification of financial statements.
A reporting option was not the intent when SAS No. 2 was issued, even 
if it is viewed as the current result. When SAS No. 2 was being developed, 
a requirement to decide whether a “subject to” qualified opinion or a dis­
claimer of opinion for an uncertainty was appropriate was removed from 
the authoritative literature. The reason for the removal was the inability to 
develop reporting criteria for the decision. In other words, the committee 
members felt unable to provide guidance and as a result rescinded the 
requirement. However, the committee members did not believe it was 
appropriate to preclude the use of a disclaimer for an uncertainty.
To prohibit a disclaimer would be tantamount to instructing an auditor to 
issue an opinion in circumstances in which the auditor personally did not 
believe he or she had an opinion. In other words, a professional who does 
not have an opinion should not be required to express one. Thus, the 
disclaimer was not seen as an alternative in equivalent circumstances. It 
was to be used only when the auditor did not have an opinion.
The problem was that SAS No. 2 did not provide guidance on when 
it was not possible to have an opinion. To fill that void in the authori­
tative literature, some CPA firms developed their own specific guidance 
on when a disclaimer was necessary. In general circumstances, that 
guidance provided—with variations in wording among firms—that a 
disclaimer should be issued when the uncertainty so overshadowed 
the client’s financial position or operating results that there was no 
substance to the opinion. In specialized industries, some firms provided 
more explicit guidelines.
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Savings Institutions as an Example. A peculiarity of some specialized 
industries, including the savings and loan industry, is that a company does 
not fail until a state or federal chartering authority declares that it has failed 
and takes possession. An important consideration for the chartering 
authority is usually the solvency of the company. In most regulated indus­
tries, this translates into some form of net worth or capital requirement. 
However, the capital requirement may be based on an average of several 
years rather than just the current year. For example, from 1982 through 1988 
the capital requirement of savings and loan institutions was 3 percent, based 
on a 5-year average. Thus, a savings and loan institution could be insolvent 
on a GAAP basis and still meet the net capital requirement.
The current net capital requirements for savings and loan institutions, 
adopted at the end of 1989, establish differing percentage requirements for 
tangible capital, core capital, and risk-based capital. In response, some 
CPA firms have adopted specific criteria for reporting on savings and loan 
institutions that require a disclaimer when there is an extreme going- 
concern problem. An extreme going-concern problem is defined as not 
meeting the tangible capital test, tangible capital below zero, and a capital 
plan that either has not been approved by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
or that is not likely to be achieved during the year following the balance 
sheet date. A savings and loan institution in the same situation with an 
approved plan and that is likely to be in compliance with the plan within a 
year would receive an audit report with an explanatory going-concern 
paragraph following an unqualified opinion. A savings and loan institu­
tion that does not meet the tangible capital requirement, but that has 
tangible capital above zero in the current year and has an approved 
plan that it is likely to achieve in the coming year, would receive an 
explanatory uncertainty paragraph rather than a going-concern paragraph 
following an unqualified opinion.
Distinguishing Uncertainties and Qualified Opinions. The SEC’s 
administrative policies also contributed to another practice problem prior 
to SAS No. 58 and No. 59 that has continued. The SEC does not accept 
financial statements in filings that have other than an unqualified opinion 
caused by a scope limitation or a GAAP departure. In some cases, an 
auditor was known to treat an item as an uncertainty that might more 
appropriately be considered a scope limitation or a GAAP departure.
Under APB Opinion 11, for example, to recognize a tax loss carryforward 
as an asset, realization had to be assured beyond a reasonable doubt. One 
large public company recorded an asset for a tax loss carryforward, but the 
audit firm issued a report modified for uncertainty because of uncertainty 
concerning the company’s ability to realize the carryforward.
A new casualty insurance company, or one entering an entirely new line 
of business, often does not have a sufficient base of historical experience 
to reliably estimate loss reserves. This is evaluated by some as a scope
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limitation because an insurance company would ordinarily be expected to 
have sufficient experience to reliably estimate loss reserves. Others view this 
as an uncertainty because for this particular company, the historical exper­
ience never existed and the proper reserve will be known at a future date.
A sset Realization Uncertainties. The SEC’s administrative policies 
also prohibit a fourth paragraph for uncertainties that affect asset realiza­
tion, except for going-concern uncertainties. Apparently the SEC’s view is 
that asset realization is a matter that should be audited and that an evaluation 
should be made as to whether a write-down is necessary. An uncertainty 
paragraph should not substitute for a write-down. This policy makes some 
sense for trade receivables, inventory, and other assets ordinarily presented 
at net realizable value. However, even in this case, there may be exceptions. 
For example, the collectibility of a receivable from a single large customer 
may be in doubt because of that customer’s financial difficulty.
Environmental Uncertainties. Environmental problems raise an 
interesting implementation issue because of the massive potential cost of 
cleaning up existing problems and the fact that in some industries potential 
significant future problems are a virtual certainty. Are these risks being 
properly evaluated? Is the absence of explanatory paragraphs for uncertain­
ties concerning environmental cleanup costs a lurking disaster comparable 
to the savings and loan crisis?
Limitations and Implications
Limitations
The research is limited by the fact that most of it was conducted prior to 
SAS No. 58 and No. 59. Studies that attempt to measure a market reaction 
to a going-concern modification are also limited by difficulties in isolating 
the effect of the audit report. Release of the report simultaneously with 
other information makes identifying its effect on stock market returns diffi­
cult. Also, isolating circumstances in which such a report is not expected by 
the market and therefore provides “information” is difficult. Finally, the 
market studies do not consider the reaction of financial statement users 
other than common stock investors.
The various studies using experimental and survey approaches address 
additional user groups. However, they are also limited in that most were 
conducted prior to the new SASs and they are all affected by questions as to 
external validity. It is unclear whether the answers to the various question­
naires are indicative of “real world” responses and whether most of 
the studies on auditor decision making solicit from a respondent what is 
essentially a team decision.
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Implications
Several market reaction studies would seem to indicate that some inves­
tors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. In certain 
“surprise” situations equity investors responded to “subject to” qualified 
opinions. We have not found any study that confirmed these findings for 
audit reports issued after SAS No. 58 and No. 59 became effective, but 
stock market reaction in earlier studies would seem to imply that at least 
one user group values such audit report modifications. Also, survey 
research has suggested that other groups of financial statement users main­
tain that they use such reports. These results would ultimately argue that 
such reports do benefit some investors.
Given this admittedly weak support for the notion that financial statement 
users do use such modified reports, a basic decision must be made by the 
Auditing Standards Board as to whether the issue of audit report modifica­
tion for uncertainties should be reopened.
Should SAS No. 59 be revised to clarify the relationship between going- 
concern status and the concepts of bankruptcy and solvency? The fact that 
numerous studies performed prior to SAS No. 59 indicate that approxi­
mately one-half of companies that fail do not receive such a modified report 
in the period prior to bankruptcy may not bode well for the profession due 
to potential litigation exposure. Has performance on this dimension 
improved subsequent to passage of SAS No. 59?
The definitions in SFAS No. 5 for “reasonably possible” and “probable” 
result in situations in which there is great variation in the numerical proba­
bilities that auditors attach to these phrases. The term “substantial doubt” 
in SAS No. 59 leads to similar results. The Auditing Standards Board may 
wish to consider whether providing quantitative guidance in this area would 
be meaningful or worthwhile.
Future Research
At one extreme it may be argued that all of the research performed prior 
to issuance of SAS No. 58 and No. 59 is of only historical interest since the 
standards have changed. Thus, an updating and replication of the various 
research approaches might be called for. In the process, a refinement of 
these approaches might lead to more meaningful results. For example, the 
power of statistical tests of stock market return data may be improved by a 
greater emphasis on identifying situations in which the issuance of the 
report is a surprise (for example, see Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 
1987).
Most of the behavioral studies have reduced what is a team decision to an 
individual decision. The extent to which such individual decisions general­
ize to the “real world” is open to question. An obvious extension of extant
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research is to replicate it in a group setting. However, obtaining realistic 
audit teams is not likely to be accomplished easily, if at all.
It would seem that standard setting and practice would both benefit from 
a significant amount of descriptive research. Table 2 summarizes audit 
reports of 600 large SEC-reporting companies as presented in Accounting 
Trends and Techniques. One notices, perhaps, a slight increase in modified 
reports. On an overall basis, has the shift from a qualification to an explana­
tory paragraph resulted in more, fewer, or no change in uncertainty-related 
modifications? What types of uncertainties result in explanatory paragraphs 
other than going-concern problems? What types of uncertainties are 
disclosed only in notes to financial statements without an explanatory 
paragraph in the audit report? For going-concern uncertainties, what 
sources of substantial doubt are described in explanatory paragraphs? Is 
there any relationship between the sources of substantial doubt and the 
issuance of a disclaimer? Are SAS No. 58 and No. 59 being complied with? 
Do explanatory paragraphs on going-concern problems include the phrases 
“substantial doubt” and “going concern”? Do descriptions of some 
uncertainties seem to indicate GAAP departures or scope limitations?
TABLE 2 Summary of 600 Audit Reports Reported 
in Accounting Trends and Techniques
1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984
Going Concern 18 12 8 13 11 13 14
Litigation 20 18 11 10 12 18 16
Other 8 12 7 9 15 15 9
Total Uncertainties 46 42 26 32 38 46 39
Total Companies 34 32 23 24 30 33 29
The reaction of users of financial statements to different types of report 
modifications also seems to be a fertile area for research. Do users recog­
nize or react to the distinctions among an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph, 
a fourth explanatory paragraph for an uncertainty, and an explanatory 
paragraph indicating substantial doubt about ability to continue as a going 
concern? Do users perceive the explanatory paragraph differently from a 
“subject to” qualification? Do users regard a disclaimer of opinion and an 
explanatory paragraph for an uncertainty as substantially different? Per­
sonally, we would be very surprised if users did not recognize a substantial 
difference. Would such a difference mean that the Auditing Standards 
Board should restore the requirement to disclaim an opinion and provide 
guidance on when an uncertainty precludes an opinion?
What criteria do CPA firms use for disclaimers? Do the criteria that have 
been developed by CPA firms for when to disclaim provide operational 
guidance?
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Have CPA firms developed operational criteria for qualitative concepts of 
likelihood (probable, reasonably possible, substantial doubt)? We noted 
earlier the limitation that auditors may not make likelihood evaluations in 
quantitative terms. There is a related research area of comparable sig­
nificance. Because audit situations do not come with numerical probability 
labels, it might be worth researching what numerical probability auditors 
attach to particular factual situations involving uncertainties.
Conclusion
We hope we have raised provocative issues for both researchers and stan­
dard setters. Although there are several interesting issues concerning 
reporting on uncertainties, generally, the most important and perplexing 
issues relate to going-concern uncertainties. This is not surprising because 
going-concern reporting is at the heart of a central element of the expecta­
tion gap. How can a business fail shortly after receiving an unmodified 
audit report? If an audit cannot provide an early warning of impending busi­
ness failure, what good is it? For this reason, we believe one of the most sig­
nificant issues our review of the literature and practice has highlighted is the 
relationship among going-concern status, solvency, and bankruptcy. In 
short we cannot seem to agree on the answer to a simple question—What do 
we mean by a going concern? Until that question is answered, both  research 
and practice will suffer.
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Audit Committees: 
Is There an Expectations Gap?
An Analysis of SAS No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees
Larry E. Rittenberg, Professor o f Accounting,
University o f Wisconsin-Madison 
R. D. Nair, Professor o f  Accounting,
University o f  Wisconsin-Madison
SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees, was issued with a 
stated objective of ensuring “that the audit committee receives additional 
information regarding the scope of the audit that may assist the audit 
committee in overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process for 
which management is responsible. ’ ’ This paper examines changes in the 
responsibilities placed on audit committees as they attempt to meet the 
public’s demand for effective governance structures and then discusses 
the auditing profession’s role in meeting those demands. Many of the 
increasing demands on audit committees can be traced to the perceived 
power of corporate management, including influence on the board of 
directors, and the need to provide another independent view of the financial 
reporting process. SAS No. 61 is seen as a positive step in influencing the 
activities of audit committees. However, the demand for increased respon­
sibilities for audit committees in the corporate governance area creates a 
gap between rising expectations and the role presently served by the 
independent auditor. The nature of these rising expectations is addressed, 
the gap between current performance and the expectations is identified, the 
appropriate role and limitations of the public accounting profession in 
meeting the increasing demands are discussed, and suggestions are offered 
for increasing the responsiveness of the profession.
SAS No. 61 was issued with a stated objective of ensuring “that the 
audit committee receives additional information regarding the scope of 
the audit that may assist the audit committee in overseeing the financial 
reporting and disclosure process for which management is responsible.”
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The communication required by SAS No. 61 supplements requirements in 
other auditing standards, such as SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by 
Clients, and SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Structure 
Related Matters Noted in an Audit, that require auditors to communicate 
with audit committees when they become aware of significant deficiencies 
in an organization’s control structure, or of the existence of fraud, or of 
illegal acts, in the course of their audits.1 The standards, by describing the 
information that should be communicated to audit committees, give us a 
picture of the auditors’ views of the responsibilities of audit committees. At 
the same time that auditors have been addressing these issues, other organi­
zations and groups, such as the Treadway Commission, the SEC, the GAO, 
insurance organizations, as well as accounting firms, have been describing 
their views of the responsibilities of audit committees. Our paper examines 
the differences—or, in other words, the gap—between those points of view. 
The gap appears to be substantial.
This paper examines the evolving role of audit committees as they attempt 
to meet the public’s demand for effective governance structures, compares 
that evolving role with the information that auditors are currently required 
to provide to audit committees, explores the gap between required auditor 
communication and the expectations of audit committees, and points out 
areas where the public accounting profession may assist audit committees 
more effectively in meeting their responsibilities.
External auditors and audit committees both can help improve each 
other’s performance. The requirements can be compared with the challenge 
issued by A. A. Sommer, Jr. (1991), chairman of the Public Oversight Board 
of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA:
If American business is to meet the demand that its governance 
structures and practices match public expectations, it is vital that 
audit committees do a better job. And, if auditors are to reduce the 
hazards posed by litigation, they must avail themselves of every 
resource available to them. Clearly the audit committee is one of 
those resources. It is in their interest to be sure that resource is as 
effective as it is possible to make it, and they are in position to make 
it so.
1 For example, SAS No. 53, paragraph 28, states:
For the audit committee to make the informed judgments necessary to 
fulfill its responsibility for the oversight of financial reporting, the 
auditor should assure himself that the audit committee is adequately 
informed about any irregularities of which the auditor becomes aware 
during the audit unless those irregularities are clearly inconsequential.
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The Audit Committee, the Board of Directors, 
and the Power of Management
Audit committees, no matter how effective, may not be an adequate 
substitute for effective, independent boards of directors. Nor should audit 
committees necessarily be expected to replace the corporate oversight 
functions reserved for the board of directors (e.g., if the board of directors 
is dominated by insiders and friends of the CEO, then it is difficult to 
expect that the existence of an audit committee will necessarily improve 
the oversight function). Leslie Eaton, writing in Barron’s (1990), states it 
another way:
The Eighties, whatever the decade’s other claims to feme, was rife 
with corporate excess. It was a period when managements pros­
pered mightily, often at the expense of the corporation’s true 
owners. Thus, executives’ pay and perks soared, even when their 
companies’ performance faltered. Shareholders’ interests, mean­
while, were subverted by greenmail payments, poison pills and 
golden parachutes.
Which raises the question: Where were the corporate directors, who 
are supposedly the stewards of those shareholders’ interests?...
One reason directors have failed as corporate watchdogs, quite 
obviously, is that they tend to represent management rather than 
shareholders.
Similarly, Wechsler (1989) is very critical of the influence of management 
on the audit committee:
Too many audit committees are more creatures of the company’s 
management than they are watchdogs over shareholders’ interests.
Wechsler quotes Peter Martosella, brought in to run Crazy Eddie’s, a failed 
retail company, after it was discovered that the financial statements were 
fraudulently prepared. Martosella states:
You have to be careful about how much you expect of the audit 
committee. You’re talking about people brought in by the CEO and 
you’re telling them they shouldn’t necessarily listen to him. It’s not 
realistic, especially when the chief executive is a charismatic 
person, a darling of the securities world.
A survey by executive recruiter Korn/Ferry International indicated that 
in 74 percent of the 426 companies it surveyed in 1989, the new directors 
had been appointed upon the recommendation of the CEO. Indeed, one of 
the reasons many audit committees are not attuned to danger signals is that 
CEOs often pick other CEOs as members of the board of directors and they 
often serve on each others’ boards. This, coupled with the lack of time to
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adequately serve on a number of boards, tends to invest even greater power 
in corporate executives. The strength of chief executives in dictating 
operating procedures and covering up losses or “managing earnings” 
allowed massive frauds in such companies as Miniscribe, Crazy Eddie’s, 
and Equity Funding to take place. Some of these companies, such as 
Miniscribe, even had audit committees, but they were not attuned to the 
danger signals of the fraud.2
Such views of the limitations of audit committees are not limited to the 
United States. The Economist writes in its May 30, 1992, issue:
In principle, shareholders have two main controls over managers: 
the company board and the company’s auditors. The board is 
supposed to look after their interests; non-executive directors, 
especially, are expected to do so. Auditors are supposed to tell 
shareholders whether a company’s account of itself is broadly 
correct. Neither control is working properly. Boards are dominated 
by the company’s bosses; non-executive directors, though approved 
by shareholders, are nominated by the chief executives they are 
meant to monitor. Auditors, too, are far closer to a company’s 
managers, who supply the information they need, than to share­
holders; other sorts of lucrative work, such as management 
consulting and tax planning, may hang on the auditor’s relationship 
with management.
Hopefully, the nature of that relationship may now be changing. The 
recent example of the Board of Directors at General Motors assuming a 
more positive stance may be an indication that Boards of Directors in many 
organizations may become more independent in action in the 1990s (White 
and Ingrassi 1992). Such movements may greatly assist the audit commit­
tees in accomplishing the tasks that seem to be demanded by the public.
The Evolution of Audit Committees
The concept of an audit committee is not new. Audit committees were 
proposed by the AICPA as long ago as 1937 and have been recommended by 
the SEC since 1940 as one way of addressing the problems raised in the 
McKesson-Robbins case. The New York Stock Exchange recommended 
the formation of audit committees in the early 1970s and made it mandatory 
for listing on the Exchange after 1978. The American Stock Exchange 
recommends the formation of audit committees, of which the majority
2 For a description of the ineffectiveness of audit committees at Miniscribe, see Curtis 
C. Verschoor. 1990. “Miniscribe: A New Example of Audit Committee Ineffective­
ness.” Internal Auditing (Spring): 13-19.
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must be outside directors. The National Association of Securities Dealers 
and Quotation Analysts (NASDAQ) adopted a requirement in 1989 that 
audit committees should be established, “the majority of the members of 
which shall be independent directors.” The recommendations have been 
taken to heart. Sommer (1991) reported that a 1989 survey by Korn/Ferry 
International found that 97.7 percent of the companies responding to their 
survey, which were listed on all three exchanges, had audit committees and 
none included “inside” directors.
Audit committees are recommended to help ensure the integrity and 
independence of the audit function and to protect the public interest. 
Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972, provides an 
overview of the SEC’s long-standing interest in audit committees:
The Commission,.. .endorses the establishment by all publicly- 
held companies of audit committees composed of outside directors 
and urges the business and financial communities and all share­
holders of such publicly-held companies to lend their full and 
continuing support to the effective implementation of the 
above-cited recommendation in order to assist in affording 
the greatest possible protection to investors who rely upon such 
financial statements [emphasis added].
The implied message is that audit committees represent an effective 
device to protect outside investors who rely on financial statements. But, the 
demand on audit committees has not stopped with the call for oversight of 
the integrity of financial statements; indeed, the demand on audit commit­
tees has continued to expand beyond the scope of the financial reporting 
process. There are many reasons for the calls for more effective audit 
committees. These include—
• The relaxation of rules affecting competition in the public accounting 
profession.
• The increase in power of corporate executives.
• The increase in incidences of fraudulent financial reporting.
• The increase in takeovers and other business combinations.
• The increase in businesses and other entities affecting the “public 
interest,” but that are not publicly held companies.
• Governmental pressure, especially GAO reviews of the banking industry.
Reaction to these forces can be seen in the following calls for expanded 
audit committee effectiveness.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
As noted earlier, the SEC has been an active proponent of the audit 
committee concept. Although the earlier pronouncement focused on the
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financial reporting process, its commissioners have been active in 
promoting a larger role that includes an emphasis on broader corporate 
governance issues. As early as 1979, A.A. Sommer Jr. (1980), then an SEC 
commissioner, encouraged audit committees
to approve in advance each professional service provided by the 
independent auditors, and review their independence; to consider 
the range of audit and non-audit fees of the independent auditors; to 
review the adequacy of the corporation’s system of internal 
controls, and propose major changes in accounting policy; to direct 
and supervise investigations into any matter within the scope of its 
duties; to make recommendations and reviews in respect to the 
corporation’s code of corporate conduct and business practices; 
and to review the corporation’s report to stockholders and other 
financial statements prior to publication.
Sommer’s broad role contains items that had not been addressed 
previously in the auditing literature such as proposing major changes in 
accounting policy, directing and supervising investigations, monitoring 
compliance with the corporation’s code of conduct and business practices, 
and reviewing (all) financial statements (not just annual reports) before 
publication. Most of the items advocated by Sommer had been embraced by 
the SEC in Accounting Series Release No. 278 in 1978. That release also 
contained the explicit task of recommending the “engagement or discharge 
of the independent auditors.” The push by the SEC for audit committees to 
become more involved in corporate governance issues has since been 
echoed in many subsequent reports on the evolution of audit committees.
AICPA Activities on Audit Committees: 
The 1970s and 1980s
The AICPA has been a long-time advocate of effective audit committees. 
However, it was not until the issuance of SAS No. 61, Communication With 
Audit Committees, in January 1989, that it specifically established a 
requirement for formal communication with audit committees as a standard 
part of each audit.
Informal Recommendations: 1979. A 1979 special committee on audit 
committees appointed by the AICPA concluded that audit committees were 
not necessary for either the maintenance of auditor independence or for the 
performance of an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. However, it did comment that audit committees could be helpful 
to both corporate directors and independent auditors in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. The committee report went on to specify the following 
duties that the audit committee should perform:
1. Approve the selection of the independent auditor
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2. Review the arrangements and scope of the audit
3. Consider the comments from the independent auditor with respect to 
weaknesses in internal accounting control and the consideration given 
or corrective action taken by management
4. Discuss matters of concern to the audit committee, the auditor, or 
management relating to the company’s financial statements or other 
results of the audit
5. Review internal accounting procedures and controls with the com­
pany’s financial and accounting staff
6. Review the activities and recommendations of the company’s internal 
auditors
The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities (1978). The Com­
mission on Auditor’s Responsibilities (often referred to as the Cohen 
Commission, 1978) reiterated the importance of audit committees and 
independent directors in achieving a proper balance between the auditor 
and management and in protecting the shareholder’s interest. The Cohen 
Commission states:
The important point is that the auditor should have direct access to 
a significant number of board members who are not part of 
management. Outside members of the board of directors are in a 
unique position to represent the shareholders’ interest, to monitor 
the performance of management, to provide adequate support to the 
independent auditor, and to make changes within the organization.
The Cohen Commission statement extends the potential responsibilities 
of the audit committee to one of representing shareholders and effecting 
change in an organization.
Opposition to Expanded Role of Audit Committees
Traditionally, this more expansive role of the audit committee has been 
met with opposition on the part of the auditing profession. That view was 
summarized by Larry D. Horner, then chairman and chief executive of Peat, 
Marwick, Main & Co., in a 1987 speech to the National Association of 
Corporate Directors. Horner outlined audit committee activities in a tradi­
tional sense, but included overseeing the company’s internal accounting 
controls. However, he objected to expansion into operational areas:
More importantly, a committee should not take on functions that 
involve it too directly in operational matters. This will impair the 
committee’s independence and credibility can suffer.. . .  For this 
reason, Peat Marwick opposes any mandate or movement that 
would detract from the audit committee’s oversight of auditing and 
financial reporting. (Bacon 1990)
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The outside public accounting firms were not the only groups who 
resisted expansion of the audit committee duties. Joseph Wright, chairman 
of the Audit Committee of Bethlehem Steel stated in a 1979 speech:
While it is obvious that boards of directors must have oversight 
responsibility for a corporation’s environmental behavior and 
community relations, these are not really functions of an audit 
committee, and they should not be... .The same goes for opera­
tional audits; they are a necessary part of corporate management, 
but can divert an audit committee from its primary responsibility 
regarding financial audits. (Wright 1980)
Others also disagree on the extent that audit committees can, or should, 
be involved in detailed issues regarding corporate accounting. Wright 
points to a 1979 report of a committee of the American Bar Association 
which states:
It [the audit committee] is not equipped to make determinations as 
to specific actions the corporation should take in the areas of finan­
cial accounting and reporting.. . .  No audit committee should 
undertake to determine the scope or extent of the annual audit, 
decide upon financial accounting standards to be used in the
preparation of financial statements___These are, and must remain,
functions of management and/or the independent auditors.
That traditional view stands in marked contrast with the recommenda­
tions from the GAO and the Treadway Commission discussed below.
The Treadway Commission
The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Report­
ing (1987, hereafter referred to as the Treadway Commission) cited an 
effective, vigilant audit committee as one of the cornerstones of an effective 
policy to minimize the incidences of fraudulent financial reporting. The 
Treadway Commission recommended that all public companies should 
be required by the SEC to establish audit committees composed solely of 
independent directors. However, the Treadway Commission also recog­
nized that it is not enough to simply have an audit committee; care must be 
taken to structure and staff the audit committee to ensure its effectiveness. 
Their prescription for audit committee activities and responsibilities was 
quite broad and included:
• The board of directors of all public companies should be required 
by SEC rule to establish audit committees composed solely of indepen­
dent directors.
• Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers 
of the financial reporting process and the company’s internal controls.
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• All public companies should develop a written charter setting forth 
the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. The board of 
directors should approve the charter, review it periodically, and modify 
it as necessary.
• Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to 
discharge their responsibilities.
• The audit committee should review management’s evaluation of factors 
related to the independence of the company’s public accountant. Both the 
audit committee and management should assist the public accountant in 
preserving his or her independence.
• Before the beginning of each year, the audit committee should review 
management’s plans for engaging the company’s independent public 
accountant to perform management advisory services during the coming 
year, considering both the types of services that may be rendered and the 
projected fees.
The recommendations of the Treadway Commission envisioned an active 
role for audit committees in overseeing a company’s financial reporting 
process and its internal control structure. Additionally, it should play an 
important role in assisting the public accountant in preserving independ­
ence, including an analysis of management’s plans for procuring other 
services from the audit firm.
The Conference Board Report: A 1988 Survey on Practice
The Conference Board has conducted two major surveys of audit com­
mittees: the first in 1978 (Bacon 1979) and again in 1988 (Bacon 1990). 
The Board cites the rationale for the 1988 report as an opportunity 
to examine changes in the audit committee as an institution that stood 
“out in bold relief as a success story among the array of organizational 
approaches to make corporate boards of directors more effective” (Bacon 
1990). They cite seven major reasons for the increased call for more effec­
tive audit committees.
1. Corporate failures. Bad judgment, or mismanagement, and inadequate 
financial controls and reporting systems are often cited as major 
contributors to corporate failures and bankruptcies. They suggest 
that effective, independent audit committees could help monitor 
such activities.
2. Takeovers and business combinations. Mergers, especially unfriendly 
takeovers, have generated substantial litigation, with much of that 
litigation focusing on false or misleading information about finan­
cial circumstances. Such allegations call the audit committee’s role 
into attention.
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3. Growth in internal auditing. The growth of internal auditing and the 
responsibilities of audit committees are inextricably intertwined. The 
increased professionalism of the internal audit community facilitates 
and contributes to the functioning of many effective audit committees.
4. An “expectation gap” regarding independent audits. The Conference 
Board report describes the audit committee as one of the ways by which 
the profession has responded to questions about its responsibility to 
ensure the integrity of an organization’s financial statements.
5. The Treadway Commission Report. The Conference Board believes the 
Treadway Commission may represent the “most influential private- 
sector initiative” on audit committees.
6. Other private sector initiatives. The study cites initiatives by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors and the American Law Institute as major 
contributors to the effectiveness of audit committees.
7. Regulatory and legislative initiatives. Most of the push for expanded 
and effective audit committees at the time of the Conference Board 
report came from the SEC.
The Conference Board notes that the above cited factors have pushed 
the audit committee to expand beyond its initial role of simply overseeing 
the annual report and discussing financial audit matters with the external 
auditor. This expanded responsibility is best summed up in their words:
Most of the tasks that stretch the committee’s reach beyond 
financial issues relate to monitoring corporate behavior, both the 
firm’s as a whole and on the part of individual executives or other 
employees [or directors]. Thus, many audit committees now 
oversee the content of, and compliance with, corporate policies 
governing ethical behavior and employee conflict of interest. Some 
committees also monitor compliance with specified laws such as 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or with the Defense Industry 
Initiatives. . . .  Some have an even broader mandate to monitor the 
company’s compliance with the law in general; this may include 
reviewing litigation against the company or its employees or 
directors... .A final point on the audit committee’s enlarged 
role: This committee is sometimes the logical choice when a 
situation arises that requires investigation or review at the board 
level but does not fit easily into the job description of any particular 
board committee. Several of the audit committee’s characteristics 
recommend it: (1) it is made up of outside directors, which gives it 
objectivity; (2) it is accustomed to probing; and (3) it has 
experience working with outside accounting firms [emphasis 
added] [Bacon 1990].
Clearly, the Conference Board sees audit committees emerging with an 
expanded scope of responsibilities. Interestingly, they cite the audit
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committee’s experience working with the outside public accounting firms 
as one of the major qualifications that should allow them to be more 
effective in this expanded realm of duties. The Conference Board also 
addressed the extent to which audit committees are formally taking on 
responsibilities related to the expanded role. As seen in table 1, which is 
based on a survey of 689 corporations, audit committees presently have the 
authority to perform many of the activities, such as initiating investiga­
tions, monitoring compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and 
monitoring compliance with laws or regulations as cited above.
TABLE 1 Authority of Audit Committee to 
Carry Out Various Activities
Audit Committee Activity
Authority
(%)
No
Authority
(%)
Not
Established
(%)
Meet privately with outside auditors 98 1 1
Meet privately with internal auditors 93 1 6
Initiate investigations 86 1 13
Monitor compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 79 6 15
Monitor conflict-of-interest policy 76 8 15
Monitor code of ethics or behavior 74 8 18
Monitor compliance generally with
laws or regulations 72 8 20
Review quarterly financial statements 68 12 20
Monitor Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 64 8 29
Hire outside expert advice or service 61 8 31
Insurance Guidelines for Audit Committee Members:
Another Insight Into Scope of Duties
National Union Fire Insurance Co. is the leading underwriter of Direc­
tors and Officers (D&O) insurance in the United States. They sponsored a 
study to examine causes of litigation against boards and officers and to 
make recommendations to audit committees. The nature of claims made 
against boards and officers (D&O Claims) also serves as a guideline to 
expectations of audit committee members.
Their 1989 report, Audit Committees: A Self-Assessment Guide, identi­
fies D&O claims as a source of concern with an average growth rate in 
claims of 10 percent per year. They cite a trend in which many of the higher 
dollar claims were directly related to financial reporting or matters
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associated with financial reporting, and companies that experienced losses 
showed greater susceptibility and frequency to D&O claims than those 
companies without losses. A description of the types of claims provides 
some insight into public expectations of audit committees and directors. 
The five major sources of claims cited in their study were:
1. Irregularity in securities issuance. These mostly relate to representa­
tions contained in financial statements—both the annual statement and 
quarterly statements.
2. Misleading representations. These apply to annual and quarterly 
reports to shareholders.
3. Failure to follow mandated procedures. Many of these procedures are 
set forth by legislative and regulatory bodies and include procedures 
specifying financial reporting. A prime example is given in manage­
ment’s representation that there is a proper functioning of the system of 
internal control.
4. Improper expenditures. These are claims against the companies for 
incurring expenditures that are not prudent or exceed company-stated 
policy. Often audit committees are charged with reviewing the 
processes that ensure the propriety of these expenditures.
5. Conflicts of interest. Many of these are claims that involve transactions 
with related parties. The proper disclosure of such transactions is often 
called into question.
The insurance report develops a set of self-assessment guidelines that 
should be helpful for organizations in reviewing the scope of their audit 
activities and the independence of the committees. An outline of the ques­
tions contained in that assessment is included in the appendix.
The General Accounting Office Report 
on the Banking Industry
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has performed a number of 
studies relating to failed financial institutions. Their findings are not 
surprising: many of the causes of the failures were related to numerous 
internal control breakdowns that contributed to improper extensions of 
credit, outright fraud, and insider loan dealings. They called on audit 
committees to provide an “independent review” of management’s conduct 
of the business of the bank.
The GAO, in a separate study, expressed significant dissatisfaction with 
the functioning of audit committees in banking institutions (GAO 1991). 
Their criticism touched on areas such as independence, expertise needed to 
perform their tasks, and the lack of information available to perform 
independent assessments of key bank operations (and the audit committee’s
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reliance on the external auditors for much of that information). The GAO 
reported that many bank audit committees had members who had customer 
relationships with the banks. More than half of the audit committee chairs 
interviewed indicated that their committees lacked expertise in some 
specific areas where they had oversight responsibilities. Finally, the GAO 
indicated that audit committees were very reliant on external auditors for 
the wide variety of information (not all of which are contained in financial 
statements) needed to perform their analysis. They were also concerned that 
internal auditors who reported administratively to bank management may 
not be sufficiently independent to provide objective information, or have 
banking regulators consistently provide effective early warning signals. 
The GAO was critical of the public accounting profession on two fronts:
1. The annual external audit did not consistently help identify or make 
recommendations to resolve problems related to internal controls and 
compliance with laws and regulations. For example, they reported that 
fourteen of the twenty-five chairpersons that reported significant asset 
quality/loan collectability problems and four of the six chairpersons 
that reported significant problems with compliance with banking laws 
and regulations, also reported that their external audits did not help 
them identify these problems.
2. Audit standards do not require adequate examination and reporting on 
internal controls and compliance therewith. They were critical in their 
interpretation of the control standards, asserting that the current 
standards do not require auditors to examine any management or 
administrative controls that are not directly related to financial state­
ments. Their example is that controls that might provide reasonable 
assurance that the bank is in compliance with safety and soundness 
laws are generally not examined, and the existing standards do not 
require tests of compliance with any controls.
The GAO reported that audit committee chairpersons felt that additional 
information and analyses from the outside auditors beyond what is 
currently required in financial statement audits would be highly useful to 
audit committees. Specifically, a majority of respondents wanted to receive 
an analysis of the adequacy of management’s control structure and compli­
ance with applicable banking laws and regulations.
The GAO recommended that legislation be passed that—
• Requires all federally insured depository institutions to have independent 
audit committees made up solely of outside directors.
• Requires large institutions to maintain an audit committee that (1) does 
not have members that are large customers of the institution, (2) includes 
members with banking or related financial management expertise, and 
(3) has access to legal counsel.
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Most of these recommendations were included in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
Consistent with their previous recommendations, the GAO also recom­
mended that an auditor’s report on management report on its system of 
internal control, and that it report to the institution and the regulators on the 
institution’s compliance with laws and regulations that are identified as 
relating to safety and soundness where compliance can be determined 
objectively. Finally, as in the report from the insurance industry cited 
above, they recommend that independent accountants for large institutions 
perform reviews of quarterly financial data. The general thrust of the GAO 
recommendations for banks also applies to other financial institutions such 
as mutual insurance companies, savings and loans, and credit unions that 
operate in the public trust.
The Public Accounting Profession 
and Audit Committees
As noted above, the public accounting profession has been an effective 
agent for change. Although the profession cannot mandate the scope or 
duties of audit committees, it can require that certain information be com­
municated regularly to the committee. The profession can also effectively 
serve by educating audit committees on matters that will assist them to 
accomplish their expanding responsibilities.
SAS No. 61: An Agent for Effective Change
SAS No. 61 expanded the scope of the independent auditor’s respon­
sibility to ensure that the audit committee receives information useful 
to assist them in “overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure 
process for which management is responsible.” It specifies the following 
matters that must be communicated to audit committees, either orally or in 
written form:
1. Auditor’s responsibility under generally accepted auditing standards. 
The committee should be informed of the responsibility taken by the 
auditor. The audit committee should be warned that an audit is 
“designed to obtain reasonable, rather than absolute, assurance about 
the financial statements.”
2. Significant accounting policies. The audit committee should be 
informed about the initial selection of and changes in significant 
accounting policies or their application, especially the accounting 
for controversial or emerging areas for which there is a lack of 
authoritative guidance or consensus.
72
3. Management judgments and accounting estimates. A number of 
financial frauds have taken place through the manipulation of account­
ing estimates. Audit committees should be informed as to the critical 
assumptions, past data, and the processes used by management in 
making significant estimates.
4. Significant audit adjustments. The committee should be informed of 
significant adjustments that could, either individually or in the 
aggregate, have a significant effect on the entity’s financial reporting 
process. This communication should take place even if management 
agreed to make such adjustments.
5. Other information in documents containing audited financial statements. 
The auditor needs to communicate the nature of the responsibility 
and any reservations regarding the fairness of the presentation of the 
other information.
6. Disagreements with management. Disagreements with management 
can arise over a wide range of items, including (1) application of 
accounting principles, (2) management’s judgments on important 
accounting estimates, (3) scope of the audit, (4) disclosures to be 
included in the audited financial statements, and (5) wording of 
the audit report. The disagreements should be discussed with the 
audit committee, even if the disagreements were resolved to the 
auditor’s satisfaction.
7. Consultation with other accountants. If the auditor is aware of manage­
ment’s consultation with other accountants, the auditor should discuss 
the nature of the consultation and the auditor’s views on the significant 
items that were the subject of the consultation with the audit committee.
8. Major issues discussed with management prior to retention. This item 
is designed to discourage “shopping for accounting principles” since 
the audit committee would be aware of any potential agreements 
reached by new auditors and management regarding treatments of 
controversial accounting areas or the scope of the audit.
9. Difficulties encountered in performing the audit. This communication 
is designed to focus on significant audit difficulties that were the direct 
effect of management, such as unreasonable delays in providing infor­
mation or delays caused in commencing the audit.
The auditor is still required to communicate significant deficiencies in the 
organization’s control structure, the discovery of fraud or illegal acts, and 
reservations about interim financial information. It would appear that the 
requirements of SAS No. 61 should meet two of the objectives of audit 
committees as set forth in the Treadway Commission’s recommendations: 
overseeing the financial reporting process and assisting the public account­
ant in preserving independence. SAS No. 61 has had another positive 
change: it has encouraged auditing firms to expand their regular interaction
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with audit committees thereby becoming more conversant with the needs of 
audit committees.
Recent Public Accounting Firm Guidance 
on Audit Committees
Many public accounting firms have recognized that the external auditor 
does indeed serve a unique role that could assist audit committees in 
meeting their public expectations. For example, Grant Thornton (1988), 
in one of its regular newsletters to financial institution clients, states:
The auditors are a gold mine of information. For some reason, bank 
and S&L staff will often confide in auditors about operating 
problems, faulty documentation, or even fraud. The external 
auditors have a better chance of passing this information on to the 
audit committee than the internal auditors.
Advocates of expanded communication with audit committees may be 
disappointed that Grant Thornton only describes the information as some­
thing they “have a better chance of passing along to audit committees” 
rather than being required to pass it along. But it does recognize that 
auditors can expect to communicate more information to audit committees.
Other public accounting firms also see a broader role for audit com­
mittees. Deloitte & Touche, in its booklet Current Issues for Audit 
Committees, 1992, cites the following examples of special projects the 
audit committee may undertake to ensure that the company’s disclosure 
obligations are satisfied:
• Investigating questionable payments or lapses of internal control
• Monitoring compliance with the company’s code of conduct
• Assessing the adequacy of internal control over electronic data process­
ing operations or certain computer-accessible data
• Measuring the impact that changes in accounting standards proposed by 
the FASB or other regulatory bodies are likely to have on the company.
Arthur Andersen & Co., in its booklet Audit Committees in the 1990’s, 
firmly comes to grip with the growing global economy and the need for 
independent and effective action by audit committees. They recognize that 
“expectations of regulatory agencies, shareholders, lenders and the public 
at large have risen dramatically in recent years. These expectations, world­
wide, are likely to broaden even further in the 1990’s and beyond.” Their 
view is broad:
The Audit Committee, with the full Board, should concentrate on 
critical business issues and assure itself that management and the
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independent auditors have focused on the areas of greatest risk to 
the company.
Their subsequent conclusion is the same as that of the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission in its preliminary 
report, Internal Control—Integrated Framework:
The Audit Committee, in conjunction with, or in addition to a 
strong internal audit function is in the best position within an entity 
to identify and act in instances where top management overrides 
other internal controls or otherwise seeks to misrepresent operating 
or financial results.
Areas of risk cited in the Arthur Andersen & Co. document include 
elements of the corporate control environment, regulatory matters, and 
business risk. A review of these risk areas provides an avenue to which 
we can compare the potential expectation gap between audit committee 
needs and SAS No. 61. Elements of that detail are briefly discussed below 
in each of the areas of (1) monitoring the overall corporate control environ­
ment, (2) ensuring a sound financial reporting function, and (3) fostering 
ethical behavior.
Monitoring the Overall Corporate Control Environment. In assess­
ing control, much of the discussion in the AA booklet focuses on traditional 
areas already discussed. However, the information needed to understand, 
assess, and monitor the financial planning and control function includes 
knowledge of an organization’s—
• Strategic business plan.
• Annual operating budget.
•  Future business, financial, and control risks.
• Key financial and business controls.
• Data processing function and related controls.
• Management information systems.
• Liquidity.
• Long-term commitments.
• Regulatory requirements.
Ensuring a Sound Financial Reporting Function. Audit committees 
are increasingly concerned that a sound reporting function exists if they are 
to meet their expanding responsibilities. They can accomplish this analysis 
only if they thoroughly understand the business and related accounting 
concepts. This area includes—
• Understanding the company’s business.
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• Understanding and assessing the financial reporting process, including 
an understanding of the complexity of company business and financial 
systems, significant judgmental reporting matters, and the historical 
reliability of the company’s reporting system.
• Understanding and assessing the fairness of financial reporting.
Fostering Ethical Behavior. AA sees a broad role for audit committees 
in fostering and monitoring an ethical environment in the organization. 
This includes the assurance that a code of conduct is developed, 
implemented, and effectively monitored.
Rising Expectations: Is There a Gap 
or Is It a Nonaudit Role?
Expectations of audit committees are clearly growing. It is not expected 
that required auditor communication address all the issues of rising expec­
tations, but it is necessary to periodically compare the rising expectations 
with current responsibilities. A summary of those expectations and 
SAS No. 61 and other reporting requirements is shown in table 2.
As can be seen in table 2, expectations of audit committees have 
evolved to an extent where much is expected of them. As pointed out 
earlier, a large part of this is caused by changing ideas about corporate 
governance and the growing recognition of the responsibility of the 
board of directors to serve as an independent check on the powers of 
management. Also, as noted earlier, many of these responsibilities are 
being thrust on the audit committee, because usually it is the only 
committee of the board composed solely of outside directors, its members 
are used to probing, and working with independent, objective third-party 
advisors. In this changing environment, we feel that external auditors, 
as well as others, have an important role to play. However, the external 
audit role defined in SAS No. 61 is restricted to financial reporting issues, 
problems in conducting the audit, significant accounting policies, 
judgments, and estimates, and “opinion shopping,” rather than broader 
and more important issues of corporate governance. Our specific 
recommendations about what changes are necessary are discussed 
in the next section.
Questions may be raised as to whether this is a legitimate role for auditors 
to play. However, the changing environment may thrust this role on 
accountants by holding them responsible for not providing such 
information. As the earlier quotation from Al Sommer (1991) stated: “If 
auditors are to reduce the hazards posed by litigation, they must avail them­
selves of every resource available to them. Clearly the audit committee is 
one of those resources. It is in their interest to be sure that the resource
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is as effective as it is possible to make it, and they are in a position to make 
it so.” Some accounting firms are clearly moving toward recognizing this 
increased responsibility. For example, Arthur Andersen believes that 
independent auditors should be prepared to answer the following questions:
• Has the audit identified any areas of serious concern relative to the 
overall corporate control environment?
• To what extent is a review of compliance with government or other 
regulatory requirements a part of the annual audit? Are you aware of any 
areas of significant risk or instances of noncompliance?
• What issues or concerns exist that could have a serious future adverse 
impact on the financial or operating stability of the company? Do you 
believe that these are being addressed by management?
• Are the personnel in the financial organization sufficient in number, 
experience, and capability for the size and complexity of the company 
and its activities?
• Putting yourself in the Audit Committee’s position, are there any other 
key questions that you (the auditor) believe should be asked by us as 
outside directors?
Brochures from other firms suggest similar types of questions.
Clearly, there is a gap between expanding responsibilities and required 
communication. Also, our analysis of table 2 shows that there are many 
areas where external auditors have a competitive advantage in assisting the 
audit committee members in performing their tasks.
R ecom m endations and  Future Research
SAS No. 61 has been effective in promoting communication with audit 
committees. However, as discussed in the previous section, there are areas 
where the auditing profession could more effectively meet the challenge 
offered by Sommer at the beginning of this paper to ensure that this resource 
(i.e., the audit committee) is as effective as possible. The first set of recom­
mendations may have implications for the Auditing Standards Board. The 
second set of recommendations are more pertinent to the general practice of 
public accounting in assisting audit committees to be more effective.
Recommendations With Potential 
Standard-Setting Implications
1. The required communication in SAS No. 61 to audit committees should 
specify that the auditor be required to meet at least once annually with
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the audit committee without members of management present. The 
internal audit profession should develop similar standards for meeting 
with audit committees. Those standards should be incorporated into 
audit committee charters.
2. The SEC should consider having the auditor review quarterly financial 
data on all publicly held clients, significant nonpublicly held financial 
institutions, and other companies that have significant operations in the 
public trust. The results of that review should be communicated to the 
audit committee.
3. Communication with audit committees ought to be expanded to include 
a discussion of compliance with significant laws and regulations where 
noncompliance may cause unusual risks for the organization.
4. SAS No. 55 cites an effective and independent audit committee as one 
of the important elements of an organization’s control environment. 
However, there is a concern as to what constitutes “independent” in 
terms of audit committee membership. The profession should consider 
providing additional guidance in evaluating the independence of audit 
committees—as noted above, it is more than just being an outside direc­
tor. An audit study guide on effective audit committees could develop 
suggestions on the content of meetings, the audit committee charter, 
and the potential audit committee role in evaluating compliance with 
laws and regulations.
5. The profession should consider the development of guidance to assist 
auditors and audit committee members in evaluating aspects of internal 
control such as those being developed in the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) report and cited in the GAO report that have 
traditionally been viewed as administrative controls, but are important 
in assessing business and control risk.
6. The SEC should consider expanded reporting on the resignation of 
audit committee members.
Recommendations for Public Accounting Firms
1. External and internal auditors should anticipate the information needs 
of the audit committee and help it be an effective force. The financial 
management of the company can help this effort by providing regular 
briefings as well as training on important issues to committee members.
2. Audit committee members need to be educated in several areas, 
including those reporting issues in which judgment is required, the 
nature of the business, operational and financial risks facing the 
company, as well as complex financial reporting issues.
3. The public accounting firms should work more aggressively with audit 
committees in ensuring that management takes follow-up actions in 
light of their findings and discussions.
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4. Public accounting firms should work with clients and their internal 
auditors to establish audit committees in organizations such as mutual 
insurance companies that could affect the public well-being.
5. The public accounting profession should work with the internal 
auditors in planning and working to meet the needs of audit com­
mittees. The public accounting profession can reinforce for audit 
committee members the importance of the internal audit function, 
including its usefulness in helping the committee operate effectively.
6. External auditors need to alert audit committees about potential 
problems as soon as they are noted.
Future Research Recommendations
Audit committees are evolving and there is a call for more responsibility 
in the area of corporate governance on a worldwide basis. But are there 
limits to audit committees? These limits and the profiles of effective, 
independent audit committees need to be examined further. We suggest the 
following topics for further research:
• Factors affecting the independence of audit committees. To what extent 
do audit committee members have relationships with management that 
may negatively affect their independence? What are these factors? Should 
these factors be monitored by, or reported to, the SEC?
• Methods to improve accountability of audit committees. To what extent 
should the actions of the audit committee be communicated outside of the 
corporation, especially regarding controversial issues where auditors 
and management may have had disagreements? What mechanisms exist 
to ensure that audit committees communicate effectively with the boards 
of directors?
• Limits and expectations of audit committees. There are limits to the role 
that an audit committee can take in dealing with broad corporate 
governance issues. What are those limits? What mechanisms exist for the 
audit committee to carry out its responsibilities if it has disagreements 
with both management and the board of directors?
C oncluding C om m ents
Audit committees have been, and continue to be, an important component 
of the system of corporate governance. During the last decade they have 
been asked to assume an even greater role. The external auditing function 
can assist audit committees in performing that function and can do so within 
the parameters of SAS No. 61. However, the profession also needs to assist 
audit committee members in achieving needed effectiveness through the 
implementation of the recommendations discussed above.
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A ppendix
Audit Committees: 
A Self-Assessment Guide
Note: The following questions are offered as top-level questions to begin inquiry 
into the nature of Audit Committee activity. A No answer to any of the questions 
requires the committee to consider the effect of the answer on its activity. A Yes 
answer leads to further questions to explore the extent to which procedures relating 
to the question have been effectively implemented.
I. Organization
1. Is your Audit Committee composed of a majority of independent directors?
2. Is the chairman an independent director?
3. Does the Audit Committee follow a written charter?
4. Does the Audit Committee meet at least three times annually?
II. Financial Reporting
1. Does the Audit Committee review annual financial statements, footnotes, 
audit adjustments, accounting changes, and where required to be filed, the 
annual report on Form 10K?
2. Does the Audit Committee review quarterly financial statements and, where 
required, Form 10Q and 8K filings?
3. Does the Audit Committee review transactions with related parties?
4. Does the Audit Committee review status of income and other tax returns, 
reserves, and significant disputes with taxing authorities?
5. Does the Audit Committee review terms of material transactions, contracts, 
and other agreements as they affect the financial statements?
6. Does the Audit Committee review the status of significant legal matters 
affecting the Company?
III. External Auditing Matters
1. Does the Audit Committee recommend or approve the selection or retention 
of the external auditor?
2. Does the Audit Committee evaluate the independence of the external auditor?
3. Does the Audit Committee review the proposed scope and activities of the 
annual audit plan to ensure adequate coverage?
4. Does the Audit Committee review the effect of significant changes in 
accounting principles, auditing standards, and SEC reporting requirements 
on the scope of the audit?
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Does the Audit Committee review the results of the completed audit?
Does the Audit Committee review the weaknesses and recommended improvements in the system of internal control reported by the external auditor?Does the Audit Committee review the timetable for implementation of these recommendations?Do the external auditors have free access to the Audit Committee?Are the external auditors engaged to review quarterly financial statements?
Internal Auditing Matters
Does the Audit Committee approve the hiring or termination of the chief internal auditor?Does the chief internal auditor have free access to the Audit Committee? 
Does the Audit Committee review the proposed internal audit program and its relationship to the scope of the external audit plan?Does the Audit Committee review the proposed scope of any special projects or investigations?Does the Audit Committee review the reports resulting from internal audit work as they relate to financial reporting?Does the Audit Committee review the reports resulting from internal audit work as they relate to weaknesses and recommendations for improvement in the system of internal control?Does the Audit Committee review the timetable for implementation of recommendations to correct weaknesses in internal controls?
Other Matters
Is there a procedure in effect to advise the Audit Committee, on a timely basis, of any serious breakdown in internal controls or management fraud? 
Does the Audit Committee review management perquisites?Does the Audit Committee review reports on any illegal, improper, or sensi­tive payments?Does the Company have a code of business conduct? If so, does the Audit Committee review the compliance procedures?Does the Audit Committee have procedures to document its activities, including the reasons for its decisions?Does the Company include in its annual report to stockholders, a manage­ment report dealing with management’s responsibility for financial statements and the system of internal accounting control?
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Implementing SAS No. 55: 
An Interim Report
W illiam R. Kinney, Jr., University of Texas at Austin 
W illiam L. Felix, Jr., University of Arizona
SAS No. 55 may have the broadest potential impact of any of the expecta­
tions gap standards. It increased the factors to be considered in control 
risk assessment (including risk at the assertions level), provided new 
definitions, and altered the requirements for control testing. The related 
Audit and Accounting Guide showed how the standard can be applied to 
control testing in an electronic data processing (EDP) environment.
We reviewed the literature on SAS No. 55 and the implementation 
guidance of several Big Six, large non-Big Six, and smaller firms. We found 
that auditors are being directed to consider a broader range of control 
factors and to assess control risk at the assertions level. Also, EDP 
guidance is now more systematic and consistent across firms. However, 
the requirements of SAS No. 55 are subject to more varying interpretations 
than were its predecessors. We found that implementation guidance across 
firms is more varied, especially for control testing. Thus, SAS No. 55 may 
have mixed success in narrowing the expectations gap.
Between September 1984 and April 1988 only two SASs were issued 
by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), April 1988 brought nine new 
“expectation gap closing” standards, including a major revision of the offi­
cial guidance on internal control—SAS No. 55. SAS No. 55, Consideration 
of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, was 
accompanied by an unusually large number of explanations and support 
statements as well as a subsequent audit guide to provide additional 
guidance and elaboration (AICPA 1990). There were also expressions 
of concern from ASB members and statements from auditing professors 
and students.
Given the passage of time, what can now be said about SAS No. 55? 
How has it been implemented? How has it affected practice? Has it been 
as successful in improving auditing as the proponents claimed it would? 
Have consequences been as dire as its detractors predicted? Although we
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cannot be definitive in answering these questions, we can provide an 
interim review report of some changes to date.
In this brief paper, we review the claims and counterclaims made about 
SAS No. 55 and select several key points of controversy for follow up. We 
then review the scholarly and practice literature on internal control, SAS 
No. 55, and the related audit guide. This is followed by an analysis of audit 
polity and practice guidance of four Big Six and three second nine public 
accounting firms, as well as an audit guide used by a large number of 
smaller firms. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
SAS No. 55: Prom ise and  Pitfalls
Before attempting to assess the implementation of SAS No. 55 and 
whether it has been successful, it is useful to review some of the claims 
made about why it was needed, what it was intended to accomplish, and 
why some had opposing views. Our review includes justification of the 
statement by the ASB’s chairman (Sullivan 1988) and three 1988 Journal of 
Accountancy articles explaining the statement to AICPA members (Guy and 
Sullivan 1988; Monk and Tatum 1988; Temkin and Winters 1 9 8 8 ) .1 The 
opposing views are from those ASB members expressing qualified assents 
and dissents to issuance of SAS No. 55, a professor and former AICPA 
vice-president (Carmichael 1987), a discussant’s comments on Sullivan 
(Kinney 1988), and two articles evaluating SAS No. 55 (Morton and Felix 
1990, 1991).
Supporting Views
According to the ASB’s chairman, SAS No. 55 was based on an analysis 
of Treadway Commission materials and some unpublished research 
conducted by Coopers & Lybrand (Sullivan 1988). SAS No. 55 was needed 
to correct some serious weaknesses in AU section 320 (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1)—the descendant of Statement on Auditing Procedures 
(SAP) No. 54. In particular, correction was needed to (1) broaden 
the auditor’s review of internal controls to consider additional types of 
misstatement, especially fraudulent reporting by management; (2) focus on 
financial statement assertions; and (3) encourage use of multiple levels of 
control risk and not simply a “rely” or “don’t rely” approach.
Some concerns related to weaknesses in the wording of AU section 320 
itself, and some involved application of the guidance in practice (table 1
1 These latter articles were reprinted in an AICPA booklet entitled Implementing the 
Expectation Gap Standards (AICPA 1989).
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summarizes both types of comments). As an example of the former, all 
commentators believed that the focus of AU section 320 was too narrow. In 
planning audits, auditors did not consider all possible misstatements that 
might arise—notably intentional misstatement by management. Sullivan 
(1988) stressed that misstatements are typically not in the transactions but 
in fraudulent reporting.
It should be noted that SAP No. 54 was the source of the guidance that the 
auditor should consider possible errors that might arise in the accounting 
process. AU section 320, paragraph 74, described a four-step “conceptually 
logical approach.” Also, paragraph 53 of AU section 320 states that an 
internal control review “should be designed to provide. . .  an understanding 
of the control environment an d ...th e  accounting system  [emphasis 
added].” However, it is true that most of the AU section 320 guidance 
focused on transactions and controls over transactions.
TABLE 1 Criticisms of AU Section 320
Said to Be Alleviated by SAS No. 55
Criticism
Sullivan
(1988)
Guy and 
Sullivan 
(1988)
Temkin and 
Winters 
(1988)
Monk and 
Tatum 
(1988)
Weaknesses in wording: 
Focus is on transactions 
and control procedures, 
and not on environment 
and accounting system X X X X
Assertions not addressed X X X X
Inadequate recognition of 
effects of EDP X
Compliance test sampling 
for transactions is 
over-emphasized X X X
Relation of substantive 
tests to compliance tests 
and control weaknesses 
not clear X X
Weaknesses in application: 
Auditors implicitly rely 
on internal control without 
adequate documentation X X
Reliance tends to be all 
or nothing X X X
88
The lack of attention to the control environment may lead to a lack of 
consideration of the possibility of fraudulent reporting by management or 
to lax implementation of controls by management’s employees. One might 
argue that the possibility of management fraud is properly a part of the 
inherent risk that exists even with excellent controls, and that (top) manage­
ment fraud is within the scope of another expectations gap standard 
(SAS No. 53). However, almost all would agree that the potential effective­
ness of internal control procedures can be undone by a management with 
fraudulent intent or that is lax in its attitude toward controls.
The proponents of SAS No. 55 also believed that the wording of AU section 
320 was not clear as to the relation of substantive tests to compliance test 
results and control weaknesses. Many auditors believed that compliance 
tests were tests of transactions and that they applied only to individual 
transactions (Temkin and Winters 1988). Monk and Tatum (1988) comment 
that statistical sampling is not required to assess control risk and frequently 
is used in compliance testing when it is not needed.
Other expressed concerns related to weaknesses in the application of the 
guidance of AU section 320 in practice. That is, although the words might be 
in AU section 320, auditors did not behave according to the standard. One very 
serious claim was that, due to confusion about the requirements for reliance, 
many auditors stated in their workpapers that they did not rely on controls, but 
implicitly relied on them for some assertions (Sullivan 1988). Implicit reliance 
might exist without even a review of the internal control “structure.” Although 
this behavior was not sanctioned by AU section 320, Sullivan claims that it was 
the result of the section, possibly because auditors fa iled to understand 
compliance sampling. Finally, three of the four papers listed in table 1 state 
that, under AU section 320, control reliance tended to be “all or nothing” 
rather than various degrees of reliance, depending on the circumstances.
Overall, we interpret these comments to favor a less structured, less 
detailed, more holistic approach to control risk assessment.
Opposing Views
ASB members expressed many reservations about particular features of 
SAS No. 55. Two ASB members gave qualified assents to issuance and four 
others dissented from issuance of the entire document. This is the largest 
number of members expressing dissatisfaction with a final statement in the 
history of the ASB. At issue were the definition of “control tests,” the extent 
of control testing required to support an assessment of control risk at less 
than the maximum, the role of evidence in control risk assessment, and the 
relation of control weaknesses to substantive tests (see table 2).2
2 Note that the latter two issues were also alleged weaknesses in AU section 320 that 
SAS No. 55 was designed to replace.
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TABLE 2 Some Critical Responses to SAS No. 55
Response
ASB Members’ 
Qualified Assents 
and Dissents 
(1988)
Carmichael
(1987)
Kinney
(1988)
Morton 
and Felix 
(1990, 1991)
Weaknesses in 
wording:
Relation of sub­
stantive tests to 
control tests and 
control weak­
nesses not clear X X X X
“Evidence” is 
redefined and 
is ambiguous X
Control risk 
definition unclear X X
Weaknesses in 
practical application: 
Less rigorous 
(less conclusive) 
control testing 
is required X X X X
Efficiency is 
encouraged while 
effectiveness 
is slighted X X X X
Overreliance on 
management 
representations 
and controls 
is encouraged X X X X
Beyond concerns about the clarity of wording, some ASB members also 
believed that SAS No. 55 might lead to less effective auditing and might 
widen the expectations gap. Dissenting members’ concerns about effective­
ness included: “Placing undue reliance on effectiveness of specific control 
procedures based solely on inquiry of client personnel and inspection 
of client-prepared documents” ; the need for “review and evaluation” of 
internal control and not merely an “understanding” of controls; and that 
SAS No. 55 “does not clearly distinguish the operating effectiveness of an 
internal control structure policy or procedure from the placing in opera­
tion. ..” (AICPA 1988a).
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Academic commentators raised similar concerns about wording and the 
possible reduction of audit effort leading to overreliance on controls. For 
example, Morton and Felix (1991) explain how auditors with different 
beliefs about the possible existence of material misstatement can come to 
substantially different levels of achieved audit risk. This is due to the new 
definition of control risk and the role that control testing plays in its 
assessment.3 Kinney (1988) laments that the focus of SAS No. 55 is on 
efficiency instead of effectiveness. He cites several reminders that evidence 
supporting a low-risk assessment in one area may also imply low risk in 
related areas. These reminders of interconnections that reduce audit work 
are not balanced by reminders of those that may increase it. For example, 
recent litigation cases and Waller (1992) indicate that when misstatements 
exist there are often multiple misstatements. This fact has substantial 
implications for the assessment of risk.
Both Kinney (1988) and Carmichael (1987) were concerned that the 
changes in wording would lead to underauditing in practice. At issue was 
ambiguity as to what credit should be taken for management’s attitudes 
toward controls, when reliance on controls and low inherent risk assess­
ments could eliminate substantive tests, whether maximum risk meant zero 
reliance, the nature and extent of control testing, and how control risk 
assessments relate to substantive tests.
Overall, the ASB and academic commentators expressed beliefs that the 
new guidance allows many possible interpretations with different implications 
for audit effectiveness. This view may have been shared by others. The 
discussant of Morton and Felix (1990) gives the rather surprising view that 
“literal interpretations of SAS No. 55 can be misleading” (Kreutzfeldt 1990).
Judgm ent Research on Internal Controls
Since Ashton’s 1974 article on internal control judgments, a significant 
portion of audit judgment and decision-making research has used an 
internal control setting. Student and auditor subjects have been studied 
while learning internal controls, assessing control risks, making judgments 
about the extent of tests of controls, and evaluating the effects of their 
internal control work on planned substantive tests. As a result, a number of 
useful insights have been generated. We believe some have had an impact on 
the policies and practices of individual firms. Early work by Ashton (1974), 
Joyce (1976), and Mock and Turner (1981), for example, suggest that auditors
3 SAS No. 55 also broadens the concept of “evidence” to include evidence about con­
trols. To our knowledge, prior AICPA literature limited the concept of evidence to 
that which helps to satisfy the third standard of field work (“sufficient competent 
evidential matter”). Under SAS No. 55, risk assessment evidence that relates to the 
risk that misstatement might occur may be confused with substantive evidence for 
limiting the detection risk that misstatement has occurred.
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were not consistent in their assessments of the qualities of internal controls or 
their importance. More recent studies suggest that, in line with complaints 
about AU section 320 and SAS No. 55, auditors have difficulty linking 
internal controls to errors (Bonner 1990).
In Frederick (1991), practicing auditors and auditing students were asked 
to recall from memory internal controls that would be effective in prevent­
ing or detecting specific errors. His purpose was to improve understanding 
of knowledge differences between experienced and inexperienced auditors. 
Experienced auditors had not only more extensive knowledge of controls, 
as expected, but also organized their knowledge in memory differently. 
Thus, this study provides information about auditors’ abilities to link errors 
and controls.
In a study closer to SAS No. 55, Brown and Solomon (1990) specifically 
focused on control risk assessments using configural (or combination pattern) 
knowledge to compensate and amplify controls. The auditors did use internal 
control information in a “configural” manner, suggesting that internal control 
risk assessment guidance should be sensitive to the system of internal controls. 
This evidence supports continued inclusion of the accounting system as part of 
the internal control structure, as defined by SAS No. 55 (and AU section 320).
Two recent papers (Waller 1990, 1992) investigated auditor assessments 
of both inherent and control risk across all five major assertions for three 
commonly material accounts—Trade Accounts Receivable, Inventory, and 
Trade Accounts Payable. In an experiment, Waller (1990) found judgmental 
dependence between inherent and control risk assessments, and a strong 
association between risk assessments across both inherent and control risk. 
The latter occurred despite the fact that the rate of detected misstatements 
varied significantly over the assertions. In an analysis of audit workpapers, 
Waller (1992) investigates the effects of second-order uncertainty (Waller 
and Felix 1984), or the evidence sufficiency of control risk assessments. He 
finds that auditors do address second-order uncertainty in control risk 
assessment, and that the contribution of separate assessments is an 
unresolved issue. The results of this study indicate that the call by Morton 
and Felix (1991) for clarification of the control risk definition is potentially 
important in the auditor’s assessment and use of internal control risk.
Waller’s papers also identify significant issues in applying SAS No. 55. 
Separate assessments of inherent risk and control risk present at least 
two problems (see also Kinney 1984). First, in both professional standards 
and the firm literature for the subjects in Waller’s experiments there is 
substantial overlap in the factors to consider in assessing inherent risk and 
internal control risk. Thus, separation of inherent risk and control risk is 
ambiguous. Second, because control risk has both preventive and detective 
components, a probability theory-based decomposition is not possible 
unless preventive control risk and detective control risk are kept separate. 
He suggests that a combined “auditee” risk be assessed in place of separate 
assessments of control risk and inherent risk.
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Finally, related to the overall thrust of SAS No. 55, Waller (1992) finds 
that there is considerable positive co-occurrence among and between 
misstatements in the assertions. For example, if overstatement is discovered 
in an earnings assertion for one account, it is likely to be accompanied by 
overstatements of earnings in other assertions or accounts. This implies that 
when the auditor becomes aware of misstatements, he or she should 
consider reevaluating the prior probability of misstatement (or the product 
of inherent risk and control risk) for other assertions and other accounts.
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1990) investigate the association between inter­
nal control risk assessments and detected errors. Their study was motivated 
by contradicting evidence in the early literature (see Willingham and Wright 
1985). Kreutzfeldt and Wallace conclude that their data strongly suggest 
that control risk assessments are linked to errors at the account level (Waller 
1992 elaborates on this linkage). They also note that joint consideration of 
inherent and control risk factors is useful.
Another issue is how auditors’ control judgments should be combined. 
Libby and Libby (1989) obtained expert auditors’ judgments about control 
risk for a set of cases. They then conducted experiments asking less expert 
auditors to evaluate the same cases. One group made global judgments 
about control risk and a second group made judgments about individual risk 
elements that were then combined using a mechanical algorithm to yield an 
overall risk assessment. Libby and Libby found that the individual risk 
assessments combined mechanically were closer to the experts’ judgments 
than were the global judgments. This implies that global judgments of less 
experienced personnel may be improved through structure such as can be 
provided in professional standards, as well as the guidance of firms.
In two separate papers, Morton and Felix (1990, 1991) suggest that the 
ASB’s combination of risk assessments and evidence sufficiency judgments 
in one construct, “assessed internal control risk” in SAS No. 55, was an 
unexpected and potentially confusing choice. The choice was unexpected 
because there is no literature indicating that such a combination is a sensible 
and efficient approach to considering the two elements. They suggest the 
choice may be confusing because the result is an auditing planning element 
that has different meanings in different contexts.
Analysis of Audit Policy M aterials
To assess the implementation of SAS No. 55 in practice, we reviewed 
the audit practice and policy guidance statements of several large public 
accounting firms. Included were four Big Six firms and three firms from the 
second nine. We also reviewed the guidance in Practitioners Publishing 
Company’s Guide to Audits of Small Businesses (Carmichael, McMurrian, 
and Anderson 1991), which is used by many smaller firms. Thus, we had 
input from a wide range of accounting firms.
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Our review covered several topics, but we focus on the thirteen areas 
noted in tables 1 and 2. As might be expected, the results are mixed. Some 
problems or alleged problems seem to have been mitigated by SAS No. 55 
and the audit guide, whereas others have not. And, some predictions of both 
the supporters and the detractors for SAS No. 55 are supported by our 
review, whereas others are not. Table 3 summarizes our findings.
TABLE 3 Score Sheet for Claims of Proponents 
and Opponents of SAS No. 55
__________________ SAS No. 55__________________
_____________________________ Successful_______________ Unsuccessful______
Proponents (Table 1)
Broader focus of 
control risk (CR) 
assessment
Assertions basis
EDP recognition
Less transaction 
compliance testing
Relation of control 
effectiveness to 
substantive tests
Reduced implicit 
reliance on controls
Variable reliance 
on controls
Opponents (Table 2)
Relation of control 
effectiveness to 
substantive tests
“Evidence” ill-defined
“Control risk” ill-defined
Less rigorous 
control testing
Efficiency unduly 
encouraged
Overreliance on 
management repre­
sentations encouraged
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Supporters
We find successes for SAS No. 55 and the audit guide in resolving four 
of the five alleged difficulties caused by the wording of SAP No. 54 and 
AU section 320 (the first five issues in table 1). First, all manuals give 
attention to the control environment and the accounting system. As 
discussed in both sections above, it is arguable that aspects of the control 
environment relate to inherent risk and not to control risk. However, there 
is particular attention given to assessing the risk of management fraud and 
to the likely attention of management to any control deviations or fraud 
by employees. As to recognition of all possible types of errors, we did not 
find evidence that auditors are instructed to list systematically all possible 
errors. Furthermore, one firm has formally reduced the scope of its internal 
control work. Prior to SAS No. 55 it required the auditor to identify, 
document, and evaluate basic controls in the control environment. Now, 
the required work is limited to controls over completeness and accuracy 
of records.
Second, the policy guidance of all firms indicates an assertions-at-the- 
account-balance-level evaluation of control risk.4 Third, there is evidence of 
increased attention to electronic data processing (EDP) and to lower control 
risk assessments due to EDP. All of the firms surveyed prescribe a separate 
workpaper section evaluating EDP. One Big Six firm that previously had 
used a transactions level approach defines EDP as “inherently reliable” 
under specified conditions, and has worksheets to help assess EDP features 
and controls for virtually all audits. Furthermore, the same guidance states 
that EDP should lead the auditor to focus on controls over EDP pro­
grammed controls and not on transactions directly. Although one could 
argue that technological change and not SAS No. 55 is the cause of the 
change, SAS No. 55 (especially the audit guide) encourages such an 
approach since the controls over controls (i.e., supervisory controls) may 
be relatively easy to test and may eliminate costly tests of controls over 
transactions. Finally, as discussed below, use of audit sampling in tests of 
controls is a “last resort” effort in six of the seven firms studied.
On the other side of the ledger, we find that the ties between control risk 
and substantive tests are still rather vague. Part of the problem may be in 
SAS No. 55 itself. For example, the Practitioners Publishing Company 
guide states: “The auditor’s task in assessing control risk is to link control 
policies and procedures with assertions. SAS No. 55 provides no guidance 
on methods for establishing that link [emphasis added].”
Given the lack of linkage in the SAS, firms have developed their own. One 
second tier firm states simply that for low control risk, the auditor will
4 Three firms have modified the approach by including “cutoffs” and “accuracy” along 
with the five assertions from SAS No. 31 to yield seven “objectives” for each account.
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“typically rely on analytical procedures as the primary test.” For maximum 
control risk, use of analytical procedures as the primary procedure will be 
limited, whereas for moderate risk, a blend of procedures is common. 
Interestingly, the same firm provides structured audit programs for moder­
ate risk but requires that the auditor generate his or her own program for 
low and maximum risk. Thus, the auditor is encouraged to assess control 
risk at the moderate level. Further encouragement for a moderate risk 
assessment is offered in control testing. For moderate risk, firm policy 
states that control testing can be limited to a “walk-through” of three to five 
items selected from the accounting period.5 Apparently this is a control test 
over the design of the system. There are no required tests to support an 
evaluation of moderate risk for “operating effectively.” For an assessment 
of “low” control risk, a sample of fifty to sixty items is required, but the 
auditor can judgmentally evaluate whether the sample deviation rate is 
sufficiently below the tolerable deviation rate to justify the “low control 
risk” assessment. The auditor could decide that two, three, or even five or 
six deviations might be acceptable evidence that the population rate does 
not exceed 10 percent, for example.
Whether positive or negative, a trend away from audit sampling for 
control testing is obvious in all three of the Big Six firms reviewed. One 
states, “Examination of evidence, coupled with in-depth inquiry and 
observation, often provides sufficient evidence about the effective design 
and operation of controls without using sampling techniques.” Further, the 
focus is on whether “individuals responsible for a control understand it 
and are diligent in its execution, and for computerized controls,. . .  how the 
client ensures that it is properly implemented, maintained, and operated.” 
This firm also states that inquiries, observations, and examinations of 
evidence are “normally sufficient” to assess whether the control is operat­
ing effectively. Cases of required reperformance of a procedure are not 
the normal case and no guidance is offered as to how such procedures 
are to be applied.
Another Big Six firm limits audit sampling for control testing to “possi­
ble use for testing manual controls if high reliance is to be placed on them” 
and the minimum sample size is set at twenty. For this firm, “a moderate 
degree of control satisfaction” can be obtained from a review of controls, 
“supplemented by a process of inquiry and observation, possibly including 
the tracing of a few items through the system (to provide evidence regarding 
the operating effectiveness).”
A third Big Six firm that prior to SAS No. 55 had strongly encouraged 
broad use of audit sampling, now has guidance that states: “Sampling is not
5 On the other hand, the Practitioners Publishing Company’s guide is very explicit in 
warning that walk-throughs “[r]arely provide enough evidence about operating 
effectiveness by themselves to allow reduced control risk assessment.”
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necessarily required for tests of controls.” Rather, the judgment about 
control risk often “involves many control procedures operating together 
and does not necessarily require a separate judgment about a particular 
procedure.” However, if sampling is deemed important for an individual 
procedure, then a sample of twenty-five is to be taken and a single deviation 
indicates that the procedure does not support an assessment of low control 
risk assessment. Thus, if sampling is used for control tests, the criteria for 
assessment is clear.
We find improvement in practice in the required consideration and 
documentation of controls for most of the firms surveyed. By focusing on 
assertions, the control environment, and the accounting system, there is at 
least some consideration of the reliance on controls to satisfy the complete­
ness assertion and implicit reliance on controls is more explicit. In fact, one 
firm states that reliance on controls for completeness is often essential and 
may require a control risk assessment.
Finally, we find evidence that auditors are relying on controls to a varying 
degree. The most common classifications used by auditors are “maximum 
risk,” “moderate risk” and “low risk.” Some firms also use a “slightly less 
than the maximum” category. The latter category yields a 20 percent reduc­
tion in substantive sample size with very little auditor effort at control risk 
assessment. This level is a new one for the firm (i.e., new with SAS No. 55) 
and it should be noted that “maximum” means 1.0 risk or no control 
reliance for this firm. For some other firms, the “maximum” risk is clearly 
less than one. Thus, substantive tests and achieved audit risk will vary 
across firms even when they agree that control risk is at the “maximum.”
Opponents
As to the critics of SAS No. 55, we find that their concerns were justified 
(at least the six listed in table 2). There is now no confusion about 
the meaning of compliance tests (since the term has been deleted), 
but, there is now confusion about control tests and how they are to be 
considered. The varying interpretations are especially apparent for tests of 
whether controls are operating effectively. For example, one firm warns 
against overreliance on management inquiry for evidence about “operating 
effectively,” whereas two other firms require no tests for effectiveness if the 
assessment is moderate risk. In contrast to the latter two, the smaller firm’s 
guidance was particularly strong in warning that inquiry and observation 
are persuasive only while the auditor is present, and that “persuasiveness 
of evidence from prior audits is limited because effectiveness may 
have changed.”
A review of the policy guidance clearly indicates that many auditors have 
reduced the extent and relaxed the nature of control testing. This comes in 
three forms. One, given increased emphasis on EDP and programmed
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controls, detailed sampling of individual controls is properly reduced. This 
may be in part balanced by more testing of the design and operating 
effectiveness of EDP controls and supervisory controls (i.e., supervisory 
controls over transaction controls). Second, we found many references to 
“ inquiry” and “observation” of control procedures and relatively little 
about “reperformance.” Thus, risk of overreliance on controls that are not 
operating effectively may be increased. Third, as discussed above, we did 
not find any firm that requires (or even encourages) audit sampling for 
control tests.
The emphasis on audit efficiency in SAS No. 55 is also evident in the 
firms’ guidance on the relation among controls. As examples, one firm 
states “certain controls over completeness and existence may also reduce 
the risk of cutoff errors at year end,” and “information used to make 
valuation judgments may be subject to controls. . .  [and].. . may provide 
evidence about the reliability of that information, thus reducing the 
evidence needed from other tests.”
As to the linkage of control risk to the substantive audit, there appears to 
be a trend away from audit sampling and tests of details.6 One firm’s 
guidance states that “normally” it is not necessary to perform substantive 
tests of details of transactions in the income statement. Rather, when 
the risk of material misstatement is not high, the balance sheet work and 
analytical procedures provide the necessary assurance.
One concern about SAS No. 55 was that credit would be taken for a “good 
attitude” toward internal control (Carmichael 1987; Kinney 1988). We did 
not find firm guidance references to control risk reduction for good attitude 
alone. On the positive side, one Big Six firm now states that in a good con­
trol environment the “evidence obtained by inquiry of client personnel is 
more persuasive.” The same guidance also cautions the auditor that inquiry 
ordinarily will not support reliance on effective operation of a control 
procedure. On the other side, we did not find similar cautions in the other 
firms’ guidance. Nor did we find cautions about the co-occurrence of errors 
problem documented in Waller (1992).
We were unable to locate any comprehensive transition documents 
bridging the firms’ guidance from AU section 320 to SAS No. 55. This 
would have been helpful in determining at least the initial interpretation 
of the new guidance and how it might affect practice. We did get contem­
poraneous input from one Big Six partner who called us when his firm’s 
guidance was changed. He said, “Bill, you will be interested to know that 
our firm has just issued new guidance that substantially reduces the amount
6 Concerning the linkage, the Practitioners Publishing Company guide states: “The 
auditor’s task in assessing control risk is to link control policies and procedures with 
assertions. SAS No. 55 provides no guidance on methods for establishing that link 
[emphasis added].”
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of auditing that our personnel are required to do.” Bill said, “Really, what 
do you call it?” He responded, “We call it ‘implementing SAS No. 55,’ but 
the effect is to reduce our required effort in order to be competitive.”
Conclusions
In conclusion, based on our review of the objectives and the guidance of 
SAS No. 55, we find that implementation has had mixed success at best. 
Clearly, there is more attention being given to assertions at the account 
balance level, to documenting the control environment and accounting 
system, and to reliance on supervisory controls including EDP-based 
controls. Also, there is a broader focus overall for control risk assessment. 
This reliance on a combination of controls is probably well placed.
There is still confusion about what control tests mean, especially tests 
of operating effectiveness, and about the links between controls and 
substantive tests. Also, it is clear that there is more flexibility allowed in 
control testing to support an assessment of low control risk than was 
required for a “high-reliance” assessment under AU section 320. There is 
great variation in the basis for a “moderate-risk” assessment.
It is difficult to determine whether SAS No. 55 and the related audit guide 
have improved audit practice on the average. Audits should be better in that 
a broader range of risk factors is being considered at the planning stage. 
However, this possible improvement may be more than balanced by less 
rigorous control testing and looser links to substantive tests.
There is considerable risk that the variance of audit practice has been 
increased by SAS No. 55, especially given recent competitive pressures 
to lower audit fees. Different interpretations of the minimum requirements 
for determining operating effectiveness of controls can lead to dramatic 
differences in the audit effort expended on control risk assessment. In turn, 
there will be different levels of detection risk with a final result of different 
levels of achieved audit risk.
Since audit quality is not easily observed in the short run, any large 
differences in average audit effort across audit firms may drive high-quality 
auditors out of business. In the long run, the low-quality auditors may also 
fail due to unmet expectations. We remain concerned that reliance on more 
general, subjective, and impressionistic control risk assessments may lead 
to significant variation (if not reduction) in audit effectiveness.
99
References
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1988a. Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 55, Consideration of Internal Control Structure in a 
Financial Statement Audit. New York: AICPA.
______  1988b. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities. New York: AICPA.
______  1989. Implementing the Expectations Gap Standards. New York: AICPA.
______  1990. Audit Guide for Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a
Financial Statement Audit. New York: AICPA
Ashton, R.H. 1974. “An Experimental Study of Internal Control Judgments.” 
Journal of Accounting Research (Spring), 143-157.
Bonner, S.E. 1990. “Experience Effects in Auditing: The Role of Task Specific 
Knowledge.” The Accounting Review (January), 72-92.
Brown, D.E. and I. Solomon. 1990. “Auditor Configural Information Processing 
in Control Risk Assessment.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 
(Fall), 17-38.
Carmichael, D.R. 1987. “Reconsider the Exposure Draft on Control Risk.” The 
CPA Journal (November), 54.
Carmichael, D.R., H.P. McMurrian, and J. Anderson. 1991. Guide to Audits of 
Small Businesses, Vol. 1, 9th edition. Fort Worth, Texas: Practitioners 
Publishing Company, July.
Felix, W.L., Jr., and M.S. Miles. 1988. “Research and Internal Control Evaluation.” 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Spring), 43-60.
Frederick, D.M. 1991. “Auditors’ Representation and Retrieval of Internal Control 
Knowledge.” The Accounting Review (April), 240-258.
Guy, D.M. and J.D. Sullivan. 1988. “The Expectation Gap Auditing Standards.” 
Journal of Accountancy (April), 36-46.
Joyce, E.J. 1976. “Expert Judgment in Audit Program Planning.” Journal of 
Accounting Research (Suppl.), 29-60.
Kinney, W.R., Jr. 1984. “Discussant’s Response to an Analysis of the Audit Frame­
work Focussing on Inherent Risk in the Role of Statistical Sampling and 
Compliance Testing.” In Auditing Symposium VII. Lawrence, Kansas: Touche 
Ross/University of Kansas, 126-132.
______  1988. “Discussant’s Response to ‘Why the Auditing Standards on Evalu­
ating Internal Control Needed to be Replaced.’ ” In Auditing Symposium IX. 
Lawrence, Kansas: Touche Ross/University of Kansas, 55-60.
______  1989. “Achieved Audit Risk and the Audit Outcome Space.” Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory (Suppl.), 67-84.
Kreutzfeldt, R.W. 1990. “Discussant’s Response to Assessing Control Risk: 
Effects of Procedural Differences on Auditor Consensus.” In Auditing Research 
Symposium X. Lawrence, Kansas: Touche Ross/University of Kansas, 132-145.
Kreutzfeldt, R.W. and W.A. Wallace. 1990. “Control Risk Assessments: Do They 
Relate to Errors?” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Suppl.), 1-26.
100
Libby, R. and P. A. Libby. 1989. “Expert Measurement and Mechanical Combina­
tion in Control Reliance Decisions.” The Accounting Review (October), 
729-747.
Mock, T.J. and L. Turner. 1981. Internal Accounting Control Evaluation and 
Auditor Judgment. New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Monk, H.L., Jr. and K.W. Tatum. 1988. “Applying SAS No. 55 in Audits of Small 
Business.” Journal of Accountancy (November), 25-34.
Morton, J.E. and W.L. Felix, Jr. 1990. “Assessing Control Risk: Effects of Procedural 
Differences on Auditor Consensus.” In Auditing Research Symposium X. 
Lawrence, Kansas: Touche Ross/University of Kansas, 109-131.
_____ . 1991. “A Critique of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55,” Accounting
Horizons (March), 1-10.
Sullivan, J.D. 1988. “Why the Auditing Standards on Evaluating Internal Control 
Needed to be Replaced.” In Auditing Symposium IX. Lawrence, Kansas: 
Touche Ross/University of Kansas, 47-54.
Temkin, R.H. and A.J. Winters. 1988. “SAS No. 55: The Auditor’s New Respon­
sibility for Internal Control.” Journal of Accountancy (May), 23, 86-98.
Waller, W.S. 1990. Auditors ’ Probability Assessments: A Constructive Perspective. 
University of Arizona Working Paper.
______ 1992. “Auditors’ Inherent Control Risk Assessments: A Priori and Empiri­
cal Analyses.” University of Arizona Working Paper.
Waller, W. and W.L. Felix, Jr. 1984. “Cognition and the Auditor’s Opinion Formu­
lation Process: A Schematic Model of Interactions Between Memory and 
Current Audit Evidence.” In S. Moriarity and E. Joyce (Eds.), Decision 
Making and Accounting Research: Current Research. Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma, 27-48.
Willingham, J. J. and W. F. Wright. 1985. “Financial Statement Errors and Internal 
Control Judgments.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Fall), 57-70.
101
An Evaluation of SAS No. 53, 
The Auditor's Responsibility 
to Detect and Report 
Errors and Irregularities
W. Steve Albrecht, Brigham Young University 
John J. Willingham, KPMG Peat Marwick
The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant research, litigation, and 
state of practice to determine if SAS No. 53 has been successful in narrowing 
the expectation gap with respect to auditors ’ responsibilities to detect and 
report errors and irregularities. The paper concludes that SAS No. 53 can 
be successful if (1) users, the SEC, and the courts accept SAS No. 53 as 
defining the auditor’s responsibility to detect and disclose fraud or (2) if 
SAS No. 53 effectively changes the way auditors conduct audits so that 
audits actually provide “reasonable assurance” that irregularities have 
been detected. The evidence concerning both possibilities seems rather 
negative. Indeed, SAS No. 53 contains three limiting caveats that appear to 
be unacceptable to users, the SEC, and the courts. Accordingly, lawsuits 
against accountants appear not to have decreased. In addition, the quality 
of an audit is being questioned today more than ever. Users ’ expectations 
of auditors to detect fraud appear to be deeply rooted in the profession’s 
earlier undertakings to detect fraud. Changes made by auditors because of 
SAS No. 53 appear to be rather cosmetic at best. In addition, this paper 
provides empirical evidence about the effectiveness o f the risk factors 
identified in SAS No. 53 in identifying financial statements where material 
misstatement is likely.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 provides guidance on the 
independent auditor’s responsibility for the detection of errors and 
irregularities in the audit o f financial statements. It was effective for audits 
of financial statements for periods beginning on or after January 1, 1989. 
One of the purposes motivating its issuance was the need to narrow the 
expectation gap between what independent auditors actually do and what 
the users of financial statements perceive that they do.
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The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant research, litigation, 
and state of practice to determine if SAS No. 53 has been successful in 
narrowing the expectation gap with respect to errors and irregularities. 
In meeting this objective, the paper is divided into ten sections. In the first, 
the relevant parties (players) involved in the expectation gap controversy are 
identified. In the second, a brief history of auditing standards relating to 
errors and irregularities is presented. In the third, SAS No. 53 is analyzed 
to determine how it differs from previous standards and what promise it 
holds to close the expectation gap. In the fourth, the guidance provided in 
SAS No. 53 to identify risk factors that may signal financial statement 
fraud are examined and empirical research that tested their reliance is 
presented. In the fifth, evidence concerning whether auditors have changed 
their practice because of SAS No. 53 is presented. In the sixth, evidence 
regarding the views of the public—one of the primary groups of users 
of audits—about SAS No. 53 is discussed. In the seventh, evidence describ­
ing the views and expectations of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) with respect to errors and irregularities are discussed. In the eighth, 
lessons learned about SAS No. 53 from lawyers’ perceptions are pre­
sented. In the ninth, litigation evidence relating to SAS No. 53 issues is 
presented. The paper concludes with a short summary and implications 
for the profession.
Parties Involved in the 
Expectation Gap Controversy
There are five primary parties (players) involved in the expectation gap 
controversy. On one side are (1) the AICPA with its professional standards 
and (2) practicing independent auditors. Together, these groups promulgate 
auditing standards that articulate the necessary care that must be exercised 
when conducting an audit and issues audit opinions used by the public.
On the other side are three independent groups: (1) the public, usually 
represented by investors and creditors, (2) the SEC, to which all public 
companies must report, and (3) the courts, which make determinations, 
usually in civil cases, about whether auditors have been negligent in 
conducting an audit and/or whether or not they should pay penalties to 
plaintiffs (usually investors and creditors) who have suffered damages.
Each of these five groups has had significant input in determining the 
level of responsibility an auditor has to detect errors and irregularities 
when conducting an audit. The public, usually through opinion polls and 
editorials, has stated its position about auditors’ responsibilities to detect 
irregularities. The SEC, through various releases, has also stated its 
position about auditors’ responsibility to detect irregularities. The courts, 
through their rulings in numerous cases where the quality of auditors’
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work has been questioned, have made determinations as to the extent of 
responsibility an auditor has to detect irregularities.
As will be discussed, the positions of the public, the SEC, and the courts 
have been relatively consistent over time. The position of the AICPA 
and auditors, on the other hand, has been quite fluid, changing consider­
ably over time. Thus, for purposes of this paper, the expectation gap 
is the perceived difference between the three parties (public, SEC, and 
courts) and the public accounting profession (AICPA and auditors) with 
respect to an auditor’s responsibility to detect errors and irregularities while 
conducting an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS).
Auditors' Responsibility to Detect Errors 
and Irregularities: A Brief History
During the early part of this century there was universal agreement, even 
among auditors, that the detection of fraud (irregularities) was one of the 
primary purposes for conducting an audit of financial statements. Indeed, 
as noted in Carmichael and Willingham (1971), the function of detecting 
fraud is deeply rooted in the historical role of auditors, dating back 
to the early 1500s. As late as the 1930s, most auditors emphasized the 
detection of fraud as a primary purpose of an audit. Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) stated, “Until recently there was substantial acceptance of the idea 
that an independent audit had as one of its principal purposes the detection 
and prevention of fraud and other irregularities.” An early edition of 
Montgomery1 listed three objectives of the audit: (1) “The detection 
of fraud,” (2) “The detection of technical errors,” and (3) “The detection of 
errors in principle.”
By the late 1930s, there was a very visible change in the auditing profes­
sion’s willingness to accept responsibility for detecting fraud as a purpose 
of an audit of financial statements. This revolutionary change culminated in 
the issuance of Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 1, Extensions 
of Auditing Procedure? SAP No. 1 contained the following statement:
The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of financial 
statements accompanied by a report and opinion of an independent 
certified public accountant is not designed to discover all defalca­
tions, because that is not its primary objective, although discovery 
of defalcation frequently results... .To exhaust the possibility of
1 Carmichael and Willingham, p. 7 (citing R.H. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and 
Practice, 1912). This provision also appeared in Montgomery’s second (1923) and 
third (1927) editions.
2 Sullivan, Gnospelius, Defliese, and Jaenicke, pp. 121-122.
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exposure of all cases of dishonesty or fraud, the independent audi­
tor would have to examine in detail all transactions. This would 
entail a prohibitive cost to the great majority of business 
enterprises—a cost which would pass all bounds of reasonable 
expectation of benefit or safeguard therefrom, and place an undue 
burden on industry.3
Since the issuance of SAP No. 1, the profession has struggled, some would 
say without much success, to refine and articulate its position on detecting 
irregularities and to establish standards that are capable of convincing users 
that auditors should have only a limited role in detecting fraud.
During the late 1950s, SAP No. 1 and the profession came under vigorous 
attack and pressure mounted for the AICPA to consider its official position 
as stated in SAP No. 1. The AICPA’s response was to issue a new standard, 
SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in 
the Examination o f Financial Statements, in 1960. SAP No. 30 was viewed 
by many as being unresponsive to user concerns because it added no new 
responsibility to detect fraud. Specifically, SAP No. 30 stated an auditor’s 
responsibility to detect irregularities as follows:
The ordinary examination incident to the expression of an opinion 
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, 
and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other simi­
lar irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, 
although the discovery of deliberate misrepresentations by manage­
ment is usually more closely associated with the objective of the 
ordinary examination, such examination cannot be relied upon to 
assure its discovery.4
Although the standard did stress that an auditor had an obligation to “be 
aware of the possibility that fraud may exist,” it also made it clear that an 
auditor had no affirmative responsibility to go beyond that minimum duty 
and design tests that would detect fraud. As Costello (1991) states, “Indeed, 
the language contained in SAP No. 30 was so negatively stated that it justifi­
ably led auditors to conclude they had little or no obligation to structure 
their tests to detect fraud.” Because the goal of a GAAS audit is to determine 
if the financial statements conform to generally accepted accounting
3 As stated by Costello (p. 272), the fact that this standard cut across the grain of 
common understanding concerning the role of auditors has had a troublesome 
significance for the profession. The public’s expectations today are still deeply rooted 
in the profession’s earlier undertakings to detect fraud. Costello believes that because 
of the earlier stated purpose to detect fraud, attempts by the profession to renounce 
or amend those undertakings may ultimately prove futile. As he states, “As a 
minimum, more will be required than the promulgation of new and often esoteric 
standards which fail to reach the public consciousness.”
Statement on Auditing Procedures No. 30, paragraph 5.
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principles (GAAP), even strict adherence to GAAS would have provided 
little assurance that fraud would be detected. As Carmichael and Willin­
gham (1971) stated, SAP No. 30 failed as the controlling standard for audi­
tors because it was regarded by many auditors as an inadequate vehicle to 
avoid liability. The courts appeared to ignore SAP No. 30 and allowed 
numerous actions to be brought against auditors for failing to detect and 
disclose fraud.5
Although the courts were holding auditors responsible for failing to 
detect fraud, it took the Equity Funding Case and its associated scrutiny 
of the profession to determine that SAP No. 30 was inadequate. Because 
of Equity Funding, in 1975, an AICPA committee was established to 
re-examine the auditor’s responsibility to detect management fraud. That 
committee concluded that “no substantive change in the degree of responsi­
bility was necessary.”6
The Cohen Commission (comprised largely of non-AICPA members) 
reached a different conclusion. According to the Cohen Commission, 
the auditor:
. . .  has a duty to search for fraud, and should be expected to detect 
those frauds that the examination would normally uncover.
They went on to say that
.. .users of financial statements should have a right to assume that 
audited financial information is not unreliable because of fraud.
. . .  An audit should be designed to provide reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are not affected by material fraud.7
In 1977, SAS No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the 
Detection o f Errors or Irregularities, was issued, which admitted some 
obligation to search for fraud in the normal course of a GAAS audit. As 
stated in SAS No. 16:
The independent auditor’s objective in making an examination of 
financial statements in accordance with (GAAS) is to form an 
opinion on whether the financial statements present fairly financial 
position, results of operations, and changes in financial position in 
conformity with (GAAP).. . .Consequently, under (GAAS), the
5 During the period SAP No. 30 was effective, actions against auditors became quite 
common. Some of the more famous cases litigated during this period include Schact 
v. Brown, Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, United States v. Simon, United States 
v. White, Fischer v. Kletz, Western Surety Co. v. Loy, Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, Rosenblum v. Adler, National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, Maduff Mortg. v. 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, and Bonhiver v. Graff.
6 Treadway Report, p. 50.
7 Cohen Commission Report, p. 36.
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independent auditor has the responsibility, within the inherent 
limitations of the auditing process,. . .to plan his examination to 
search for (material) errors and irregularities.8
Although SAS No. 16 required the auditor to “search for” fraud, it did not 
require the auditor to “detect” fraud. Even after SAS No. 16, auditors 
remained unwilling to accept or even acknowledge a substantial respon­
sibility to detect fraud. SAS No. 16 contained some of the same kinds 
of “defensive and qualifying” language that was included in SAP No. 1 
and No. 30. Phrases such as “inherent limitations of the auditing process” 
and “unless the auditor’s examination reveals evidentiary matter to the 
contrary, his reliance on the truthfulness of certain representations and 
the genuineness of records and documents obtained during the examination 
was reasonable” allowed auditors to justify an unwillingness to detect 
fraud. Madison and Ross (1990) stated that “the language of SAS No. 16 
was ambiguous. It did not provide adequate guidance and therefore did not 
meet the needs of the accounting profession or the business community.” 
Costello (1991) agrees when he states “These qualifying provision(s) 
undermined the integrity of SAS No. 16 and rendered any requirement 
that an auditor was obligated to search for management fraud virtually 
meaningless. . .  .Consequently, under SAS No. 16, substantial reliance on 
the audit by users of the financial statements to detect management fraud 
would have been unwarranted.”
SAS No. 53: Does It Solve the Problem?
By the mid-1980s it was obvious that SAS No. 16 was not doing the job 
and that auditors’ unwillingness to accept increased responsibility to detect 
fraud was increasing the expectation gap. “Many corporate and banking 
debacles once labeled as ‘business failures’ were increasingly being dubbed 
‘audit failures,’ a situation shamefully underscored by an epidemic of 
lawsuits leveled against auditors for, among other things, failing to uncover 
and disclose management fraud” (Costello, 1991). The public, the courts, 
and even Congress demanded that auditors accept a greater responsibility 
to detect irregularities. In 1988, SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, was issued.
SAS No. 53 differs from SAS No. 16 in that it requires an auditor to 
“design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors 
and irregularities.” It also requires auditors to “exercise. . .the proper 
degree of professional skepticism to achieve reasonable assurance that 
errors and irregularities will be detected.” Unlike prior standards, this
8 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16, paragraph 5.
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professional skepticism requires the auditor to assume management is 
neither honest nor dishonest.
SAS No. 53 holds out two possibilities for reducing the expectation gap. 
First, it will result in a narrowing of the gap if users (including investors and 
creditors), the SEC, and the courts accept the standard as defining the 
auditor’s responsibility to detect and disclose fraud. Indeed, if CPAs can 
now be assured that compliance with SAS No. 53 insulates them from 
further liability and scrutiny, the standard has been successful. Second, 
SAS No. 53 will help close the expectation gap if it effectively changes the 
way auditors conduct audits so that audits actually provide “reasonable 
assurance” that irregularities have been detected. This latter solution would 
require a change in audit approach to be successful. The first case requires 
user expectations to change; the second requires that auditors change their 
attestation behavior.
Guidance Provided by SAS No. 53
Before discussing any changes in auditors’ attestation behavior, some 
evidence about the effectiveness of the guidance contained in SAS No. 53 
must be discussed. If the twenty-one factors listed in SAS No. 53 that 
should be considered in combination to assess the risk that irregularities 
may cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement 
are not the set of factors that should be considered, a change in the way 
auditors conduct audits will be ineffective in assessing this risk. In addition, 
SAS No. 53 includes no guidance for the auditor about the importance of 
each risk factor. How does the auditor combine the factors? How much 
weight should be given to each?
KPMG Peat Marwick initiated research to tackle two problems: rele­
vance of the factors presented in SAS No. 53 and the question of how they 
should be combined.9 The research studies concentrated on management 
fraud (i.e., fraudulent financial statements). Judgments about the presence 
or absence of “red flag” indicators were collected from engagement part­
ners on seventy-seven fraud cases and 305 nonfraud cases. The relevant 
fraud indicators were then combined using a statistical model.
Table 1 lists the auditor judgments about the presence of the twenty-one 
SAS No. 53 indicators of management fraud in both fraud and nonfraud 
companies. Eight of the factors listed in the SAS are not statistically 
significant indicators of fraud. Table 2 lists auditor judgments about the 
presence of fraud indicators not included in SAS No. 53 that were obtained 
by searching the management fraud literature. There are nine red flags in
(continued on page 113)
9 KPMG study of SAS No. 53 risk factors.
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this list not included in SAS No. 53 that appear to be indicators of 
management fraud. When assessed individually, SAS No. 53 includes some 
red flags that appear to be poor indicators of management fraud and 
excludes some red flags that are good indicators of fraud.
The weight that should be assigned to each relevant fraud indicator is a 
very complex problem. Ultimately, a complex set of statistical models was 
used by KPMG researchers to determine weights. Based on the research 
results, guidance about a combination of fraud indicators is beyond the 
capability of an SAS.
Have Auditors Changed the Manner in Which 
Audits Are Conducted as a Result of SAS No. 53?
The evidence as to whether or not SAS No. 53 has caused a change in the 
way audits are conducted is skimpy and mixed. According to a recent survey 
by the New York insurance broker Johnson & Higgins (Caprino 1990), four 
out of five certified public accountants have cut back on the services they 
provide. The poll of 500 accountants nationwide showed that 56 percent 
have ceased doing business with clients considered at “high risk” for initiat­
ing lawsuits, and 98 percent ask clients to sign protective contracts before 
work begins. It is not clear whether it has been the increased fraud-detection 
requirements of SAS No. 53 or the fear of lawsuits that has motivated CPAs 
to be more cautious. Certainly one way to provide “reasonable assurance” 
that fraud does not exist is not to accept high-risk clients.
On the other hand, Madison and Ross (1990) do not believe that SAS No. 
53 has caused a change in the way audits are conducted. In their article, they 
ask the question “does anyone who is familiar with the audit planning and 
development procedures of the larger accounting firms really think this 
requirement (SAS No. 53) represents a substantive change from existing 
practice?” The response they received to this question from three firm 
partners in charge of practice unit audit operations was that their firm’s 
reactions were largely in the semantics of the audit programs and planning 
meeting agenda. It was their opinion that no substantive changes would 
occur in the actual audit procedures or applications. Madison and Ross
(1990) go on to conclude that “. .  .one would logically presume this would 
generally be the reaction in most of the larger accounting firms.”
Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the Public's (Investors 
and Creditors) Expectations of the Auditor's 
Responsibility to Detect Irregularities?
The public’s perception of auditor responsibility to detect and disclose 
irregularities has not changed over time. The public has always expected
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auditors to detect all financial statement fraud. This expectation has 
been restated several times. A 1974 poll conducted by Opinion Research 
Corporation (1974) for Arthur Andersen & Co. revealed that “66 percent of 
the investing public believe that the audit is conducted primarily to uncover 
fraud.” The poll also revealed that most segments of the public expect audi­
tors to detect management fraud.
This same expectation was restated in a subsequent poll conducted by 
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. in 1986 for the AICPA. That poll stated 
that “solid majorities of all the principal public groups are convinced that 
a ‘clean’ opinion also means that the auditing firm has found no fraud."
After studying auditor litigation and audit service quality, Palmrose 
(1988) concluded that the value of extended audits stems from financial 
statement users’ expectations that auditors will detect and correct (or reveal) 
any material misstatements or omissions of financial information.
The Dingell Committee (1986) expressed its findings by noting, “The 
public expects that the independent auditors will make reasonable efforts 
to assure that fraudulent corporate activity will not go undetected or 
unreported.” The Dingell Committee subsequently initiated a bill that 
would have required auditors to perform “specific and substantial proce­
dures to reasonably ensure the detection.. .of any material fraud.”
Although SAS No. 53 does acknowledge an affirmative duty to detect 
fraud, it probably will not satisfy the “public.” Whereas the public requires 
the detection of “all material financial statement fraud,” SAS No. 53 
contains at least three limiting caveats. First, SAS No. 53 limits the 
auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud where the fraud is concealed by 
management collusion and forgery. As SAS No. 53 states, “because of the 
characteristics of irregularities, particularly those involving forgery and 
collusion, a properly designed and executed audit may not detect a material 
irregularity.” Second, SAS No. 53 appears to limit the auditor’s responsi­
bility to design the audit to detect fraud where there are no suspicious 
circumstances suggesting that fraud might be present. SAS No. 53 states, 
for example, that the auditor at the beginning of each audit engagement 
should “design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors 
and irregularities that are material to the financial statements.” However, 
according to the standard, the audit “design,” including setting the scope of 
the audit and designing specific audit tests, should be formulated based on 
an assessment of the “risk that [fraud may exist] may cause the financial 
statements to contain material misstatements.” A reasonable interpretation 
by an auditor would lead him or her to believe that the responsibility to 
detect fraud is relieved when the risk assessment for a particular client 
provides no indication that fraud may be present.
The third limiting caveat of SAS No. 53 places substantial limitations on 
the auditor’s obligation to disclose fraud to the investing public once fraud 
has been detected. As stated in SAS No. 53, “disclosure of irregularities to
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parties other than the client’s senior management and its audit committee or 
board of directors is not ordinarily part of the auditor’s responsibility..."
In addition, the standard goes on to say that such disclosure “. .  .would be 
precluded by the auditor’s ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality.” 
The standard provides three circumstances when an irregularity can be 
disclosed: (1) to the SEC and a successor auditor where there is a change in 
auditors, (2) in response to a subpoena, and (3) to a governmental agency 
when the audit is conducted in accordance with requirements for the audits 
of entities that receive financial assistance from a government agency.
All three of these limiting caveats are contrary to the expectations of the 
public who expect all fraud to be detected and disclosed. As a result, unless 
auditor actions change as a result of SAS No. 53 in ways that will detect all 
fraud, it is doubtful that the standard will narrow the expectation gap with 
respect to the “public.”
Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the SEC's Perception 
of the Auditor's Responsibility to Detect 
and Disclose Irregularities?
Similar to the public’s position, the SEC’s perception of auditor responsi­
bility to detect fraud has remained constant over time. The SEC views the 
detection of fraud as a major purpose of the audit. Probably the first public 
statement by the SEC about the fraud detection responsibilities of an audit 
was Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 19, In the Matter of McKesson & 
Robbins, Inc., issued in 1940, wherein they stated:
.. .accountants can be expected to detect gross overstatements of 
assets and profits whether resulting from collusive fraud or other­
wise. . .we feel that the discovery of gross overstatements in the 
accounts is a major purpose of such an audit even though it be 
conceded that it might not disclose every minor defalcation.
In 1974, in response to the Equity Funding case, the SEC issued ASR No. 
153 (1974) in which it restated its position on the auditor’s responsibility to 
detect and disclose management fraud in exactly the same terms used in 
ASR No. 19. In addition, in his first speech after being named as the current 
SEC enforcement director, William McLucas outlined several areas of 
stepped up SEC attention. In doing so, he warned auditors that “you should 
assume the division of enforcement will take a look at you to be certain that 
. . .  independent auditors are aggressive in preventing fraud at corpora­
tions” (Salwen 1990).
Nowhere is there evidence that the SEC accepts any of the limiting 
caveats in SAS No. 53. Since 1940, its stated position has been that auditors 
should detect and disclose all material financial statement fraud.
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Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the Court's Perception 
of Auditors' Responsibility to Detect 
and Disclose Irregularities?
It does not appear that SAS No. 53 satisfies lawyers’ perception of 
auditor responsibility to detect and disclose fraud. As stated by Costello
(1991):
Lawyers representing CPAs inevitably will be asked to advise their 
clients on whether compliance with SAS No. 53 will be an effective 
tool for avoiding liability in the area of management fraud. Their 
advice should be simple. Neither GAAS nor SAS No. 53 constitute 
the controlling measure of an auditor’s liability. The door remains 
open in auditor malpractice suits for plaintiffs to introduce evidence 
indicating that the auditor should have done more than the profes­
sion’s self-imposed standards dictated. Complicating the situation 
is that the auditor’s obligations for detecting and disclosing fraud 
under SAS No. 53 fall short of those previously imposed on 
auditors by the courts. Perhaps the best advice for auditors is to 
design their audits to detect all forms of fraud, regardless of the 
cause and regardless of whether suspicious circumstances are 
present. Further, to the degree that courts perceive CPAs as owing 
their allegiance to the investing public and view the public’s right to 
know as outweighing the auditor’s ethical obligations of confiden­
tiality, CPAs may, under certain circumstances, find compliance 
with the fraud disclosure provisions under SAS No. 53 inadequate 
protection from liability.
Costello makes a very persuasive argument that professional standards, 
such as SAS No. 53 can never be dispositive in deciding whether a defen­
dant exercised due care.10 As stated by Costello, “professional standards 
should not and do not replace the role of the jury in determining either what 
constitutes due care or whether, under the particular circumstances, the 
defendant exercised that due care.” Therefore, although a CPA defendant 
may establish compliance with SAS No. 53, he or she does not thereby 
establish as a matter of law that due care was exercised. Attorneys argue that 
allowing professional standards to play a conclusive evidentiary role would 
reduce a jury to “. .  .the mechanical process of applying the self-imposed
10 The only exception to this rule is in the medical profession, where medical standards 
are generally considered the controlling measure of liability in medical malpractice 
cases. In medical malpractice cases, failure to establish non-conformity is fatal to the 
plaintiff and the defendant who establishes conformity is entitled to a directed 
verdict. The same cannot be said for auditors. Costello was unable to locate a single 
court decision directing a verdict for the auditor merely upon a showing of compli­
ance with the auditing standards.
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standards of the defendant’s profession.” Furthermore, they argue that if 
professionals, such as auditors were to have their esoteric standards define 
the measure of liability for the profession’s members, a two-tier system of 
justice between the haves (professionals) and the have-nots would be 
created (Morris 1942).
Costello very eloquently traces the legal precedence through such 
auditor-liability cases as Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corp., Rhode 
Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yauner & 
Jacobs, and Maduff Mortgage Corporation v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
to show that auditor negligence is a matter for courts to decide, not 
professional standards. As was stated in the latter case:
The AICPA standards are only evidentiary.. .They are principles 
and procedures developed by the accounting profession itself, not 
by the courts or the legislature. They may be useful to a jury in 
determining the standard of care for an auditor, but they are not 
controlling. The amount of care, skill and diligence required to be 
used by defendants in conducting an audit is a question of fact for 
the jury, just as it is in other fields for other professionals.11
The result is that as long as the professional standards for detecting and 
disclosing irregularities differ from the public’s expectations, failure to 
detect fraud by auditors will be litigated. And, it appears that SAS No. 53 
differs considerably from those public expectations.
The Litigation Evidence
While it is too early to establish a clear trend and know for certain what 
the impact of SAS No. 53 has been on litigation, there is no evidence that 
the number of lawsuits against accountants is decreasing. As is shown 
in table 3, most of the cases being reported in recent public reports as 
being filed, settled, or litigated are for years prior to the effective date 
of SAS No. 53. Table 3 represents a cross-section of auditor liability suits 
discussed in the current popular press. Most likely, it will take four or 
five more years before lawsuits filed for 1989, 1990, and 1991 are litigated 
and/or settled.
There is some evidence, however, that lawsuits against accountants are on 
the rise. Caprino (1990) states “lawsuits targeting accountants—filed by 
businesses challenging audits or shareholders claiming to have received 
faulty financial information—are on the rise, and the threat of litigation is
(continued)
11 Maduff Mortgage Corp v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, p. 502.
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TABLE 3 Sampling of Recent Litigation
Year of 
Problem
Year 
Reported 
in News
Suit
Filed
Settled
Out
In of 
Court Court
Acctg.
Firm Company Audited
91 91 X EY Mutual Benefit Life
89 X EY Bradford White Corp.
87 91 X EY Lincoln Savings and Loan
83-88 91 X EY Republic Bank Corp.
86 90 X DT Southeastern Insurance Group Inc.
88 90 X DT Poly-Dura Inc.
86 91 X DT Inter-Regional Financial Group
90 X DT Baker’s PTL Ministry
85, 86 91 X DT Frank B. Hall & Co. Inc.
88 90 X PM Scottish Heritable Inc.
87 89 X CL Insurance Exchange of America
87 89 X CL Thomas McKinnon Inc.
88 90 X CL Stotler Group Inc.
79-84 90 X S Universal Casualty & Surety Co.
87 91 X EY 4 Tennessee Savings and Loans
85, 86 91 X PW United Bank of Arizona
86 90 X CL Silverado
85 90 X EY FP Investments
84 90 X EY Western Savings Association
88 90 X DT Beverly Hills Savings
83, 84 90 X DT Sunrise Savings
X GT Sunbelt Savings of Dallas
X GT Rooks County Savings
X CL First Federal S&L of Shawnee
82 91 X AA Indutril Tectonics
80 90 X PW AM International
85 90 X X EY Small World Greetings
82-86 91 PW Brictard & Co.
81 90 X DT Inter Regional Financial
80 89 X LH Herman Fiesod
85 90 X CL Overseas Trust Bank
90 X PM Penn Square Bank
90 X PM Holt Leasing
90 X MH Continental Illinois
89 CL Inland Power & Light Co.
91 X DT Columbia Savings & Loan
84-91 91 X DT First Executive
90 X PM Central Bank
88-90 91 X DT FNN
91 X X EY W. L. Jackson
89 90 X PM Eagle Trust
90 91 X EW Monarch
91 DT First South
91 X EW Imperial Savings Assoc.
91 DT Commonwealth Federal
Legend: EY—Ernst & Young; DT—Deloitte & Touche; PM—KPMG Peat Marwick; CL—Coopers & 
Lybrand; S—BDO Seidman; MH—Main Hurdman; EW— Ernst & Whinney; GT—Grant Thornton; PW—Price 
Waterhouse; AA—Arthur Andersen & Co.; LH—Laventhol & Horwath.
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Being Reported, Settled, or Litigated
Industry of Audited Co.
$ Millions 
Sought
$ Millions 
Awarded Fraud Negligence
Insurance X
Water Heater Manuf. 1.2 X
Savings and Loan (S&L) 1.5 X
Banking x
Insurance 10 x
Portable Toilets Purchased
Brokerage 19.75 X
Religion x
Insurance 14 total x X
Manufacturing X X
Insurance X
Brokerage Firm 160 X
Brokerage X
Insurance 15.7 X
S&L 250
Banking 600 X
Banking S&L X
Exotic Plants 18.9 X
Banking 560 X
S&L 300 X
S&L 250 X
S&L
S&L
S&L X
Ball Bearings
Graphics Group X
Gift Company 5 X
Development X
Brokerage 19.75 X X
Limited Partnership 13.0
Banking X
Banking
Banking 16
Banking 15.2
Utility 5 X
S&L 20 2.5 X
Insurance Unspecified
Banking X
Network X
Manufacturing 1.2 1.2 X
Film £70 X X
Insurance 165 total X X
Thrift 400 X
Thrift 26 X
Thrift 50 X
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having a chilling effect on the profession.” Lawsuits have been filed recently 
in such cases as Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., Financial News Net­
work, Infotechnology Inc, Monarch Life Insurance Co., Central Bank, and 
First Executive for audits performed subsequent to the implementation of 
SAS No. 53.
Increasingly, lawsuits are being brought by the investing public who are 
questioning the value of an audit (Brenner 1991). They are alleging that 
either (1) the audits were incompetent, which suggests than an accountant’s 
opinion is not worth much, or (2) as regulators and other critics charge, 
some of the leading firms in the country are churning out negligent audits. 
A recent article in Bowman’s Accounting Report stated, “. .  .Nothing has 
shaken CPAs as much as the embarrassing questions that are being asked 
about the intrinsic value of the audit. This is the first time the technical 
competence of the profession is being questioned by the public” (Brenner 
1991, 35).12 Certainly auditors’ failure to detect management fraud and the 
resulting litigation, with all its coverage in the press, is fueling the fire that 
is causing the questioning of the value of the audit.
Concluding Comments
SAS No. 53 does not appear to have narrowed the expectation gap 
between auditors and the users of their opinions. The evidence suggests that 
SAS No. 53 has had little, if any, impact on the way audits are conducted. 
In addition, at least one firm’s studies show that some of the guidance in 
SAS No. 53 may be faulty and may not identify high-risk clients. Although 
SAS No. 53 does require some affirmative duty to provide reasonable 
assurance that irregularities do not exist, CPAs appear not to have altered 
their audit planning or tests as a result of its issuance. Furthermore, there 
does not appear to have been an acceptance of SAS No. 53 by public users 
(investors and creditors), the SEC, or the courts. The three limiting caveats 
in SAS No. 53 are not acceptable to these groups, which expect all material 
financial statement fraud to be detected. As a result, SAS No. 53 falls short 
of their expectations. And since compliance with professional standards, 
such as SAS No. 53, does not provide the controlling evidence in negligence 
lawsuits against accountants, no material reduction in the number of 
lawsuits against auditors is expected. Indeed, the number of suits currently 
being filed supports the claim that SAS No. 53 will not result in reduced 
liability for auditors.
More than ever, the value of an audit is being questioned. In most cases, 
failure by auditors to detect irregularities will lead to litigation against
12 Similar questioning of the value of the audit was discussed in Jacob.
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CPAs. This is a very serious problem for the profession given that a recent 
Institute of Management Accountant’s survey (The Wall Street Journal 1990) 
revealed that 87 percent of company managers who responded would 
consider committing financial statement fraud under certain circumstances. 
More than half were willing to overstate assets, 48 percent were willing to 
understate loss reserves and 38 percent would “pad” a government contract.
What is the solution? One possibility would be for the profession to 
accept responsibility to detect and report all fraud publicly. Certainly, 
to do so would substantially increase audit costs. With the very low 
frequency of management fraud, imposing such high costs on all clients 
may not be fair. In addition, auditing for fraud would dramatically change 
relationships between auditors and their clients and would require a 
changed audit approach.
The other possible solution would be for the public and others to relieve 
auditors of fraud detection and reporting responsibility. While this solution 
is most appealing to CPAs, such a reduction in expected responsibility is not 
likely to occur unless there is significant decrease in financial remedies, 
class action lawsuits, and contingent fee lawsuits. As long as it is financially 
rewarding to bring suit, litigation is predicted to be automatic every time a 
material management fraud is missed.
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Auditing Complex 
Accounting Estimates
Wanda A. Wallace, The John N. Dalton Professor o f Business 
Administration and Associate Dean fo r  Academic Affairs,
College o f William & Mary
Research provides insights regarding factors to consider when formulating 
or auditing accounting estimates. Future dimensions o f estimates create 
uncertainties that may be communicated by a variety of disclosure practices. 
Although management discussion and analysis, as well as footnotes, have 
been a vehicle for disclosure, regulatory pressures are redefining the notion 
of probable and estimable. Research is needed to determine how best to 
identify changing risks, assess probabilities, and communicate uncertain­
ties. Auditing standard setters are encouraged to use industry audit guides 
for account-level guidance on estimates. Clarification of probable, estima­
ble, and uncertainty communication by audit reports may be merited.
As the expectation gap standards were being drafted, a gap in the litera­
ture became apparent: the audit of estimates. Although it was recognized 
that soft numbers permeated the financial statements and that estimates 
were an integral part of every set of financial statements, the official 
pronouncements did not address separately the audit implications of 
accounting estimates. Practice had been addressing accounting estimates, 
but this practice development had been in the absence of a general set of 
standards to guide the level and type of work performed. On the basis 
of interviews with both drafters of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
AU sec. 342), and members of the practice community (see Appendix), the 
pronouncement is principally a codification of existing practice. It plugged 
a hole in the literature but had little perceptible influence on practice other 
than increased attention on a category of accounts, information flows, and 
accounting processes over less routine, but more than one-time transactions.
The author appreciates the assistance of the AICPA and a number of practitioners who 
generously gave of their time in discussing practice-related issues—particularly Donald 
L. Neebes, Ernst & Young.
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Instead, the interplay of SAS No. 57 with other pronouncements in both 
the audit and accounting literature led to practice effects. Specifically, 
among the practice challenges are—
• When does Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5, 
Accounting for Contingencies, require a financial statement adjustment, 
and when is disclosure sufficient?
• As “tougher to estimate” numbers appear on both the financial state­
ments and in footnotes, what is adequate audit evidence to form an 
opinion on their fairness?
• When assisting the client in formulating estimates, how does the auditor 
ensure that the client takes responsibility for the estimate and then how 
should the audit process proceed?
• As the “more likely than not” threshold in SFAS No. 109, Accounting for 
Income Taxes, joins SFAS No. 5, how are the words in guidance trans­
lated in practice?
•  How do inherent risk, accounting estimates, and control risk interrelate?
• What control practices, with respect to accounting estimates, merit 
reduction of control risk in the audit process?
• Do circumstances arise in which reduction of control risk is essential 
because alternative audit evidence is virtually inaccessible?
• Is more directed guidance in industry manuals sufficient, or do certain 
types of estimates merit increased attention?
These and related questions begin to be answered by past research and 
current practice, but also identify future lines of inquiry.
The principal objective of this paper is to communicate the implications 
of existing research for establishing and implementing auditing standards 
associated with the audit of complex accounting estimates. Relevant 
research findings are summarized, practice implementation problems iden­
tified through interviews (see Appendix) are described, and an assessment 
of the implications of research and implementation problems for auditing 
standard setters and promulgators of other types of guidance is offered. 
Potential research issues are likewise highlighted.
Existing Literature
The formulation of accounting estimates has been the subject of a wide 
array of academic research articles. Table 1 provides a representative over­
view of literature concerning—
• The implications of efficient markets for standard setting, information 
evaluation, and disclosure practices.
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• The ability to quantify by statistical procedures both their future orienta­
tion and how they might be affected by incentives, as well as judgment 
biases and related considerations.
• The accounting selection process, its determinants, and the variety of 
estimates required.
• Interim reporting issues.
• The sophistication of users.
• Available valuation tools.
• Communication, interpretation, and automation.
• Independence and remaining challenges.
(continued on page 141)
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Implications of Efficient Markets
“What should be the FASB’s objectives given an efficient stock market? Beaver 
has stated four implications... .First, many reporting issues are trivial. Firms 
should report using one method and provide sufficient disclosure to permit 
adjustment to other methods. Second, the role of financial reports is to prevent 
individuals from earning abnormal returns from inside information. All items 
should be disclosed if there are no additional costs. Third, naive investors can 
get hurt by presuming they can trade on published accounting data and earn 
abnormal returns. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should 
discourage these beliefs. Fourth, the FASB should realize that accounting 
reports are not the only suppliers of information. Other sources of informa­
tion may be more appropriate for disseminating firm information if they involve 
less cost.
The implications for FASB objectives detailed by Beaver are open to serious 
question for three reasons. First, stock market agents are not the only users 
of accounting information. Other consumers have financial information needs 
that should concern the FASB. Second,.. .the efficient markets hypothesis is 
overstated. . .  [and more likely to be] partially efficient.. .Third, even if stock 
markets are completely efficient in an informational sense, various reasons 
suggest that stock markets are not efficient in an allocative sense” (Ketz and 
Wyatt 1983/84).
“Market prices represent one approach to the collapsing of multidimensional 
future benefits and sacrifices into a single number. They can reflect a rich set 
of information about the future events and reflect the ‘market’s’ (i.e., buyers 
and sellers) assessment of future benefits and sacrifices. Under conditions of 
imperfect and incomplete markets, market prices may only imperfectly reflect 
future benefits and sacrifices” (Beaver 1991). Boatsman, Dowell, and Kimbrell 
(1984/85) report on whether cost is better estimated with parent share price 
before a business combination is announced to the capital market or afterward.
(continued)
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They propose a simple rule: “To use the preannouncement price if the share 
price declines upon announcement of the terms of combination and the post­
announcement price otherwise.. .this rule minimizes error in all cases except 
when the capital market is considerably more, in fact one third more, optimistic 
than the negotiating parties. Such cases are expected to be rare.”
Miller (1980/81) concludes, “There is an important asymmetry in the impact 
of information on stock prices. Accounting that leads to overvaluation is likely 
to result in overpricing, while accounting that understates earnings probably 
will not have an effect. Thus the maintenance of fair stock prices will be facili­
tated by accounting conventions that resolve ambiguous situations by using a 
more conservative rule.”
Lev and Taylor (1978/79) use capital market efficiency to “imply that the 
information conveyed by conventional performance measures is more consis­
tent with the information used by investors (and hence reflected in stock prices) 
than the information conveyed by the earnings net of cost of equity measure.” 
This suggests that firms’ earnings should not be charged with a cost of equity 
capital, assuming certain caveats such as reasonable information costs.
Kellogg (1984) reports that “there is some support for a prediction that 
changes in realizable values will, on average, be associated with less concentra­
tion of stock price declines in the discovery month.”. . .Theory suggests “that 
the degree of precision of information,. . .defined as the inverse of the variance, 
is positively related to the concentration in time of capital market reaction” 
and that “the precision of information relative to previously available informa­
tion is positively related to security price variability when the information 
is announced.”
Implications: Stock market prices can be used in formulating and evaluating 
the reasonableness of accounting numbers but is only one source of information 
and has limitations.
Disclosure Approach
Footnotes or Financial Statement?
“[I]t may be a matter of indifference as to how lease information is presented” 
to stockholders, yet a survey in 1972 indicated “the off-balance sheet nature of 
lease accounting was an advantage in dealing with ‘unsophisticated’ statement 
users. In this context, unsophisticated statement users included the ‘small stock­
holder and the regional bank’” Martin, Anderson, and Keown (1978/79).
Murray (1981/82) concludes, “Direct capitalization seems to add little infor­
mational content vis-a-vis footnote disclosure.” Consistently, Munter and 
Ratcliffe (1982/83) conclude, “investment managers do distinguish among the 
alternative treatments of leases.” In addition, Marston and Harris (1988) find 
that “leases and debt are substitutes,” although “firms do not view leases as 
displacing nonleasing debt on a dollar-for-dollar basis.” Research estimates the 
displacement at from 60 to 85 cents on the dollar.
Bazley, Brown, and Izan (1985) studied the rationale for voluntary disclosure 
by Australian companies of lease obligations from 1964 through 1980 and
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discovered an association with industry, firm size, and whether the lessee was 
a subsidiary company of a foreign parent. Weak associations were observed 
with whether the lessee entered into the Australian Institute of Management’s 
good reporting award.
Tosh and Rue (1988) report that “the [unconsolidated finance] subsidiary’s 
debt is reflected in the firm’s market risk.”
Nichols (1973) found no significant difference in relative forecasting ability 
as it relates to future income figures, from inclusion or exclusion of extraor­
dinary items.
Implications: The market is reasonably efficient in reflecting certain types of 
footnote disclosures in the stock price, but financial statement inclusion of such 
information would be perceived as more useful for unsophisticated users.
Ability to Quantify
Behavioral Considerations 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) and numerous citations provided in Abdel-khalik 
and Solomon (1988) describe decision making in the presence of ambiguity, the 
use of heuristics, framing effects, elicitation of Bayesian priors, and similar 
behavioral considerations in formulating judgments. A major implication 
of such literature is that decision making can be improved by understanding 
common problems and studying the effect of the various decision aids.
Preferred Quantification 
“A preferred quantification consists of (1) an actual increase or decrease in 
cash; (2) in the absence of an actual increase or decrease in cash, a highly 
probable and legally required future increase or decrease in cash; and (3) a 
measurable decrease in an existing accounting quantification. . . .  If an event 
does not produce any preferred quantification, quantify both effects of the 
event by the cash increase or decrease that would have occurred in the most 
likely analogous transaction” (Sorter and Ingberman 1987).
Kinney (1983) describes “the development of statistical procedures that 
reflect the nature of the population and result in effective and efficient estima­
tors.” Quantitative applications in auditing are described. Kinney (1981/82) 
likewise describes the use of prior-year information in formulating predictions 
of future years’ adjustments. Also see Wallace (1991a,c) for a discussion of 
technology and the use of both analytics (Scott and Wallace 1992) and statistical 
methods.
Incentives
Accounting treatment and the choice of both accounting method and disclosure 
approach is systematically related to various attributes of a firm. In particular, 
Daley and Vigeland (1983) report that firms capitalizing research and develop­
ment costs until 1974, when choice existed pre-SFAS No. 2, were “more highly 
levered, used more public debt, were closer to dividend restrictions, and were 
smaller than firms which expensed R&D costs.” The variables cited were 
attempting to capture “the firms’ proximity to constraints imposed by debt 
covenants, the cost of violating these covenants, and political costs... The
(continued)
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results are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher renegotiation costs 
associated with public debt provide an additional incentive for firms to choose 
accounting techniques to avoid constraints imposed by debt covenants.” 
“During an election campaign, incumbent managers apparently exercise 
their accounting discretion to paint a favorable picture of their own performance 
to voting stockholders. If elected, dissidents tend to take an immediate earnings 
‘bath’ which they typically blame on the poor decisions of prior management” 
(DeAngelo 1988).
“Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common 
stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preced­
ing announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously 
reported accounting book values” (Kellogg 1984).
This research identifies “Type 4” information releases as “realizable values 
of assets reported in prior financial statements that are being reduced” and 
explains the assets revalued were “receivables, inventories, capitalized product 
development costs, investments in subsidiaries, and marketable securities.” 
This “Type 4” information release is cited as distinguishable from other 
possibilities since “there is no implication that prior financial statements were 
at the time of their publication imperfect or incomplete. Realizable values 
regularly change between financial statement preparation dates.. . .The 
Federal courts.. .emphasize the subjective nature of estimated valuations and 
their susceptibility to changing conditions.” “There is some evidence that 
announcements of these revisions are associated with different patterns of 
security returns than are other kinds of announcements that contribute to 
lawsuit occurrence. On average, information that asset realizable values are 
being revised is associated with greater abnormal returns prior to announce­
ment and smaller abnormal returns in announcement months than are 
announcements that fraud, mistake, or failure to separately note specific 
transactions affected prior financial statements.”
Hughes (1986) observes that disclosure is a signal selected by companies 
going public and that the regulatory setting plays a role in contract enforcement. 
Specifically, the “investment banker is legally liable (along with directors of the 
company and its auditors) for damages if the security price declines within three 
years and material omissions or misstatements are in the prospectus.”
Leases
Accounting for leases and the accounting selection process pre-SFAS 13 
encompassed leverage effects, management compensation, and taxes (El-Gazzar, 
Lilien, and Pastena 1986).
Executory Contracts 
Given the piecemeal treatment of executory contracts, Cramer and Neyhart 
(1978/79) suggest “extending recognition criteria (i.e., criteria for admit­
ting data to the accounts and for determining the specific information to be 
included in respective financial statements) to encompass the recording of 
executory contracts in situations where reasonable assurance exists that the 
reciprocal promises will be fulfilled.” Such an approach would set aside
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perceived overreliance on cash basis, corporeal transfers, and the requirement 
of partial performance and begin to erode another source of “off-balance sheet 
financing.” Related commentary is provided by Henderson and Peirson (1984).
An analogy can be drawn between pledges at educational institutions and 
certain types of executory contracts. ". . .the economic value of an asset (e.g., 
a pledge or bequest) should be accounted for in the same manner regardless of 
the type of nonprofit organization” (Kagle and Dukes 1988). Valuation 
challenges and the role of legal enforceability are among the issues raised 
regarding current practice.
Perquisites
The “SEC issued an interpretive release [the August 1977 release] stating that 
perks must be included when remuneration is disclosed in SEC filings” (Weisen 
and Eng 1978/79). “Three approaches were available...
(1) Including the perk amount in the remuneration table, but with no other 
disclosure, e.g., a footnote description;
(2) Including the perks amount in the remuneration table, and providing a foot­
note description; or
(3) Excluding the perk amount in the remuneration table, but providing a foot­
note description.
Most companies did not quantify perks.. ." (Wiesen and Eng 1978/79).
“In footnoting, companies avoided specificity by stating that the ‘perks’ were:
• Directly related to job performance.
• Ordinary and necessary to the conduct of business.
• Not material.
• Impossible to value or not reasonably ascertainable.
• Not allocable between business and personal use, and indicating an approxi­
mate or maximum value.”
“The independent auditor’s responsibility for the content of remuneration 
tables and accompanying footnotes depends, in part, on the document 
involved.” “Shareholders bring perks lawsuits, and demand disclosure on perks 
by suggesting shareholder votes on the issue.”
Pensions
In describing pension liabilities, Hennessy (1977/78) observes, “This off- 
balance sheet liability probably now exceeds $50 billion for all American 
corporations... .Whatever the complexities and uncertainties of ERISA, actu­
arial cost methods, and pension plans, one thing has become clear. Corporate 
employers have a legally enforceable obligation with respect to their pension 
plans. An accounting system that fails to recognize such a generally 
acknowledged fact can only expect its credibility to be further eroded in the eyes 
of investors and creditors ”
Audit program steps for pension costs and disclosures under SFAS No. 87 and 
No. 88 are detailed by Schwartz and Gillmore (1988), including how to review 
clients’ key economic assumptions. Among the assumptions cited are discount 
rate, rate of future compensation increase, and expected long-term rate of return 
on plan assets.
(continued)
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Postemployment Benefits
“[F]ull accrual accounting for the cost of retiree health care benefits could cut 
the annual net income of many corporations by.. .30% to 60%” (Gerboth 
1988). ".  .accountants have never felt constrained to recognize only those 
obligations that are legally binding.” Assumptions include “rates of inflation, 
mortality, retirement, disability, turnover, and dependent coverage” and “rate 
of increase in the general level of health care costs,” “future changes in plan 
terms,” and “future changes in legal and regulatory requirements.”
Perspective as to the judgment elements in such assessments is provided 
by a two-part article responding to the query “Is Social Security Financially 
Feasible?” (Robertson 1987, Part I and Myers and Creedon 1987, Part II.) The 
role of assumptions is particularly apparent.
Embedded Estimates
Often estimates are embedded in other estimates, such as the role of tax rates; 
related issues on means of quantifying such rates are described by Stickney and 
McGee (1982), Stark (1985), and Bernard (1984). Nurnberg, Thomas, and 
Cianciolo (1985) describe an approach to estimating an income tax measure­
ment valuation allowance account and related problems. The interplay of tax 
consequences and LIFO layers is explored by Cottell (1986). Another example 
is the accounting for shrinkage within continuous flow process costing systems 
as a prerequisite to valuing inventory costs (see Mensah and Chhatwal 1987). 
Ten causes of problems with inventory valuation are similarly outlined by 
Shayeb (1986), with related solutions—problems include changing standard 
costs, incorrect computation of purchase price variance, failure to expense 
materials used by nonmanufacturing departments, poor controls in issuing and 
receiving material, inaccurate bills of material, failing to expense monthly 
material usage variance, incomplete scrap policies and procedures, inaccurate 
recording of “outside inventory” (i.e., owned by one company but physically 
held by another), improper accounting for demos, marketing samples, and 
engineering prototypes, and a formula approach to relieving cost of sales. 
Schnee and Hreha (1987) explain how boot determination and capital gains 
interrelate in the accounting for reorganizations. Price Waterhouse (1991, 1992) 
points out that “FAS 109 provides little guidance for management or auditors on 
the issue of assessing the reliability of management’s estimate of future 
taxable income.”
Interim Reporting
Deitrick and Alderman (1978/79) report that “U.S. Steel is generally credited 
for being the first American corporation to report interim financial information; 
this initial statement was issued in 1902. By 1920, approximately 50 percent 
of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) reported 
interim information. And by 1960, 93.5 percent of the listed companies were 
issuing quarterly or more frequent reports and another 5.5 percent were issuing 
semiannual reports. For most companies, publication of interim financial 
information was a combination of voluntary disclosure and compliance with 
new listing requirements. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) did not
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require its listed companies to publish interim financial information until 1962.
.. .The reporting of interim results to the exchanges and to leading financial 
publications is assumed to be sufficient. The SEC did not require companies 
under its jurisdiction to file interim information until 1945.” The 1945 require­
ments were revenue oriented, in 1955, the form 9-K required nine income 
related disclosures, and in 1972 form 10-Q was adopted (filed forty-five days after 
each of the first three fiscal quarters). These researchers describe pressures for 
an “auditor of record” concept and related cost/benefit considerations.
A comparison of statistics for companies undergoing interim-limited reviews 
by CPAs and those not reviewed indicate “no large-scale, systematic differences 
between the data which had been reviewed and that which had not, leading us 
to conclude that audit involvement did not have a significant effect on the 
interim data” (Alford and Edmonds 1980/81).
Implications: Tools are available for estimation, factors influencing account­
ing choice are identified in the literature, and pressures exist to expand and 
enhance accounting estimates.
Available Approaches
Crandall (1987) outlines twelve valuation methods used to place a price tag 
on businesses. “In a perfect transaction, all parties would share all the major 
relevant facts, and the business would be sold for cash—but so much for fairy 
tales.” This quote bears out the perceived likelihood that approximation tech­
niques will have to be used to assess the reasonableness and acceptability 
of proposed prices.
Weiss (1987) describes the valuation of closely held stocks, in light of a legal 
decision and in so doing describes an available approach to such valuations— 
discounted cash flow method vs. the market comparable approach.
“Mathematics, we are told, is ‘the subject in which we never know what we are 
talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.’ .. .‘mathematics studies 
nothing but hypotheses, and is the only science which never inquires what the 
actual facts are.’ ‘Mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of complete 
abstraction from any particular instance of what it is talking about. . .  .The 
certainty of mathematics depends on its complete abstract generality.’ For the 
refinement of thought, particularly deductive thought, the value of mathematics 
is unquestionable.. .the model of reality on which the postulates are based may 
be so imperfect that the inferences, however carefully drawn, will be mislead­
ing ... .the finest acquaintance with computational technique is no substitute 
for discernment and discrimination in the field of experience which we study” 
(Chambers 1967).
Inventories
A large body of empirical research on LIFO begins to explain the effect of 
LIFO adoptions on security prices, the differences that led to different accounting 
choices, and the market’s ability to adjust for differences in inventory methods, 
as reported by Lindahl, Emby, and Ashton (1988). Such research provides 
insight as to empirical regularities that need consideration in exploring valua­
tion differences.
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Implications: Accounting estimates involve qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions.
Sophisticated Users
“[T]hese results support the identification of loan officers as a ‘sophisticated’ 
user group.. .Financial statements play an important role in their responses to 
information and they have a high degree of consensus and self insight into their 
own cognitive processes” (Zimmer 1981).
Implications: The prudent sophisticated investor is a reasonably defined con­
cept in guiding standard setting.
Communication
“A major feature of current financial reporting is that it is accounting 
for assets and liabilities with uncertain future benefits and sacrifices in terms 
of a format that is very deterministic in appearance.. .At a minimum, it 
places a burden on the reporting of risk and uncertainties, because a single 
number creates the appearance of certainty when it does not exist.. .Uncertain, 
future benefits and sacrifices are inherently multidimensional in nature” 
(Beaver, 1991).
“[I]t is better to be approximately right than to be precisely wrong. This 
suggests the desirability of disclosing the estimated precision and reliability of 
accounting measurements, instead of encouraging the reader to assume that the 
figures in financial statements contain no ‘margin of error’.
“It has become the practice in Britain recently for leading practitioners to 
complain that laymen fail to realize that accounting measurements are not exact. 
Such remarks are intended as a defense against criticisms of the shortcomings 
of financial accounts. The fault surely lies not in the eyes of the lay beholders 
but in the published financial accounts, which fail to disclose the existence of 
inexactitudes of measurement” (Stamp 1970).
“The more one reflects on the nature of the deficiencies in modem financial 
accounting, which have given rise to controversies in Australia, North 
America, and the U.K., the more it seems apparent that financial accountancy 
has lost touch with the needs of the modern world. It has, in a phrase, failed to 
adapt and evolve. Far too many practitioners have adopted the attitude that can 
be summarized rather crudely as, ‘There is nothing wrong with accounting that 
a good public relations campaign won’t cure.’ These practitioners seem to 
believe that, if laymen could only be taught to understand the limitations of con­
ventional accounts, they would soon stop complaining about the inadequacies 
which have become so painfully apparent in recent years. These professional 
apologists seem to regard the ‘limitations of financial accounts’ as immutable 
facts of life with which the world has to learn to live.
“In truth such ‘limitations’ are the mark of the failure of the profession to 
adapt its ‘principles’ to the needs of a modern world. Unless the profession soon 
learns to adapt itself it will become, like its currently extant ‘principles,’ irrele­
vant and dispensable” (Stamp 1970).
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Implications: Communications need to be enhanced, as do the underlying 
valuations being communicated.
Problems With Proxies in the Absence of Valuation
“[Financial statements are seriously flawed. To reach meaningful conclu­
sions, users of financial statements must adjust or supplement them with 
additional information. In many cases, the problems with the statements are so 
intractable that one must apply techniques that are little better than rules of 
thumb in order to reach a conclusion... .Over the last several years, as annual 
reports have become more complex, the number of people who can truly under­
stand them has declined substantially” (O’Donnell 1986).
Houlihan and Sondhi (1984) report: “Investors consider off-balance sheet 
lease obligations of lessees when making investment decisions. The methods 
commonly used by investors to determine the debt-equivalent amount of those 
obligations frequently overestimate those obligations, making lessees appear 
more leveraged than they really are. This can increase the lessees’ borrowing 
costs, decrease their debt capacity, and possibly even affect their ability to 
access the public debt markets. . . .  If investors are miscalculating lessees’ total 
capital and leverage ratios, it follows that they may also be miscalculating their 
returns on capital, interest coverage ratios, and other quantitative performance 
indicators.”
Implications: Approximations inherently involve complexity and measure­
ment error.
The Significant Role of Interpretation
“[T]o develop the user of those tools into a person who can look at data and 
see a picture (the interpretation) rather than numbers. Establishing the facility 
for translation (accounting training) is not only more easily achieved than 
developing interpretive skills (economic reasoning), it seems almost to inhibit 
the success of the latter.
“To begin with, financial statements are rendered entirely in monetary terms. 
Yet everything beyond the cash account is further and further removed from 
cash (and sometimes even from reality). This is true not only of the balance 
sheet, which at least attempts to represent a real bricks-mortar-machinery- 
and-inventory situation, but also of the income statement, which is conceptual. 
While assets beyond the cash account are not cash, on the other side, the liabili­
ties generally are cash obligations. The mismatch is first evidence of a potential 
credit problem.
“[S]everal sources of earnings management were suggested: The selection 
between alternative accounting methods is classified as source type 1 while 
source type 2 is the accounting judgment required in the implementation of 
accounting principles. . .  .while type 1 is a visible act due to disclosure rules, 
type 2 is a behind-the-scenes act,. .. SFAS No. 13 results in a conversion of type 
1 into type 2 . . .  .We question the wisdom of trading a visible source of earnings 
management for an invisible one” (Gardella 1986).
(continued)
135
TABLE 1 Existing Literature (continued)
“[T]wo companies could obtain materially different results with identical 
leases. This can occur because these companies might have widely different 
interpretations of what constitutes a bargain purchase option, bargain renewal 
option, material lease, or other factors. Also, estimates of fair value, resid­
ual value, economic life, implicit interest rate, incremental borrowing rate, 
executory costs, etc., differ between companies. Thus, SFAS No. 13, while 
successfully narrowing the range of acceptable accounting methods, opened the 
door to another type of manipulation.
“A majority of the Board members expressed the tentative view that if SFAS 
No. 13 were to be reconsidered, they would support a property-right approach 
in which all leases are included as ‘right to use property’ and as ‘lease obliga­
tion’ in the lessee’s balance sheet. If politically feasible, it would be a step in 
the right direction” (Palmon and Kwatinetz 1979/80).
“Hedge accounting on a futures transaction is appropriate if the commodity 
underlying the futures contract is linked, in substance, to the price risk 
associated with the commodity being hedged. . . .  Determining whether price 
exposure exists (to be eligible for hedge accounting) must include considering 
all relevant facts and circumstances. Certain anticipatory transactions create 
such an exposure” (Rachleff 1984).
“[B]oth swaps and futures contracts can change from matched positions over 
a period of time. . .  interest rate swaps can have a significant impact on a 
corporation’s financial projections. . .  No accounting recognition is made at the 
inception of the swap agreement. Accounting for the expanded use of option 
transactions is explored by Hauworth and Moravy (1987) who explain, ‘The 
basic economic purpose of options is to serve as a tool for transferring price, 
foreign exchange, or interest rate risk from those wishing to avoid risk 
(“hedgers”) to those willing to assume it in anticipation of making a profit 
(“speculators”).’ A ‘mark to market’ approach is recommended ‘unless the 
option transaction meets the criteria for hedge accounting in which case gains 
and losses should be deferred and reported symmetrically with the hedged 
item’ ” (Riley and Smith 1987).
Figlewski (1987) provides an overview of the interaction between derivative 
securities on financial instruments and the underlying cash markets, with par­
ticular emphasis on their role in the marketplace to facilitate risk management. 
Contingent claims however can produce “somewhat slippery connections 
among the markets for fundamental assets and the various derivative securities.”
Implications: Interpretation skills must be developed with respect to reported 
numbers, as well as the underlying transactions producing such numbers.
Automating Auditing
“[E]xpert systems. . .  bring knowledge of recognized experts to those who do 
not possess the same level of knowledge or experience.
“The decision support system does not make any decisions; it supports and 
enhances the decisions that auditors make. It is as if each staff person had a part­
ner looking over his shoulder, saying, ‘This is what I would do. What do you
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think?’ The program does not give answers; it brings up questions that 
help the auditor select procedures and decide how much of each procedure 
is necessary.
“Overall, such systems function as checklists containing important points, 
covering all the bases, and raising questions an auditor might forget to ask 
because there are so many other questions—and they are interrelated and com­
plex. For each account, the program guides the auditor through such questions 
as.. .‘What is the amount of risk in each significant account?’
“[A] computer cannot think; it can only remember. No machine can 
approach the range of the human mind. However, computers are wonderful 
tools with their phenomenal memories, speed, and accuracy.. . .
“At IBM’s training sessions, the coffee-break tapes carry the message, 
‘Machines should work; people should groove.’ Computers give us tools that 
can handle dull, mechanical tasks and free us to focus on more important, more 
interesting issues” (Temkin 1986).
Estimates and risk modeling are increasingly facilitated by electronic spread­
sheet software (e.g., Togo 1987).
Implications: Technology should enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of 
accounting estimations.
Independence in Auditing
“There can be little doubt that the desired product is financial disclosure 
which can be tried, tested, and proven to be ‘true,’ ‘fair,’ ‘reliable,’ ‘credible,’ and 
‘authentic.’ For such to be the case, financial disclosure must consist of 
‘independent information;’ that is, information which can be inter-subjectively 
tested... .the auditing of accounts can be likened to a process of ‘quality 
control,’ a process in which a product is tested in terms of the extent to 
which it conforms with prescribed specifications based on the use for which 
the product has been designed. Such a testing process must be carried out 
independently of both the production process itself and those who operate it” 
(Wolnizer 1978).
Implications: To effectively audit accounting estimates, an independent assess­
ment apart from the original formulation process is essential.
Challenges Remaining
“Accountants enter an age of anxiety” is reported as a financial press observa­
tion in Australia by Birkett and Walker (December 1971). Attention is brought 
to challenges facing the profession, past scandals, responsive and unresponsive 
behavior, and the need for the profession not to be static but to be responsive to 
changing and challenging conditions.
“Professor R.J. Chambers argues that the most significant aspect of the 
financial position of a business firm is that it indicates the firm’s capacity for 
adaptation to the changes in environment which an uncertain future may bring. 
Accordingly, the statement of financial position should ideally show all assets at 
their current cash equivalent, defined as ‘the market selling price or realizable 
price of any or all goods held’” (Wright 1967).
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Stock Compensation
Beresford and Locatelli (1983) place the problem of accounting for stock 
compensation in perspective: “Theory aside, the crux of the Opinion No. 25 
debate seemed to boil down to practical considerations. While many of the 
adopters of Opinion No. 25 may have agreed that all compensatory plans should 
result in compensation costs and that such costs should be measured at the time 
the stock compensation is granted, the majority did not believe it was practical 
to measure compensation according to those guidelines in all cases.
“However, a minority believed that while measurement of compensation 
costs according to the theoretically pure concepts might be difficult in some 
cases, it was not impossible.” The issue of how employee stock option plans 
might be valued is likewise examined by Noreen (1979/80).
Bad Debt Expense
“ ‘Bad debt expense’. .. is not really a recognition, but rather a quantification 
problem. Bad debt expense is not an expense in the sense that expenses are the 
extinguishments of rights to utilize a resource. Rather, the bad debt expense 
represents a quantification of the sales inflow in terms of the amount of inflow 
that is probable and measurable” (Sorter and Ingberman 1987).
“[U]npaid bills [tied to bankruptcies] now total well over $33 billion annually 
. . .  Receivables can typically represent as much as 91 percent of a company’s 
working capital, or 42 percent of its net worth. The protection offered by 
business credit insurance goes far beyond that of bad debt reserves.
“Quite simply, the coverage insures that a company can be paid for what it 
sells. Any covered excess bad debt losses are protected by the insurance policy” 
(Legge 1987). This may merely substitute the risk of the insurer for the receiva­
bles’ associated risks.
“Two major inconsistencies of the recognition and quantification rules were 
observed. The first is that the recognition rules, while dealing with legal rights 
and obligations, result in the omission of an extremely important segment of 
rights and obligations. Contractual rights and obligations are not recorded as 
assets and liabilities, and the assumption of those rights and obligations is not 
an accounting event [unless, for example, a deposit has been received]. At a 
time when contractual rights and obligations are assuming an ever-increasing 
importance, it is hard to rationalize this omission from the accounting 
universe.. . .
“The second major inconsistency is accounting’s ambivalent attitude toward 
present value. When an activity is to be quantified in terms of future cash flows, 
sometimes the required quantification is in present-value terms and some­
times it’s in absolute terms. There does not appear to be any logical reasoning 
for how this incongruity arose and why it is allowed to persist” (Sorter and 
Ingberman 1987).
“What types of past transactions and events are considered acceptable as a 
basis for conditioning beliefs about the future?.. .consider the estimation of 
uncollectible accounts. How rich is the mix of information upon which the
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estimated uncollectibles account can be based?. . .  a known ‘predictable’ pattern 
(i.e., time series dependency). . .  .Can the estimated uncollectibles reflect the 
fact that delinquencies next quarter are expected to deteriorate further or are 
future delinquencies ‘critical events’ that cannot be anticipated, regardless of 
the expected dependency in the aging schedules?.. .What information are the 
analysts reflecting in their expectations that is not reflected in the current loan 
loss allowance?.. .Currently we do not have a well-articulated statement as 
to what types of estimates of future events are within the current system of 
financial reporting versus what types are beyond. Alternatively stated, there is 
not a well-articulated statement of what types of information (i.e., past transac­
tions and events) are acceptable upon which to condition the estimated effect of 
future events on existing assets and liabilities” (Beaver 1991).
Green Accounting
“Standardized ‘Green Audits’ will become a key element of corporate 
environmental policy and practice” (Socha and Harvey 1991).
“The International Chamber of Commerce has defined environmental audit 
as ‘a management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and 
objective evaluation of how well environmental organization, management 
and equipment are performing with the aim of helping to safeguard the environ­
ment by:
• Facilitating management control of environmental protection.
• Assessing compliance with company policies which would include meeting 
regulatory requirements’” (Vinten 1991).
Environmental liabilities were the subject of a 1991 Audit Risk Alert (AICPA 
1991) that outlined associated “red flags” such as purchase of land below local 
market prices, acquisition of increased insurance coverage against environmen­
tal risks, and participation in a real estate transaction or corporate merger.
“According to SEC Regulation S-K (reg. 229.103), disclosures dealing with 
the discharge of materials into the environment should be described in the legal 
proceedings section of Form 10-K if:
‘A governmental authority is a party to each proceeding and such proceeding 
involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the registrant reasonably believes 
that such proceeding will result in no monetary sanctions, or in monetary sanc­
tions, exclusive of interest and costs of less than $100,000, provided, however, 
that such proceedings which are similar in nature may be grouped and described 
generically’” (Freedman and Stagliano 1992).
Yet, “many firms make little or no disclosure”. Estimates of exposure for 
potential Superfund sites are as high as $750 billion. Pollution control costs 
for environmental programs meeting current legislative requirements will reach 
nearly $160 billion a year by [the year] 2000 (FASAC 1992).
Past, Present, and Future 
Sterling has the attitude that “all measurements are of past dimensions. . . .  
The original purpose of making the measurement may be to predict a future 
condition or retrodict [‘predict’ backward] a past condition, but this does not 
negate the fa c t that measurement concerns an existing condition and that
(continued)
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predictions are of a fundamentally different nature” (Mattessich 1971). Yet, as 
Mattessich observes, “Nowhere in mathematical measure theory will the 
reader find definitions of ‘measure’ and ‘measurement’ restricting these 
concepts to past or present events.”
Reporting Effects and Economics 
“[T]he reporting requirements of FASB Statement No. 4 results in accounting 
‘gains’ being reported for most discounted convertible bond exchange (DCBE) 
transactions, while the economic analysis indicates ‘losses’ in most cases” (Loy 
and Toole 1979/80).
In-Substance Defeasance 
“When implementing an in-substance defeasance, an enterprise may have to 
address the following issues: some modest reinvestment return could be 
assumed when determining the amount of assets to be placed in trust. . . ;  legal 
counsel should be sought to determine the legal status of the assets in the trust 
for any contemplated in-substance defeasance transaction. . .; (instant 
defeasance on new debt is not intended despite opportunities posed through 
European markets); Possible future payments on debt that remains legally 
outstanding but is extinguished in a defeasance transaction give rise to loss 
contingencies” (McDonald and Sutton 1984).
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
“[N]o real consensus has been reached as to how.. .investors.. .account for 
their investment in the Trust or Partnership.” The mortgage-backed securities 
marketplace will probably continue to expand in both volume and complexity 
as new products, structures, and techniques are introduced. . . .  In recent years, 
the mortgage-backed securities marketplace has become extremely complex in 
terms of the types and structures of securities being created, the accounting, 
regulatory and tax implications to investors and issuers, and the related valua­
tion and yield sensitivity of these instruments” (Wertz and Donadio 1987).
Lower of Cost or Market 
Consider the extensive evidence and debate on valuation: nonaccountants 
have been observed to think in terms of cash flow when reading income state­
ments and net realizable value when reading balance sheets (Lee 1984). The 
history of the lower of cost or market vantage points is outlined by Parker 
(1965), with the observation that the rule is “practical” though suffering from 
“ ‘theoretically’ illogicality,” thereby surviving through embodying both cost 
and value, from a conservative direction.
Purchase Audit or Review
“The ‘soft’ numbers in financial statements (e.g., allowances for doubtful 
receivables, excess and obsolete inventory, and unprofitable contracts), which 
are determined by management judgments and as to which there may be 
reasonable difference of opinion, become hard money transferable between the 
pockets of buyer and seller according to these judgments. Under these circum­
stances, the materiality threshold of net worth or net income in such financial 
statements may be almost anything more—or less—than zero” (Gormley 1979/80).
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Cost Implications
Research indicates “that smaller businesses pay proportionately higher 
accounting costs” but begs the question of cost/benefit trade-offs and causal 
factors influencing such cost proportions (Nair and Rittenberg 1982/83).
Implications: A number of challenges involving theoretical, empirical, politi­
cal, and reporting dimensions exist in formulating improved accounting 
estimates.
One key line of inquiry in such literature is conceptual, including valua­
tion models, identification of common factors that determine value or 
economic consequences, and quantification of complexity. Determinants of 
the complexity of accounting estimates include the extent to which we 
understand the causal factors of a particular economic event.
Consider the following observation by William H. Beaver concerning 
SAS No. 57 and the intrinsic future dimension of accrual accounting:
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 57, “Auditing Accounting 
Estimates,” illustrates the pervasiveness of future events and pro­
vides forty examples of where accounting estimates are required in 
part because “the measurement of some amounts or the valuation 
of some item is uncertain, pending the outcome of future events.”
In at least one-half of the examples, the estimation problem arises 
because of uncertainty regarding the outcome of one or more future 
events. Future events must be addressed because of the nature of 
accrual accounting. . . .  Accruals can be viewed as a form of fore­
cast about the future based on current and past events, and accrual 
accounting can be viewed as a cost-effective way of conveying 
expectations about future benefits or sacrifices (Beaver 1991).
Conceptually, we model key factors—often emphasizing parsimoniously, 
elegant depictions of interrelationships—and then empirically we set out to 
test those models. The latter phase of research struggles with empirical 
definitions of concepts, identifying proxies that are often plagued with 
measurement error, and then clarifies what insights are added by the models 
and what appears to remain “unexplained.” In pursuing a theoretical frame­
work, it is useful to keep in mind that:
.. .depending upon the particular assumption adopted, a set of 
theories purporting to explain the same physical phenomena may 
exist.. . .Conant has observed that “a theory is only overthrown 
by a better theory, never merely by contradictory facts;” we are 
inclined to add that the use to which a theory is put may also 
generate evidence for the choice of one theory or another (Williams 
and Griffin 1969).
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Practice applications of conceptual and empirical results lead to explicit 
recognition of certain factors that influence or determine estimates. This 
can lead to such thought-provoking comments as: “Whether the combined 
explanatory power of the variables—about 58 % of the variance of annual 
returns—is good or bad news about market efficiency is left for the reader 
to judge” (Fama 1990). At what point are models sufficiently comprehensive 
to predict and explain economic behavior? One interesting development 
is the increasing recognition of the role of incentives in the form of the 
potential effects of compensation arrangements, as well as the role of 
monitoring. If, for example, an auditor recognizes that a bonus plan keyed 
to operating income is in place, with a floor and ceiling specification, then 
that auditor can better understand possible incentives affecting manage­
ment’s relative aggressiveness or conservatism when formulating certain 
estimates. By the same token, monitoring of practices influencing operating 
income would need to be given greater attention than would practices with­
out the attendant compensation effects.
Decision Making
Research has clarified the superiority of decisions among three experts 
relative to an individual decision maker. It has also noted repeatedly that 
mere consensus in no way implies greater accuracy. Hence, means of 
ensuring against forced consensus, planned agendas, and various political 
dynamics are pursued, such as Delphi-type approaches to resolving key 
corporate decisions among managers with diverse perspectives.
The Bayesian context or “belief function” technology base of expert 
systems has increasingly sought variations of probability estimates as a 
basis for developing decision rules and guidance. Use of graphics, sophisti­
cated software, and feedback mechanisms within expert systems have all 
increased decision makers’ understanding of probabilities, the indepen­
dence of such probabilities, or lack thereof, and their consequences for 
ultimate decisions. Substantial research exists on elicitation of subjective 
assessments of probabilities and when certain approaches appear to be 
more effective (Abdel-khalik and Solomon 1988).
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment has been disaggregated to include the notions of inherent 
risk, control risk, and detection risk. Practitioners do not hesitate to 
characterize “soft” numbers as having greater inherent risk. As discus­
sions explore control risk dimensions, the foremost concern is who is 
making the estimate and with what information base. The more competent 
the individuals involved and the more tractable and comprehensible the 
information base used in developing estimates, the better the control
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environment and related procedures for estimation. Figure 1 summarizes 
these key considerations. Nonetheless, most practitioners expressed a 
resistance to reducing control risk to its lowest level without directing 
attention to both the process and the result. Many suggested that they would 
view it essential to test independently the estimate itself, regardless of how 
it was achieved. Yet, anecdotes were shared that challenged the availability 
of an independent means to test certain types of estimates that are peculiar 
to an entity’s operations. As an example, determining product liability for 
railroad car manufacturers requires records on defects in cars and potential 
liability claims tied to reported defects. Whether an adequate means exists 
of gathering such information from sources other than the client appears 
debatable at best.
Range of Reasonableness
If the focus of the practitioner becomes the estimate itself, one question 
is how to determine the breadth of reasonableness. Moreover, once a range 
is considered and the client estimate is found to lie within the range, should 
the point estimate alone be documented as reasonable, or is an interval 
assessment preferable? The guidance in the literature states that if all proba­
bilities are equally likely, the lowest bound is to be selected. Consider first 
the likelihood of a “uniform distribution” of equally likely outcomes and 
then pose the question of why the literature has endorsed a lower bound 
rather than the more common selection in statistics of mean or median? The 
answer appears derivable from revisiting history.
When SFAS No. 5 was developed, the concern was over “hidden 
reserves,” whereby reserves for contingencies and the like were being 
“stored away for a rainy day,” so to speak. The incentive of the regulators 
was to limit the extent of accruals. Ironically, in today’s environment, the 
concerns are largely the reverse: Companies appear to be avoiding accruals 
for contingencies, even when probable, on the premise that estimation 
is too difficult. Pressures are increasing by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), particularly in the area of environmental cleanup 
responsibilities by companies, to estimate contingencies even when difficult 
to measure. An appropriate perspective on the importance of estima­
tion follows:
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This 
is okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which 
can’t be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is 
artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what 
can’t be measured easily isn’t very important. This is blindness.
The fourth step is to say what can’t be easily measured really 
doesn’t exist. This is suicide (Daniel Yankelovich, as cited in 
Smith 1972).
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FIGURE 1 Evaluating Control Risk 
Associated With Estimates
Who is making the estimate?
A
COMPETENCY
TRACTABLE AND COMPREHENSIBLE
 
PROCESS & RESULT (SUBSTANTIVELY)
Whatinformation base is being used?
How well controlled is the environment and what are the controls over theestimation process?
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Risk 
Assessment
The avoidance of such “suicide” may lead to more frequent estimates, but 
the dilemma of having gone for a limit of the bound, rather than its mean 
value within SFAS No. 5 continues.
Practitioners have asked the question: Which approaches in paragraph .10 
of SAS No. 57 are most commonly used by the auditor and what is the 
rationale for the approach used? Responses suggest that approaches are 
highly dependent on (1) the client setting, (2) the technology and informa­
tion at hand, and (3) the divergence of client estimates and the auditor’s 
assessments. One practitioner told of a legal suit that had implied the stated 
range of “reasonableness” in the working papers should have been booked 
in its most conservative form. The consequence of this litigious setting is 
that at least one major international firm is contemplating no inclusion of 
“ranges” in the working papers, because they audit complex accounting 
estimates. Other firms report use of combinations of ranges and point 
estimates, with attention paid to excessively wide intervals. The constant 
balancing of audit evidence for decision-making purposes and compliance 
with general standards against litigious pressures is characterized in figure 2.
Disclosure
When auditors consider the high amounts of risk inherent in certain 
numbers, they are increasingly turning to footnote disclosure as a vehicle to 
deliver a message on such risks. Examples of disclosures cited as particu­
larly effective include those by Martin Marietta and various health care 
companies, as displayed in table 2. Yet, some suggest that the use of 
footnotes in this manner passes the audit judgment to the financial statement 
user and strives to avoid the question of “fairness.” Disputes proliferate 
as to whether disclosure of risk profiles of management’s investment 
decisions, hedging activities, and the like should be value added in financial 
statement filings. Consider the disclosures on the junk bond investment 
practices of various financial institutions, in tandem with current mark- 
to-market discussions of standard setters. A key question appears to be 
the communication of risk and activities taken to balance risk, alongside 
where such communication belongs. Of course, there are those who are 
skeptical of moving from price to value, including A.C. Litteton, who wrote 
in 1929:
Assuredly.. .value is a vague sort of thing, subject to all the whims 
of mankind and turned by the least wind of altered circum­
stances. . .  .Whereas value is an estimate of what price ought to be, 
price itself is an established fact. . .  .When accounting is loosed 
from this anchor of fact it is afloat upon a sea of psychological 
estimates, which, however important they may be to business 
management, are beyond the power of accounting, as such, to 
express (Parker 1965).
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FIGURE 2 Litigation May Encourage Less Documentation 
of the Range of Estimates
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TABLE 2 Footnote Disclosures
Martin Marietta Corporation 
1990 Annual Report, p. 32
In the fourth quarter of 1990, the Corporation established a reserve of $78 
million ($1.00 per share) associated with the Corporation’s investment in 
preproduction costs for the ADATS (Air Defense Anti-Tank System) program. 
The reserve was necessitated due to program delays and the increased uncer­
tainties surrounding ultimate recoverability of the investment through the 
production and deployment of the system. While the U.S. Army program is 
currently continuing under a two-year stretch-out and reliability growth plan, 
there is no assurance that the program will ultimately go into production. 
Management believes that the costs associated with these preproduction efforts, 
which are essential for ultimately fielding the system, will be recovered should 
the ADATS system go into full production and deployment.
American Medical Holdings, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (August 31, 1990),
pp. 41, 54
Contractual Programs
The Company’s domestic hospitals serve some patients under government 
and privately sponsored insurance programs for which payment is made based 
on cost as defined under the programs or at predetermined rates based upon the 
diagnosis, plus capital costs, return on equity, and other adjustments rather than 
customary charges. Total net revenues from such programs were 36%, 34%, 
34%, and 36% of total domestic hospital net revenues for the ten months ended 
August 31, 1990, the two months ended October 31, 1989 and the fiscal years 
ended 1989 and 1988, respectively. In addition, the Company has other con­
tracted business which represented 21%, 21%, 20%, and 17 % of total domestic 
hospital net revenues for the ten months ended August 31, 1990, two months 
ended October 31, 1989, and the years ended 1989 and 1988, respectively.
Revenues are presented net of reserve provisions to reduce customary charges 
to the estimated amounts receivable from such programs. The reserves 
provided have been deducted from accounts receivable pending final audit 
and settlement. Provisions for contractual allowances for the ten months 
ended August 31, 1990 for Holdings and AMI were $1.195 billion and $1.125 
billion, respectively. The provisions for the two months ended October 31, 1989 
and the two years ended 1989 and 1988 were $238 million, $1.261 billion 
and $1.263 billion, respectively. In management’s opinion, the reserves 
provided are adequate to cover the ultimate liabilities that may result from 
final settlements.
Professional Liability Risks
In addition to the base premium paid to the insurance company, the Company 
is contingently liable for additional retrospective premiums with respect to each
(continued)
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policy year. The company includes in its professional liability reserve the 
deductible portion of the professional liability risks of these hospitals which is 
$500,000 per occurrence. For the ten months ended August 31, 1990, Holdings 
and AMI paid $3,200,000 in premiums to this insurance company. For the two 
months ended October 31, 1989 and for the twelve months ended August 31, 
1989 and 1988, AMI paid $800,000, $5,000,000 and $6,200,000, respectively, in 
premiums to this insurance company.
The Company is self-insured for the balance of its professional liability risks. 
As of August 31, 1990 and 1989, the unfunded reserve for self insurance was 
$112,300,000 and $110,900,000, respectively, of which $23,000,000 in fiscal 1990 
and $16,000,000 in fiscal 1989 is included in current liabilities. The reserves for 
losses and related expenses are discounted to their present value based on 
expected loss reporting patterns determined by independent actuaries using a 
rate of 9%.
Columbia Hospital Corporation (December 31, 1990), 
pp. F12, F13, F18
Patient Revenues
Patient revenues are reported at the estimated amounts due from patients and 
third-party payors for services rendered, including estimated settlements under 
reimbursement agreements with third-party payors.
Columbia’s hospitals and related healthcare entities provide care to patients 
in connection with agreements with third-party payors, including the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs, and certain managed care providers. These agree­
ments provide for payments using mechanisms that are based upon established 
charges, cost of providing services, predetermined rates based upon diagnosis, 
fixed per diem rates, and discounts from established charges. The following 
table summarizes the percent of patient revenues from all payors in 1990, 1989, 
and 1988:
Years Ended December 31
Inception to 
December 31,
1990 1989 1988
Medicare 35% 33% 42%
Medicaid 7 8 6
Managed Care 10 9 5
Other 48 50 47
100% 100% 100%
Contingencies
Columbia continually evaluates contingencies based upon the best available 
evidence. In addition, allowances for loss are provided currently for disputed 
items that have continuing significance, such as certain third-party reimburse­
ments that continue to be claimed in current cost reports.
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The principal contingencies are described below:
Patient Revenues—Certain third-party payments are subject to examination by 
agencies administering the programs. Columbia is contesting certain issues 
raised in audits of prior-year cost reports.
Epic Healthcare Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Fiscal 1990), p. A-12
Net Operating Revenue and Uncompensated Care
Net operating revenue is recorded based on established billing rates less 
allowances and discounts for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid and other 
contractual programs. Payments received under these programs, which are 
based on either the costs of services or predetermined rates, are generally less 
than the established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals, and the differences 
are recorded as contractual allowances and/or contracted discounts. The 
reserves provided have been deducted from accounts receivable pending final 
audit settlement. Contractual allowances and contracted discounts amounted to 
$406,013,000 and $335,033,000 for fiscal 1990 and 1989, respectively. The pro­
visions for uncompensated care of $61,800,000 and $54,680,000 for fiscal 1990 
and 1989, respectively, are included in operating expenses.
Contingencies
Final determination of amounts earned under prospective payment and cost- 
reimbursement programs is subject to review by appropriate governmental 
authorities or their agents. In the opinion of management, adequate provision 
has been made for any adjustments that could result from such reviews.
Healthtrust, Inc.—The Hospital Company (August 31, 1990), p. A-9
Net Operating Revenue
Net operating revenue is based on established billing rates less allowances 
and discounts for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other contrac­
tual programs. Payments received under these programs, which are based on 
either the costs of services or predetermined rates, are generally less than the 
established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals, and the differences are 
recorded as contractual adjustments and/or policy discounts. Net operating 
revenue is net of contractual adjustments and policy discounts of $804,429,000, 
$633,497,000, and $487,919,000 for fiscal 1990, 1989, and 1988, respectively. 
The provision for bad debts is included in operating expenses.
Note K— Commitments and Contingencies
The Company is self-insured for a substantial portion of its professional and 
general liability risks. At August 31, 1990, the reserve for professional and 
general liability risks was $102,581,000, of which $3,750,000 is included in 
current liabilities. The reserves for self-insured professional and general liabil­
ity losses and loss adjustment expenses are based on actuarially projected 
estimates discounted to their present value using a rate of 6%. HCA retains the 
liability for all professional liability claims and claims which would be covered 
by a policy of comprehensive general liability insurance with a date of occur­
rence prior to September 1, 1987.
(continued)
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Final determination of amounts earned under prospective payment and cost 
reimbursement activities is subject to review by appropriate governmental 
authorities or their agents. In the opinion of management, adequate provision 
has been made for any adjustments that could result from such reviews.
Hospital Corporation of America (1990), p. A-19
Liability Insurance 
The general and professional liability risks of the Company are self-insured 
through a wholly-owned subsidiary for losses up to $25,000,000 per occurrence. 
The Company carries general and professional liability insurance from an 
unrelated commercial insurance carrier for per occurrence losses in excess of 
$25,000,000 with policy limits of $75,000,000 per occurrence and in the 
aggregate, on a claims-made basis. The reserve for general and professional 
liability risks is based on actuarially determined estimates.
Humana (August 31, 1990), pp. 27, 29
Accounting Policies 
Hospital revenues are reported net of contractual allowances and are based 
upon amounts receivable from Medicare and other third parties. Health plan 
revenues consist of insurance premiums derived from group and individual 
prepaid health benefit and managed health care products.
Professional Liability Risks 
The Company insures substantially all professional liability risks through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary. Provisions for such risks underwritten by the sub­
sidiary, including expenses incident to claim settlements, were $64,206,000, 
$64,614,000, and $55,809,000 for the years ended August 31, 1990, 1989, and 
1988, respectively. Amounts equal to provision for loss are funded annually.
National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (May 31, 1990), pp. 37, 43 (Note 6)
Net Operating Revenues
These revenues consist primarily of net patient service revenues which are 
based on the hospitals’ established billing rates less allowances and discounts 
principally for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid and other contractual 
programs. These allowances and discounts were $1,848,000,000, 
$1,420,000,000, and $1,091,000,000 for the years ended May 31, 1990, 1989, and 
1988, respectively.
Payments under these programs are based on either predetermined rates or the 
costs of services. Settlements for retrospectively determined rates are estimated 
in the period the related services are rendered and are adjusted in future periods 
as final settlements are determined. After excluding the net operating revenues 
of the business transferred to The Hillhaven Corporation (see Note 2), approxi­
mately 28% of the remaining fiscal 1990 net operating revenues is from the 
participation of hospitals in Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Professional and General Liability Insurance 
The Company insures its professional and comprehensive general liability risks 
through a wholly-owned insurance subsidiary and another insurance company
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owned by several hospital companies in which the Company has a significant 
financial interest. Risks in excess of $3,000,000 per occurrence for general 
hospitals and corporate activities and $250,000 for specialty hospitals are 
reinsured with major independent insurance companies.
The Company’s estimated liability for the self-insured portion of professional 
and comprehensive general liability claims is $62,000,000 at May 31, 1990, and 
has been discounted to its present value based on expected loss reporting pat­
terns using a weighted average discount rate of 9.6%.
Nu-Med, Inc. and Subsidiaries (April 30, 1990), p. 25
Contractual Allowances 
The Company’s hospitals participate in several governmental and privately 
sponsored contractual programs that provide for different methods of reim­
bursement, including reimbursement based on cost or a diagnosis-related 
predetermined rate, plus a return on equity. The difference between the revenue 
recorded under each program and the anticipated reimbursement is recorded 
as a contractual allowance. Annual cost reports are generally submitted to 
and audited by agencies operating these programs. The Company records 
anticipated cost report settlements due from or to such agencies in the current 
year. A charge or credit to the amount recorded is recognized in the year of 
settlement as an adjustment to the provision for contractual allowances in that 
year’s statement of operations. The provision for contractual allowances and 
uncollectible amounts amounted to $134,075,000, $122,170,000, and 
$129,395,000 for the years ended April 30, 1990, 1989, and 1988, respectively.
Malpractice Insurance Coverage 
The Company maintains $50 million in professional and general liability 
insurance coverage. The first $500,000 is occurrence coverage, and the remain­
ing $49.5 million is a modified occurrence coverage, containing a built-in 
prepaid 84-month “tail.” An unlimited reporting tail is available for an 
additional premium. Certain specific facilities maintain an additional $10 
million in coverage. In the opinion of management, sufficient reserves 
have been established for any potential deductible portions to be paid by 
the Company.
Republic Health Corp. & Subsidiaries (August 31, 1990), pp. 25, 26
Medicare and Other Reimbursement Programs 
Settlement amounts due to or receivable from Medicare and Medicaid 
programs are determined by fiscal intermediaries. The difference between the 
final determination and estimated amounts accrued is accounted for as an 
adjustment to revenues in the year of final determination. Management believes 
that the provision for Medicare and other program settlements is adequate to 
cover final settlements.
Professional Liability Insurance 
For professional liability claims asserted, the Company assumes professional 
liability risks up to $3,500,000 per claim and $10,000,000 in the aggregate. In
(continued)
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1990, the company purchased a $10,000,000 layer of excess insurance above 
self-insured retentions that may be applied towards hospital professional lia­
bility and comprehensive general liability. The Company also purchased an 
additional $5,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance for comprehensive 
general liability only. In 1989, REPH purchased an $8,000,000 layer of excess 
insurance above self-insured retentions that may be applied towards hospital 
professional liability and comprehensive general liability. REPH also pur­
chased an additional $2,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance above the 
$8,000,000 layer for hospital professional liability only and $7,000,000 in excess 
of the $8,000,000 layer for comprehensive general liability only. In 1988, the 
Company purchased $15,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance above the 
self-insured retention. Claims-made insurance limits coverage to claims 
asserted during the policy year. Actual hospital professional liability costs for a 
particular period are not known for several years after the period has expired. 
The delay in determining the actual cost associated with a particular period is 
due to the time between when an incident occurs and when it is reported as well 
as the time involved and costs incurred in resolution of such claims. Based upon 
an actuarial study, the Company maintains reserves for the future payments of 
asserted professional liability claims and for claims incurred but not reported 
which are not covered by insurance. The reserves for all years are recorded at 
net present value using a 12 % discount rate. Certain amounts of cash are set 
aside and included in other assets to cover such claims.
Universal Health Services, Inc. (December 31, 1989), p. 20
Third Party Revenues
Net revenues include estimated reimbursable amounts from third-party payors 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and other contractual programs. Amounts received 
under such programs are based on either cost or predetermined rates and are 
generally less than established billing rates which are the basis for recording 
gross revenues. The differences between the billing rates and reimbursable 
amounts as well as prior year settlements are recorded as contractual 
allowances. The allowances provided have been deducted from receivables 
pending final determination by intermediary agencies and, in management’s 
opinion, are adequate to establish third-party receivables at realizable amounts. 
Medicare and Medicaid revenues represented 45%, 46%, and 45% of gross 
patient revenues for the years 1989, 1988, and 1987, respectively.
Commitments and Contingencies
The Company estimates the cost to complete major construction projects in 
progress at December 31, 1989 will approximate $18,000,000.
The Company is self-insured for its general liability risks for claims limited 
to $5,000,000 per occurrence and for its professional liability risks for claims 
limited to $25,000,000 per occurrence. Coverage in excess of these limits up to 
$100,000,000 is maintained with major insurance carriers.
As of December 1989 and 1988, the reserve for professional and general lia­
bility risks was $29,470,000 and $21,082,000, respectively, of which $5,436,000
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in 1989 and $3,582,000 in 1988 is included in current liabilities. Self insurance 
reserves are based upon actuarially determined estimates.
Approximately $4,500,000 of cash is restricted and has been escrowed as a 
reserve for potential professional liability risks as required by certain state 
regulatory agencies.
Under certain agreements, the Company has committed or guaranteed an 
aggregate of $40,000,000 related to options to acquire hospitals, acquisition- 
related contingencies and loans.
Various suits and claims arising in the ordinary course of business are pend­
ing against the Company. In the opinion of management, the outcome of such 
claims and litigation will not materially affect the Company’s consolidated 
financial position or results of operations.
Charter Medical Corp. & Subsidiaries (September 30, 1990), p. F-11
Net Revenue
Net revenue is based on established billing rates less estimated allowances for 
patients covered by Medicare and other contractual reimbursement programs 
and certain policy discounts. Amounts received by the Company for treatment 
of patients covered by Medicare and other contractual reimbursement programs, 
which may be based on cost of services provided or predetermined rates, are 
generally less than the established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals. 
Final determination of amounts earned under contractual reimbursement 
programs is subject to review and audit by the appropriate agencies. Manage­
ment believes that adequate provision has been made for any adjustments that 
may result from such reviews.
Unanswered Questions
Two important practice issues that continue to be largely unanswered 
questions relate to interim numbers. What is the quality of interim dis­
closures and to what extent is the auditor presently involved? Should auditor 
involvement be extended and if it were, what associated challenges exist 
with respect to interim estimates? Should all press releases including finan­
cial information be reviewed by the auditor of record?
Practice Questions and Implementation Issues
Before SAS No. 57, practitioners were largely performing the procedures 
detailed in the expectation gap standard. The literature noted:
the EDs [exposure drafts for the expectations gap] should be judged 
by their potential contribution to audit effectiveness, a shorthand 
for the larger criterion of contribution to the quality of financial 
reporting (Elliott and Jacobson 1987).
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Practitioners interviewed acknowledge that the codification of SAS 
No. 57 provided greater attention to (1) the inherent risk dimension of esti­
mates, (2) the necessity of not only formulating accounting estimates but 
also of auditing those estimates, and (3) the importance of clients assuming 
responsibility for the estimates that are audited in turn by the public 
accountant—especially in smaller client settings. These three effects of SAS 
No. 57 are illustrated in figure 3. The visibility of accounting estimates 
throughout the audit process is increasingly evident in firm literature. By 
and large, increased guidance is not sought within the SAS arena, but 
the industry guidance on particular estimates, such as loan loss reserves 
and insurance reserves (for example, Statement of Position [SOP] 92-4, 
Auditing Insurance Entities’ Loss Reserves, a supplement to Audits of 
Property and Liability Insurance Companies, September 16, 1991), is 
applauded and continues to be sought on newer developments. The example 
of an area needing enhanced guidance is the intended meaning of “more 
likely than not” and the consequence of tax assets appearing on the books 
(Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).
Small CPA Firms' Perspectives
Representatives of small CPA firms were interviewed as to whether their 
perceptions aligned with those of large-firm practitioners. Smaller firms’ 
practitioners, as did their counterparts in larger firms, viewed SAS No. 57 
as largely a “nonevent” that codified practice. They believe that they are 
less likely to be able to reduce control risk in the formulation of estimates 
for most small client settings, due to the informality or inadequacy of under­
lying processes and information bases. Moreover, with smaller clients, 
the CPAs most often assist in formulating the accounting estimates. These 
practitioners viewed SAS No. 57 as being associated with the increased 
boilerplate emphasis in management representation letters on the client’s 
responsibility for accounting estimates, even when derived with the 
assistance of the CPA. Moreover, they cited the detailed direction in SAS 
No. 57 as being useful when the separate phase of auditing was conducted, 
apart from the accounting estimation process. They noted that the concern 
existed pre-SAS No. 57 that if a CPA helped to derive an accounting 
estimate, he or she might view that estimate to be reasonable, by necessity. 
The existence of SAS No. 57 makes it very clear that such is not the case; 
corroboration and an audit process must accompany the accounting 
assistance offered to a client. SAS No. 57 was similarly cited as a means 
of motivating enhanced record keeping by the client, due to cost con­
sequences attendant to having the outside auditor both formulating and 
auditing estimates.
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FIGURE 3 Effects of SAS No. 5 7 -  
More Attention to:
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Context and Exception Monitoring
The importance of context and the nature of the item being examined was 
repeatedly emphasized as crucial. Indeed, these considerations helped to 
guide the practitioner toward a range methodology or a point estimation 
approach. Moreover, one firm described its established practice of excep­
tion monitoring.
Specified ratios are computed and if an estimate represents a certain 
percentage of equity or percentage of reserves, the issue is “bumped up” for 
review within the firm. That group has found that the age of the company 
and the product line at hand often explain such exceptions. About 10 to 20 
percent require follow-up procedures. Small companies are particularly 
problematic, as are unusual types of business and insufficient data. 
Although these problems are unlikely to disappear, an increasing role for 
expert systems is that of screening to ensure that such “ trouble spots”  are 
recognized, in order to facilitate individual attention being directed to 
evaluating the reasonableness of associated estimates.
The concept of a “peer review” team of specialists to scrutinize aspects 
of developing practice was revealed in a number of interviews with practi­
tioners. For example, one firm has a group who will review all proposed tax 
asset creations under the recently issued SFAS No. 109, Accounting for 
Income Taxes.
Reduce deferred tax assets by a valuation allowance if, based 
on the weight of available evidence, it is more likely than not 
[a likelihood of more than 50 percent] that some portion or all 
of the deferred tax assets will not be realized. The valuation 
allowance should be sufficient to reduce the deferred tax asset 
to the amount that is more likely than not to be realized [emphasis 
added] (FASB 1992).
This requirement that management estimate and consider future taxable 
income in determining a valuation allowance poses a particular challenge 
(Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).
Independent Estimation Versus Reviewing 
Management's Estimation Process
As already suggested, a need exists to understand management’s estimation 
process apart from routine data-processing activities. This responsibility 
is clarified in both SAS No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal Control 
Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, and SAS No. 57. Nonetheless, 
interviews repeatedly expressed a substantive test preference as an effective 
means of understanding other factors considered by management, versus 
those considered relevant by the auditor. Some firms are using modeling as 
an explicit way to test their estimates, relative to those of management, and
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relative to incremental approaches to testing explanations of variations 
between the estimates of management and auditors. The choices among 
alternatives in the verification process are well explicated in the literature 
of nearly forty years ago:
Verification in research and analysis may refer to many things, 
including the correctness of mathematical and logical arguments, 
the applicability of formulas and equations, the trustworthiness 
of reports, the authenticity of documents, the genuineness of 
artifacts or relics, the adequacy of reproductions, translations 
and paraphrases, the accuracy of historical and statistical 
accounts, the corroboration of reported events, the completeness 
in the enumeration of circumstances in a concrete situation, 
the reliability and exactness of observations, the reproducibility 
of experiments, the explanatory or predictive value of generaliza­
tions (Machlup, 1955).
Interrelationship With Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards
SFAS No. 5 is receiving increased attention as the conceptual platform 
for all accruals of uncertainties. The questions posed in this guidance 
include: Did the condition exist at the relevant date, is it probable, is it 
estimable, and does it have a distribution as described in FASB Interpreta­
tion No. 14, Reasonable Estimation o f the Amount of a Loss, that permits 
the lower bound to be recorded? The United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) has questioned whether “probable” has become an ill- 
defined term that at times has been treated as virtual certainty and is 
increasingly calling for a “ more likely than not” revision (Bowsher 1991; 
GAO 1992). Note that two sources of measurement error are implied: (1) the 
usual “ noise” resulting from subjective estimation of probabilities, and (2) 
the added “ noise”  from having divergent objectives in such estimates due 
to misunderstanding of what the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) intended to be “ probable”  (e.g., 50 or 75 percent). The intriguing 
question has been posed as to why Postemployment Benefits (OPEB) had to 
be a separate pronouncement given SFAS No. 5 has been in place all along? 
Similar questions are being raised regarding environmental liabilities.
Many view SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, on assertions as a critical 
conceptual framework in which estimates can be evaluated and audited. 
Others integrate the attention of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality 
in Conducting an Audit, and SAS No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal 
Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, to the role of the control 
environment. However, interviews suggest the widely held belief that
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controls are less likely over presentation, disclosure, and valuation 
assertions—the heart of the SAS No. 57 focus.
Another related pronouncement is SAS No. 61, Communication With 
Audit Committees. Since this requires increased communication, an 
improved understanding by the corporate governance framework is 
expected. The audit committee will have an understanding of where signifi­
cant evaluative judgments are used and how they are determined.
Finally, audit industry guides are applauded in the accounting estimate 
area. In particular, interviewees pointed to the 1986 Auditing Procedure 
Study, Auditing the Allowance for Credit Losses o f Banks, as having within 
its pages the content of the later SAS No. 57, issued in 1988.
Estimation challenges have and are expected to continue to grow. SFAS 
No. 97, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises fo r Certain 
Long-Duration Contracts and for Realized Gains and Losses from the Sale 
o f Investments, the tax pronouncement’s “ more likely than not”  threshold, 
and similar developments may merit additional accounting interpretations 
to assist practice.
Regulatory pressures are likewise growing in the estimation area. Quar­
terly evaluation of numbers in reserves and increased regulatory attention 
to disclosure of responsible parties in environmental matters are two areas 
of present concern.
Plausible Challenges
The disclosure of accounting estimates and the associated audit process 
has been increasingly directed to the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) section of public filings. It is viewed as an opportunity to narrow 
the expectations gap through broadened discussion. The points highlighted 
include the concept of the estimation process not being a science, a descrip­
tion of the thought process actually used, and examples of the outcome of 
such a process. The description of significant accounting policies is another 
forum to describe estimates and the degree to which they may be influenced 
by the surprise element in certain lines of business. The magnitude of effect 
is the guide in determining disclosure practice. Table 3 provides a set of 
MD&A disclosures for CIGNA Corporation.
Another possible forum for disclosure is the audit report itself: uncertainty 
descriptions, scope limitations, and client-imposed or circumstances- 
imposed limitations (and whether this distinction is relevant). Additional 
practical direction is desired by some interviewees, who expressed concern 
that the lack of clarity may decrease the warning capability of the auditor’s 
report mechanism.
Control reports, should they become more commonplace, provide another 
forum in which the role of accounting estimates can be communicated.
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TABLE 3 An Example of Management's Discussion 
and Analysis Disclosure Practices
CIGNA Corporation 
Form 10-Q (pp. 8, 16, 17)
September 30, 1991
CIGNA’s businesses are subject to the effects of a changing social, economic, 
and regulatory environment. These include efforts to restrict insurance pricing 
and the application of underwriting standards and to expand regulation. For 
example, Proposition 103, a 1988 California ballot initiative, required rate 
reductions for most lines of property and casualty business and contained “ rate 
rollback” provisions that could require insurers to make premium refunds to 
their customers. In October 1991, the California Insurance Commissioner 
ordered numerous property and casualty insurers to make premium rebates 
pursuant to emergency regulations adopted by the Commissioner. CIGNA was 
ordered to refund approximately $43 million in premiums and accumulated 
interest. The Commissioner’s actions are being challenged in state and federal 
courts on constitutional and other grounds. CIGNA intends to defend itself 
vigorously and believes that any amount that it may eventually be required to 
refund will not be material.
Reserves
CIGNA’s property and casualty reserves are management’s estimate of future 
amounts needed to pay claims and related expenses for insured events that have 
occurred, including events that have not been reported to CIGNA. CIGNA’s 
reserving methodology is described in its 1990 Annual Report on Form 10-K, 
beginning on page 12. The description explains case and bulk reserves, when 
such reserves are established, the basis for establishing and updating them, and 
the uncertainties that are inherent in the reserving process. The following 
discussion addresses reserving issues that are peculiar to asbestos-related and 
environmental pollution claims.
Asbestos-related Claims
Since the early 1980s, underwriting results have been affected adversely by 
asbestos-related claims. The majority of claims allege bodily injury resulting 
from exposure to asbestos products. A smaller number of claims allege damage 
to buildings as a result of the presence of asbestos.
CIGNA recognized in late 1985 that the limits of liability of certain policies 
were likely to be exhausted by claims payments on behalf of certain insureds 
named as defendants in numerous asbestos cases. For those policies, CIGNA 
has reserves equal to the applicable limits of liability, minus payments made to 
date and reinsurance recoverables, plus an estimate of the associated future 
expenses of litigation. For claims that may arise under other policies, CIGNA 
has reserves for reported claims but not for unreported claims or for litigation 
expenses.
Significant uncertainties prevent CIGNA from estimating the future amounts 
that may be needed for these unreported asbestos-related claims. For example,
(continued)
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TABLE 3 An Example of Management's Discussion 
and Analysis Disclosure Practices 
(continued)
it is not possible to estimate the number and value of claims that might be made 
or the universe of asbestos-related exposures. In addition, significant issues in 
the building cases are in dispute, including whether insurance coverage exists 
at all and, if it does, what policies provide the coverage.
In July 1991, the 27,000 asbestos bodily injury actions that were pending in 
pre-trial stages in the federal courts (some of which involve CIGNA insureds) 
were consolidated in a single forum. It is not known whether this consolidation, 
which does not involve the much larger number of claims in state courts and 
does not relate to building claims, will speed or retard the resolution of claims, 
or decrease or increase the cost (including litigation expenses) of settling 
claims. The uncertainties inherent in valuing asbestos-related claims are not 
likely to be resolved in the near future.
Environmental Pollution Claims
Since the mid-1980s, CIGNA has experienced significant increases in the 
number of claims for losses involving alleged environmental pollution. CIGNA 
establishes reserves for reported environmental pollution claims.
CIGNA does not establish reserves for unreported claims or for costs of liti­
gation because significant uncertainties prevent CIGNA from estimating the 
amounts that may be needed for them. The courts have addressed coverage 
issues regarding pollution claims and have reached inconsistent conclusions on 
several issues, including the following: whether insurance coverage exists at all; 
what policies provide the coverage; when an insurer has a duty to defend; 
whether the release of contaminants is one or more “occurrence” for purposes 
of determining applicable policy limits; how pollution exclusions in policies 
should be applied; and whether clean-up costs constitute covered “property 
damage.” These issues are not likely to be resolved in the near future.
These coverage issues and additional uncertainties make even the estima­
tion of liability of reported claims difficult. For example, at any given clean-up 
site, the allocation of financial responsibility among those potentially liable 
varies greatly, depending on such factors as volumetric contribution, rela­
tive toxicity, number of years active at the site, extent of impairment to 
the environment and ability to pay. A “potentially responsible party” may 
have no liability, may share responsibility with hundreds of others or may bear 
the cost alone. Developing the information necessary to evaluate these issues 
takes years.
Financial Effect
CIGNA expects that, with the exception of losses under the policies described 
above whose limits of liability are reflected in asbestos reserves, future results 
will be adversely affected by losses for unreported asbestos-related liabilities, 
for unreported environmental pollution liabilities and for litigation expenses for 
reported and unreported asbestos-related and environmental pollution liabilities.
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Management's Point of View
It would seem desirable to pursue booking of the most likely balance. 
Since estimates are more susceptible to manipulation by management, 
through bias, if not a deliberate intent to misstate, care must be taken in both 
assessing risk and in auditing the numbers put forward. A  boundary can be 
invoked between inherent and control risk. Some interviewees indicated 
that they view inherent risk as driven externally from outside of the com­
pany, whereas control risk is driven by internal activities of management. 
Indeed, this demarcation seems to work to some extent when analyzing 
guidance directed to property and liability insurance companies, since 
inflation, the legal environment, and regulations are cited as inherent risk, 
with control structure and data base issues cited as control risk determinants 
(AICPA 1991). Such a perspective facilitates the auditor’s understanding of 
what is “opinion” and “expectation” of outside effects, as distinct from 
controllable policy of a firm, as various estimates are evaluated.
Industry-Level Guidance
Guidance is often viewed as an infringement on audit judgment. The 
internal guidance of a firm tends to be driven by standardization goals 
from within and is expected to vary in the context of the particular firm’s 
technology and structure (Wallace 1991b). Most interviewees championed 
an account-by-account focus within industry guides (as in the AICPA guide 
Audits o f Providers o f Health Care Services) as distinct from an “estimates” 
directed extension of guidance similar to SAS No. 57.
Regulatory Interest
Regulators increasingly understand the economic consequences of 
accounting estimates and are, indeed, the creators of one source of estimates 
—regulatory costs, associated compliance costs, and, potentially, litigation 
exposure. Pressures increasingly challenge regulators’ oversight of the 
accounting profession, as estimates are demonstrated as not being fully 
reflective of eventual outcomes. The importance of communicating the 
future forecast nature of some numbers in the financials and the avoidance 
of a “ Monday morning quarterback’s”  mentality need to be shared across 
the profession and the regulatory bodies.
One must recognize the sometimes conflicting perspectives of the regula­
tory arms. Although opinion-shopping concerns lead to 8-K timely filings, 
the Federal Trade Commission concurrently pushes to allow commissions 
to be within the compensation framework of public accountants—at least 
potentially creating conflict-of-interest perceptions. The history in the
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financial markets of Congress and regulatory bodies’ direction of regu­
latory accepted accounting practices (RAAP), at increasing odds from 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), provides a related 
perspective (Wallace 1991c). An overall governmental regulatory policy 
may be useful in avoiding some of the paradoxical outcomes of recent times.
Perception Issues
A key perception problem is that some users may believe that a soft 
number becomes hard, merely due to the auditor’s involvement. Clearly, 
this is not the case. Steps need to be taken to help adjust the perception.
More environment-driven pressures to consider estimations are evident. 
For example, increased risks exist in contracting by financial institutions, 
insurance companies, and defense contracting, to name a few.
An example in aerospace, where there are more important but less pre­
cise numbers, is the evolution in contracting with fixed-price arrangements. 
In contrast, for health care, diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) are seen by 
practitioners as easier for hospitals than cost-based settlements, in terms of 
the precision of numbers tied to diagnostic reimbursement groups. Yet, 
self-insurance estimates create added risks for these same clients. In other 
words, the shifting of risk may be within an industry and may be among 
areas of operation within a company in an industry. Many practitioners 
point to the financial arena and fair value footnote disclosures as sources of 
increased need for estimations and a growth in related reporting risks. Asset 
securitizations are being discussed from a risk perspective, and questions 
are being raised as to the adequacy of related disclosures.
Firms' Responsiveness to the Environment
The real challenge appears to be that CPA firms need to be increasingly 
responsive to the environment to get ahead of the risk curve, so to speak. 
The change in the real estate markets, health care, and risk patterns in a 
variety of markets need to be identified on a timely basis and addressed 
throughout the accounting and auditing process. Greater attention should 
be paid to planning and supervision, since these are the phases that can best 
address such shifting of risks. I f  practitioners can successfully locate the 
risks and not only be reactive but forward looking, the chance exists to 
assess the risks as the transactions arise. Otherwise, the aftermath can 
be problematic.
Two areas that seem to have implications for the profession are OPEB and 
“green accounting.” Why has it taken approximately two decades to achieve 
OPEB, and is the environmental area different? Consider the disclosure of 
Union Carbide in its December 31, 1990 10-K:
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Estimates of future costs of environmental protection are necessarily 
imprecise due to numerous uncertainties, including the impact 
of new laws and regulations [such as the Clean Air Act of 1990] 
the availability and application of new and diverse technologies, the 
eventual outcome of insurance coverage litigation in which the 
Corporation is engaged, the identification of new hazardous waste 
sites, and, in the case of Superfund sites, the ultimate allocation of 
costs among PRP’s. Nevertheless, the Corporation estimates that 
worldwide expenses for environmental protection, expressed in 
1990 dollars, should average about $200 million annually over the 
next five years. Worldwide capital expenditures for environmental 
protection, also expressed in 1990 dollars, are expected to average 
about $120 million annually over the same period.
Can we get ahead of “established practice” so that SFAS No. 5 can suffice 
to encourage the necessary accruals and disclosures? It would appear 
appropriate for standard setters to contemplate whether lessons learned 
can help guide future pronouncements. A  number of related research and 
practice issues are detailed by Roussey (1992). As researchers struggle to set 
a relevant scope for research, we should all remember:
Breakthroughs in scientific research often come from unexpected 
places: therefore, it ill behooves accountants to rule out any area of 
research. Instead, if we are to follow the scientific norm we will do 
our individual research on the basis of our individual beliefs about 
the likely source of answers, while at least tolerating, preferably 
encouraging, others to do likewise. This strategy increases our 
chances of achieving breakthroughs [emphasis added] (Robert R. 
Sterling’s 1979 book, Toward a Science of Accounting, cited by 
Stamp 1981).
Prescriptions
Audit standard setters should develop general guidance explaining when 
an exposure is estimable, the extent to which footnotes substitute or com­
plement SFAS No. 5 requirements, and how audit reports should be used to 
communicate related uncertainties.
I join the increasing number of voices that observe:
Currently there are multiple interpretations of the term, probable, 
even at a conceptual level. It has become one major source of 
variation in practice in the applications of GAAP regarding loss 
contingencies. Removing ambiguity in the meaning of the term 
could potentially enhance the treatment of future events and 
indirectly the treatment of assets and liabilities (Beaver 1991).
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Opportunities exist for clarifying the formation and audit of accounting 
estimates in particular industries through industry guides. Figure 4 summa­
rizes implementation problems, one reason for the emerging expectation 
gap, research needs, and standard-setting needs. As we ponder how best to 
approach estimates, we must recognize that limitations of accounting are 
part of our reality.
There is no prospect that accounting can ever parallel the develop­
ment of physics, because the nature of physical reality is so totally 
different from the reality with which accountants must deal.
Nor is there any prospect that this situation will ever change. Value, 
and hence (as Sterling observes) income, are future-oriented 
concepts. It then is uncertain, and fraught with risk. Markets are 
imperfect, and they are also incomplete. Human decision making 
processes (for which accounting valuations are the input) are of 
almost infinite variety, complexity, and variability. In most, 
perhaps all, cases they are imperfectly understood even by the 
people who use them (Stamp 1981).
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Appendix
Interviewees:
Harold Monk Davis, Monk & Company
Pat Callahan Frederick B. Hill & Co.
George Lewis Broussard, Poche, Lewis & Breaux
Morton B. Solomon KPMG Peat Marwick 
Vern Johnson 
Pete Minan
Donald L. Neebes Ernst & Young
R.L. Brezovec
Michael D. Giese
J.E. Katzenmeyer
L. Kramer
J.G. Weaver
W.B. Zell
Walter R. Bogan Price Waterhouse
Ralph Hoffman
Note: Comments forwarded by James E. Brown, of Baird, Kurtz & Dobson, are 
reflected in this inquiry.
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Research in Analytical 
Procedures: Implications for 
Establishing and Implementing 
Auditing Standards
Edward Blocher, University of North Carolina 
James K. Loebbecke, Kenneth A. Sorensen Peat Marwick 
Professor, School of Accounting, University of Utah
This paper presents a framework and review of the research in analytical 
procedures, with the objective o f developing the implications o f this 
research for revising and implementing auditing standards in this area. The 
review o f the research is developed in four categories: (1) descriptive 
research, which studies how analytical procedures are used in practice;
(2) methods research, which investigates the effectiveness of different types 
of analytical procedures; (3) expertise research, which studies the decision 
processes o f auditors; and (4) bankruptcy models, which have used analyti­
cal procedures. In summary, the research shows that analytical procedures 
are used extensively, and are perceived to be effective, although studies 
have shown that preliminary analytical procedures based on simple trends 
and ratios may have limited usefulness. In contrast, model-based proce­
dures, such as regression analysis, have been shown to have a good degree 
of effectiveness, primarily in case studies. The findings for expertise show 
that although expertise is related to differences in knowledge, it does not 
appear to be related to conventional measures o f audit experience. The final 
section o f the paper presents suggestions for future research and a discus­
sion o f auditing standards in three key areas: (1) the usage o f analytical 
procedures; (2) the effectiveness of analytical procedures; and (3) the 
required expertise fo r auditors using analytical procedures. The paper 
calls fo r research on the effectiveness of analytical procedures, and study 
o f the nature o f auditor expertise in analytical procedures, particularly the 
role o f the auditor’s knowledge structure and outcome feedback. A discus­
sion o f SAS No. 56 suggests new wording for paragraph 5 to give additional 
focus on the estimation process underlying analytical procedures, and a 
rewording o f paragraph 21 to change from a search for nonerror causes to 
a search for error causes, to reduce the bias toward incorrect acceptance 
in the current wording.
177
Prompted in part by the increasing attention given to them by practicing 
auditors (Tabor and Willis 1985), analytical procedures have been an area 
of increased attention by standard setters as well. SAS No. 56 (1988) has 
significantly extended and improved the guidance available to auditors 
before 1988 by including the requirement that analytical procedures be used 
in the planning and review phases of the audit, by providing greater speci­
ficity about the role of analytical procedures in each of the three phases of 
the audit, and by identifying the criteria the auditor should use in selecting 
and evaluating analytical procedures. Moreover, there is evidence that the 
research has provided useful guidance to the Auditing Standards Board in 
the development of the current professional guidance on analytical proce­
dures, SAS No. 56 (Loebbecke 1987). And we believe that further research 
can serve to improve this guidance even more. It is, therefore, a timely and 
agreeable task for us to review this research, and to consider the contribu­
tions it has made and can still make to current professional guidance and the 
practice of analytical procedures.
Research Objective
The objective of this paper is to present the implications of existing 
research for establishing and implementing auditing standards in the area of 
analytical procedures. The paper also reports our efforts to identify 
implementation issues and issues arising from research results that were not 
addressed by SAS No. 56 or that have arisen since SAS No. 56.
The second section of the paper reviews a relatively comprehensive set of 
research works on analytical procedures that have appeared in the recent 
two decades. This review follows the research model outlined in table 1 and 
explained below. After this review, we consider the implications of this 
research for professional guidance and the practice of analytical procedures 
in section three, and provide recommendations for future research in section 
four. These last two sections are organized into three parts, each of which 
addresses a key area of guidance and research: (1) the usage of analytical 
procedures, (2) the effectiveness of analytical procedures, and (3) the 
required expertise for auditors using analytical procedures.
Review of the Research
There has been a significant amount of research into the use and effective­
ness of analytical procedures in recent years. Our review attempts to 
provide a comprehensive look at this work, and to identify the key findings 
that are relevant to consider current guidance and implementation issues. A 
total of eighty-three papers were reviewed. These papers are classified into
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TABLE 1 A Research Model for Analytical Procedures
Descriptive Research—Usage of Analytical Procedures 
Theoretical and descriptive research about analytical procedures 
Research about the usage of different types of analytical procedures 
Research about implementation issues of the use of analytical procedures 
in audit practice
Analytical Review Methods—The Effectiveness of Analytical Procedures 
Research that addresses effectiveness generally 
Research that looks at the effectiveness of specific types of procedures 
Trend analysis 
Ratio analysis 
Regression analysis 
Other methods
Expertise in Using Analytical Procedures 
Research that examines the cognitive processes of auditors using analytical 
procedures 
Heuristics and biases 
Knowledge structures 
Subjective, unaided estimation 
Research into how auditors select procedures and how they develop risk 
assessments
Research into the use of decision aids for analytical procedures
The Use of Analytical Procedures in Estimating Bankruptcy 
Estimation models 
Subjective judgment
our overall research model, which is outlined in table 1. The research is in 
four broad categories. Descriptive research is the type of research that 
attempts to understand the way analytical procedures are used in practice, 
or how they should be used. This type of research is often based on survey 
findings. Alternatively, it is sometimes based on the deductive reasoning of 
the authors, or on the logic implicit in an analytical model that is developed 
by the authors. This research helps us understand the nature of analytical 
procedures and how they are or can be used in practice.
The second category of research, methods research, investigates the 
effectiveness of different types of analytical procedures. A large portion of 
these studies have looked specifically at the effectiveness of regres­
sion analysis, and have analyzed the benefits of regression over other 
methods, and the differences in effectiveness when regression is used with 
a variety of investigation rules. Other studies in this group have looked 
at ratio analysis procedures, and more recent work has looked at possible 
new procedures, including those based on new technologies such as 
neural networks.
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The third category of research, expertise in analytical procedures, has 
the objective of understanding the decision processes of auditors and others 
when performing analytical procedures. These works have identified audi­
tors’ judgment biases when using analytical procedures. Other studies have 
identified certain knowledge structures or decision processes that are 
associated with auditors performing analytical procedures. In addition, a 
number of papers have begun to investigate the nature of auditors’ expertise 
in analytical procedures.
The final category, bankruptcy prediction, reports the findings of a small 
set of papers that have looked at the use of analytical procedures in assessing 
bankruptcy. Although many of these papers have developed prediction 
models, others have examined the usefulness of these models in auditing, 
and still other papers have examined the ability of auditors to predict 
bankruptcy unaided by the models.
Each research paper reviewed for this report is summarized in the Appen­
dix. The Appendix shows briefly the questions addressed in each paper and 
the major findings of the paper. In addition, the number of papers by 
research category is shown in table 2. In this section we present some of the 
highlights of this review.
Descriptive Research
A common theme for the papers in this group is that analytical procedures 
are used extensively and are expected to be very effective in identifying 
errors and irregularities. Papers by Biggs and Wild (1984), Daroca and 
Holder (1985), and Tabor and Willis (1985), among others, document 
the extensive usage of analytical procedures, even before SAS No. 56. In 
addition, Coglitore and Berryman (1988) point out that simple analytical 
procedures could have been used to identify the fraud in many of the notori­
ous management fraud cases in the last fifteen years. Also, Reneau (1991) 
shows analytically how even relatively imprecise analytical procedures can 
be expected to be useful in detecting errors and irregularities. Using a 
survey of actual audit engagements, Hylas and Ashton (1982) and Wright 
and Ashton (1989) find evidence that a significant portion of material finan­
cial statement errors are initially signaled by analytical procedures.
In contrast, Kinney and Haynes (1990) consider the statistical and 
behavioral biases in performing analytical procedures, and conclude that 
there are significant inherent limitations of analytical procedures. The 
authors suggest that research continues to help discover the nature of the 
statistical and behavioral biases, and the means to alleviate them. On 
balance, the research in this group indicates that analytical procedures are 
used extensively, and there is some case-based and survey research indicat­
ing that, subject to certain inherent limitations, the procedures can be 
very effective.
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TABLE 2 Summary of Research of Analytical Procedures
Secondary Category (1)
Primary Category No. Rev. E&E Reg. Rat. Empirical
Descriptive Research (Usage)
Analytical review in general 10 3 1 1 1
Analytical review methods
Various 5 1 5 2 4-F
Specific 3 1 1 1-F
Use of analytical review
in practice _3 1-F, 2-S
21
Analytical Review Methods
(Effectiveness)
Various 12 1 12 3 4-F,3-S,1-E,1-SM
Specific
Ratio analysis 5 2-FC
Regression analysis 10 5 4-F,4-SM
Other methods(2) _9 6 3-F,1-SM
36
Expertise in Analytical Review
Cognitive processes 9 1 5-E,3-P
Selection of procedures 4 2-E,l-P
Generation of expected
values 3 3-E
Use of decision aids 2 2-E
18
Bankruptcy Prediction Using
Analytical Procedures
Prediction model 2 2-FC
Subjective judgment 5 4-E,1-F
Use of ratios 1
8
— —  — 1 1-FC
83 7 29 6_ 2 18—[F]ield study
5-[S]urvey
17-[E]xperiment
4-[P]rotocol analysis
6-[SM]imulation
5-[FC]ield study using
55 corporate data base
Notes:
(1) Key: Rev. = Literature Review; E&E = Effectiveness and Efficiency; Reg. = Regres­
sion; Rat. = Ratio Analysis.
(2) These include time series models, bivariate models, index models, general financial 
modeling, and prediction from various company characteristics.
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Methods Research
The second category of research, studies that have investigated the 
effectiveness of various types of procedures, has provided useful informa­
tion on the relative effectiveness of the three types of procedures. The three 
principal types of analytical procedures are trend analysis, ratio analysis, 
and modeling techniques.
Trend analysis consists of the analyses in which the trends of the account 
balances are examined as a basis for determining whether the current period 
data are potentially misstated, that is, whether they depart significantly 
from the prior trend of the data. Trend analysis techniques vary in com­
plexity from the simplest two-period comparisons to statistically based 
time-series models. Trend analysis is the most commonly employed analyt­
ical procedure. As we shall see, it is also the least effective of the three types 
of procedures.
Ratio analysis is the term used to describe procedures that involve the 
simultaneous analysis of two or more financial statement accounts. Common 
examples are the inventory turnover ratio and the other turnover ratios, 
gross margin as a percent of sales, and other “common size”  ratios, such as 
each expense account taken as a percent of net sales. The value in using 
ratios is that often the relationship between the two (or more) accounts in 
the ratio is relatively stable over time, therefore, a variation in a ratio is a 
direct and clear signal of an underlying unusual condition—either a fraud, 
a simple error, or simply an unusual combination of environmental events. 
Ratio analysis is potentially a far more useful method for detecting error and 
fraud than trend analysis because it uses the assumed stable relationship 
between accounts, whereas trend analysis looks only at the behavior of a 
single account. The behavior of a ratio is expected to be stable, whereas a 
single account balance can change for a number of reasons related to normal 
operating factors that do not reflect error or fraud.1
A  third type of analytical procedure, based on modeling, can be more 
effective than either ratio analysis or trend analysis. The modeling approach 
is distinguished by the attempt to identify meaningful, stable relationships 
between financial and operating data. Two examples of the modeling 
approach are the reasonableness test and regression analysis.
1 In this paper, ratio analysis is defined specifically as the ratio between financial state­
ment accounts, and, therefore, excludes ratios between accounts and operating data 
or external data. The relationships between financial and operating data are impor­
tant; in this instance the operating data are often used to develop a forecasting model 
for the account data. Because of the modeling aspect, we refer to the use of this type 
of ratio as a modeling approach. For example, the ratio of total payroll expense to 
number of employees could be used to “model” or predict the average pay rate as a 
basis for assessing the reasonableness of the reported payroll expense.
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A common type of modeling approach, the reasonableness test involves 
the use of selected operating data and sometimes additional financial data 
and data external to the firm, to predict an account balance. Reasonableness 
tests of expense accounts are the most common. One example is, the auditor 
estimates a value for utilities expense based on average temperature and 
hours of operation. A  second example is the estimation of payroll expense 
from operating data on number of employees, average pay rates, and the 
number of days of applicable operations.
The reasonableness test is effective because it links financial data directly 
to relevant operating data. When, as is often the case, variations in operations 
are the principal cause of variations in the related accounts (especially the 
expense accounts), reasonableness tests provide a relatively precise means 
of detecting errors and irregularities affecting an account. This is particu­
larly true for fraud cases. When a fraud is committed, it is likely that the 
reported financial and operating facts will not agree, that is, the perpetrator 
will find it difficult to disguise both the financial data and the related operat­
ing data. For example, a reasonableness test of payroll expense can be an 
effective means of detecting fraud wherein there are “ phony”  employees or 
excess time charged, because operating records must also be manipulated 
fraudulently in the same pattern to prevent detection.
A  second important type of modeling in analytical procedures is regres­
sion analysis. In regression analysis, the auditor develops a prediction 
model of the account (dependent variable) from relevant financial data, 
operating data, and external financial data (independent variables). In 
contrast to the deterministic relationships in the reasonableness test model 
described above, regression analysis is based on derived statistical relation­
ships among the selected independent variables and the dependent variable. 
Regression analysis is widely viewed as a potentially useful analytical 
procedure, because of the benefit of modeling the auditor’s expectation and 
because of the inherent precision of the statistically derived predictions and 
related measures of prediction error.
Many of the studies have assessed the effectiveness of regression analysis 
vis a vis other procedures, or have considered the relative effectiveness of 
different rules of investigation used in regression analysis. Kinney, 
Knechel, Wilson, and many others have contributed here, with results that 
broadly support the effectiveness of regression. One achievement of the 
research in this area is the demonstration of the clear superiority (aside 
from issues of cost/benefit and required expertise) of the regression proce­
dure in detecting material errors.
A  second important stream of research in this group is reflected in studies 
that have looked at the effectiveness of preliminary analytical procedures, 
primarily trend- and ratio-based procedures. Papers by Loebbecke and 
Steinbart (1987), Kinney (1987), and Blocher and Cooper (1988) have shown 
these procedures to be relatively ineffective at detecting material error.
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On balance, the research in this category has produced results that are 
consistent with our understanding of the potential usefulness of the different 
procedures. The relatively simple preliminary procedures (trends and 
ratios) are found to be somewhat less effective than the more extensive 
model-based procedures such as regression analysis.
Expertise Research
The third category, research of expertise in analytical procedures, has 
the objective of understanding auditors’ decision processes in analytical 
procedures. Some of the earlier work focused on decision behaviors of 
auditors, particularly the potential biases that had been observed in a variety 
of decision settings, and were expected to be seen also in auditors perform­
ing analytical procedures. More recently, the research has focused on 
cognitive issues, to determine the knowledge structures and thought 
processes of auditors using analytical procedures. A common methodology 
for these latter studies is the use of protocol analysis, in which the auditor 
verbalizes a trace of that auditor’s thought processes while performing 
the procedures.
The research that has looked at behavioral issues has found that a number 
of decision biases, which are common in decision making, are also 
observed in auditors using analytical procedures. For example, Libby 
(1985) observed the availability bias, the tendency to perceive events (in this 
case, errors) as more or less likely depending on the perceived frequency of 
the event, and the recency of an occurrence.
In a similar investigation, Kinney and Uecker (1982) found that auditors 
performing simple trend analysis were subject to the anchoring and adjust­
ment bias, because they relied inappropriately on prior year balances in 
developing an expectation of the current year’s balance for an account. 
Biggs and Wild (1985) and Heintz and White (1989) replicated this finding.
Another series of studies looked at the auditors’ ability to make unaided 
predictions as part of a trend analysis procedure. Biggs and Wild (1985) 
found that auditors made significant prediction errors, which were con­
sistent with the errors observed by other decision makers in an unaided 
prediction task. Blocher (1985), Heintz and White (1989), and Kaplan
(1988) replicated this finding. In summary, the research has shown that 
auditors, like other decision makers, are subject to certain pervasive 
behavioral decision biases. Little has been done, however, to study the 
means by which these biases might be alleviated.
Another important set of studies investigated auditors’ use of analytical 
procedures and their related decisions about the extent of detail testing. The 
consistent finding of these studies is that auditors do not use analytical 
procedures to reduce detail tests (Biggs, Mock, and Watkins 1988; Blocher, 
Esposito, and Willingham 1983; Cohen and Kida 1989).
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Cognitive research focuses on decision processes and cognitive structures 
(memory, perception, etc.) in contrast to decision behaviors. These studies 
tend to look at the potential relationships among performance, experience, 
knowledge, and memory structures. This is a rapidly growing area of 
research. The available work shows in part that:
• Novices and experts have different memory structures (Biggs, Mock, and 
Watkins 1988, 1989).
• There is apparently little association between experience and perfor­
mance (Davis 1991).
The finding that experience could not be associated with performance in 
analytical procedures is explored further in Blocher, Bouwman, and Davis 
(1992), which observes that a crucial issue regarding performance and the 
development of expertise in analytical procedures is the need for unambigu­
ous and accurate outcome feedback. Without effective outcome feedback it 
is not possible to “ learn from experience,” and, therefore, developing better 
performance with analytical procedures will require experience that 
includes direct and effective feedback, and information about the effective­
ness of each specific procedure in each context—its ability to signal error 
and irregularities. Blocher and colleagues recommend that improvements 
in the performance of analytical procedures will require improvements in 
education and training that focus on the causal modeling of analytical 
procedures (linking the procedures to specific error types, such that the link 
can be “ tested” later by direct feedback), and the accumulation of feedback­
relevant data as part of the audit.
For example, when analytical review results are favorable, and overall 
risk assessments are favorable, the auditor will likely not perform addi­
tional investigation to discover errors. However, this action also means that 
the auditor is unlikely to find out if the analytical procedure was a “ miss.” 
For this reason, the auditor must follow up on at least some portion of 
analytical review results that are favorable, simply for the objective o f deter­
mining if  the procedure was effective. The idea here is that for quality 
control purposes, it will be important for the auditor to do some investiga­
tions that are not required for a specific audit, but must be done as part of 
an on-going effort to observe and calibrate the diagnosticity of the analytical 
procedures that are being used.2
We have not included comment on bankruptcy model research in the body 
of this paper, although the papers we reviewed are summarized in the 
Appendix. We elected to exclude this aspect of analytical procedures 
because of its appropriateness to the discussion of SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s
2 Note that a similar investigation may not be necessary for detail tests, such as audit 
sampling applications, since these tests have a statistically measured risk of incorrect 
acceptance.
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Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, 
another topic of this conference.
Issues for Standard Setting and Implementation
Recognizing that SAS No. 56 has provided a significantly greater clarity 
regarding the use of analytical procedures than prior guidance, it is never­
theless apparent that there are certain issues regarding standard setting and 
implementation that remain. Based on the research reviewed above and on 
the observations of experienced auditors, we have identified some of these 
issues. The issues are presented in three parts: (1) the usage of analytical 
procedures, (2) the effectiveness of analytical procedures, and (3) auditors’ 
expertise in using analytical procedures. The first part addresses the nature 
and extent of usage for those procedures actually used in practice. The 
second part deals with the effectiveness of the procedures (apart from that 
of the user), and the third part deals with the effectiveness of the user of the 
procedures (apart from the effectiveness of the procedure).
When considering the usage of analytical procedures, two types of issues 
emerge. The first relates to the wording of two paragraphs of SAS No. 56, 
which requires clarification. The second refers to specific aspects of the 
use of analytical procedures where guidance is needed, but that are not 
addressed in SAS No. 56.
First, we look at paragraph 5, which contains the definition of analytical 
procedures:
Analytical procedures involve comparisons of recorded amounts, 
or ratios developed from recorded amounts, to expectations devel­
oped by the auditor. The auditor develops such expectations by 
identifying and using plausible relationships that are reasonably 
expected to exist based on the auditor’s understanding of the client 
and of the industry in which the client operates.. . .
Although this statement is useful, and identifies “developing expecta­
tions” as a critical element of using analytical procedures, we think the 
definition of analytical procedures should be clarified to put even stronger 
emphasis on the role of expectation formation. Our view is that using 
analytical procedures is a three-step process, involving estimation, com­
parison, and judgment. The first step is to estimate the account balance or 
item by developing the necessary causal links (as the SAS states) “. . .  iden­
tifying and using plausible relationships that are reasonably expected. . . ”  
The estimation is derived from one of the three types of procedures noted 
above: trend analysis, ratio analysis, or modeling-type procedure. The 
second step is to compare the estimated amount with the recorded amount, 
and the final step is to judge whether the recorded amount is reasonable and
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to determine any follow-up that might be necessary. The nature of follow-up 
depends on the audit phase; for example, in the planning phase, the results 
are used to “enhance the auditor’s understanding of the client’s business...” 
and to direct attention to potential risk areas.
Our view is that the estimation step is often given insufficient attention, 
that there is a tendency to jump to the comparison step and compare two 
ratios, to compare a balance to the prior year or budget, etc., without 
developing the causal relationships that are necessary for an effective appli­
cation. We think it is important to view explicitly the use of the analytical 
procedure as an application of an estimation model or approach for it to be 
most effective. To focus on the estimation step assures that the auditor will 
be aware of the importance of assumptions implicit in the estimation (e.g., 
is the prior year’s balance still relevant for a comparison?), and will focus 
the auditor’s attention on the means that may be available to make that esti­
mation more accurate, that is, to focus on the effectiveness issues developed 
in paragraphs 12 through 17 of SAS No. 56. For example, while many audi­
tors would view a trend analysis of the working trial balance accounts and 
a comparison of current and prior-year balances as a useful analytical 
procedure, we expect few would argue that the prior-year’s balance, by 
itself, is a useful estimate of the current balance.
For these reasons we argue that paragraph 5 should be reworded to 
emphasize the role of estimation in analytical procedures. Suggested wording 
might look something like the following:
Analytical procedures are audit procedures used in planning, over­
all review, and as a complement to other substantive tests, based 
upon the analysis of interrelationships among a client’s financial 
and operating data, industry data, and other relevant external data.
An analytical procedure requires three steps:
(1) Develop an estimation for the account balance or item under 
examination, based upon a study of the interrelationships among 
client financial and operating data, relevant industry data, and 
other general economic data.
(2) Determine the difference obtained by comparing the estimated 
amount to the amount under audit. The amount of the difference 
is a direct measure of the chance of an unexpected variation as 
described in paragraph 2 (which can reflect unusual transac­
tions or events, business changes, random fluctuations, or 
misstatement).
(3) Determine, based upon the amount of the difference and an 
assessment of the precision of the estimation, the necessary 
audit steps that should follow, which will depend on the phase 
of the audit at which the procedures are employed. For example, 
at the planning stage, the follow-up will be to design the audit 
plan to reflect the risk areas identified by the procedures.
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Kinney and Haynes (1990) identify an issue regarding the wording of 
paragraph 21. Kinney and Haynes argue, and we concur, that the paragraph 
requires clarification, because the present wording can be interpreted in a 
way that would increase the risk of incorrect acceptance.
21. The auditor should evaluate significant unexpected differences. 
Reconsidering the methods and factors used in developing the 
expectation and inquiry of management may assist the auditor in 
this regard. Management responses, however, should ordinarily be 
corroborated with other evidential matter. In those cases when an 
explanation for the difference cannot be obtained, the auditor 
should obtain sufficient evidence about the assertion by performing 
other audit procedures to satisfy himself as to whether the differ­
ence is a likely misstatement... .
This wording tends to suggest that, when a significant unexpected differ­
ence is observed, the auditor should first consider nonerror causes, such as 
how the procedure might be deficient, rather than to first consider what 
might be the possible error cause. As Kinney and Haynes state:
The suggestion is to change the focus on SAS #56 paragraph 21 
from a search for nonerror causes to a consideration of error 
causes. That is, the suggestion is similar to the “conceptually 
logical approach” of SAP #54 (para. 65) to “consider the types of 
errors and irregularities that could occur” and then to consider 
which controls would prevent them. For analytical procedures, the 
approach would be to consider possible errors and then look for 
data that would be consistent with the misstatement.
A  second set of issues regarding the usage of analytical procedures arose 
from our discussion of implementation issues with auditors from large 
CPA firms. It became clear that at least for some of these firms, the firm’s 
internal guidance goes well beyond SAS No. 56 in specificity. For example, 
the internal guidance addresses such issues as (1) when analytical proce­
dures are appropriate, (2) what are the types of analytical procedures, 
including examples and related assumptions, (3) how precision is measured 
and related to materiality and audit scope, (4) what to do if the procedure’s 
precision is greater than materiality, (5) the required documentation, (6) the 
nature of sufficient corroborative information from management, and (7) 
how to select and use computer-based decision aids and other technology 
to facilitate analytical procedures.
The existence of this internal guidance is evidence that it is valuable. The 
additional guidance is consistent with the SAS and helpful to the individual 
auditor in complying with the SAS. However, it is likely to be generally true 
that the smaller CPA firms will not have the resources to develop and main­
tain the internal guidance, so a broad issue for standard setting is whether
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or not the SAS should be delivered at a sufficiently detailed level to assist 
the smaller CPA firms. A response to this issue is that the specific guidance 
outside of the SAS (primarily textbooks and professional books) is suffi­
cient. Our thinking is that the level of detail in the present guidance is about 
right, given the availability of textbooks and professional books on the 
subject. One exception is that, when analytical procedures are used as 
substantive tests, the issue of the relationship between materiality and the 
precision of the procedure should be addressed explicitly in the SAS. The 
statement in paragraph 20 is too vague, and should be amended to say that 
when the precision of the procedure exceeds materiality, and cannot be 
improved by aggregation with other tests, the procedure cannot be used to 
reduce other substantive tests. Kinney and Haynes (1990) present a useful 
discussion of this issue.
We now consider implementation issues related to the research findings 
on the effectiveness of analytical procedures. We refer specifically to the 
use of analytical procedures as a substantive test, which is wherein the issue 
of effectiveness primarily arises. Several of the auditors who discussed 
these issues with us noted that SAS No. 56 might cause some undue reliance 
on analytical procedures with the effect that other important audit proce­
dures that should be done are not being done. The auditors were in effect 
reluctant to place too much emphasis on analytical procedures as a substan­
tive test. This view is validated by the results of the studies by Blocher, 
Esposito, and Willingham (1983), Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1989), and 
Cohen and Kida (1989) that showed that auditors do not tend to reduce the 
level of detail testing, even if the findings of the analytical procedure are 
favorable. Part of the problem is that analytical procedures provide a lesser 
type of assurance than detail test procedures. As Blocher and Willingham
(1988) state:
To evaluate the strength of the evidence from analytical review, we 
must consider that analytical review provides a negative-type 
assurance rather than a positive one. That is, though analytical 
review can be a useful technique for detecting a material misstate­
ment, it cannot be relied upon to confirm with positive assurance 
that a misstatement is not present. Positive assurance comes only 
from the proper application of the appropriate detail test proce­
dures. Thus, the auditor can never rely exclusively on analytical 
procedures when risk or materiality is high.
Also, Kinney and Haynes (1990) observe:
Even though SAP #54, SAS #23 and SAS #56 did not indicate that 
analytical evidence was in any way inferior to tests of details, there 
was such indication from practitioners. Ernst and Whinney placed 
restrictions on the reliance that can be placed on analytical proce­
dures (Grobstein and Craig, 1984, 14). . .The Tenth Edition of
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Montgomery’s Auditing stated that, relative to analytical pro­
cedures, tests of details are less efficient, but tests of details 
“commonly provide a higher level of assurance with respect to an 
audit objective.” (Deflise, 1975, 340).
From the above, it appears that auditors take the view that analytical 
procedures provide a limited, negative type of assurance, and their use 
as a substantive test is therefore limited. Our view is that the expected 
effectiveness of the analytical procedures depends on the assertion being 
examined and the design of the procedure. Regarding the impact of the 
assertion, analytical tests may be somewhat more effective than other 
substantive procedures for tests of completeness and tests of reasonableness 
of reserves, where the positive confirmation of detail test procedures has 
little or no value. In contrast, for the assertion of existence or ownership, 
perhaps detail test procedures will be more effective. This issue is addressed 
in SAS No. 56 in a very general sense, and more specific guidance on this 
point would be helpful.
Regarding the impact of design, it can be said that, “ Nothing in auditing 
is free.” That is, while the common perception is that analytical procedures 
are a simple and inexpensive way to obtain audit evidence, we find that very 
little evidence is provided if the procedures are very simple. In contrast, if 
the more complex and expensive types of analytical procedures are used 
(e.g., regression analysis with monthly data, wherein the input monthly 
data are tested for reliability), the evidence value of the procedures goes up 
dramatically. Perhaps our thought here could be expressed in the equivalent 
positive form, “ You get what you pay for.”  In analytical procedures, this 
means if you use more complex procedures, more accurate input data, more 
detailed input data, and a more complete model, your precision and, there­
fore, your evidence value will be high. This leads us to argue that the usage 
and effectiveness of analytical procedures might be improved if they were 
not viewed as relatively inexpensive procedures, but rather, as an alter­
native to detail test procedures. Perhaps the choice between detail test 
procedures and analytical procedures would best be made based on the 
nature of the account or assertion being tested rather than, or in addition to, 
how costly or simple the procedure is.
We now consider the implications of research in auditor expertise. There 
are two broad guidance issues that arise from the research—one relating 
to the attenuation of the decision biases observed in auditors and the other 
to the development of causal modeling skills.
Dealing With Decision Biases
The research has shown consistent evidence that auditors, like other 
decision-makers, display certain decision biases—
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• Inaccurate and biased subjective time-series estimations (Blocher 1985; 
Biggs and Wild 1985; Kaplan 1988; Heintz and White 1989)
• Availability bias; auditors perceive likelihood of error as influenced by 
perceived and actual error frequency (Libby 1985)
• Anchoring and adjustment (Kinney and Uecker 1982; Biggs and Wild 
1985; Heintz and White 1989)
• Inadequate hypothesis generation (Heiman 1990; Bedard and Biggs 1991)
Guidance to overcome or attenuate these biases would appear to be 
appropriate. Professional guidance could take the form of an instruction 
about the bias, including an illustration of how the bias occurs. The idea 
here is that awareness of the bias is perhaps the most effective and efficient 
means of improvement. Thus, decision makers can be cautioned to avoid 
certain decision biases much as in the nutrition area, where we have been 
sensitized to the dangers of too much fat and salt in the diet.
A  second approach to guidance might be to integrate decision support 
within an audit practice, in the form of checklists or similar structured 
decision aids, or in the form of computer-based decision support tools. For 
example, the use of forecasting software could be an effective way to deal 
with the biases in subjective estimation.
Finally, the decision biases can be addressed through training and edu­
cation, wherein the individual auditor practices proper decision-making 
techniques, and thereby learns to reduce the effect of these biases.
Developing Causal Modeling Skills
Our view is that the ability to develop a causal model of the financial and 
other data relationships for an account is crucial to the effective utilization 
of analytical procedures. As Kinney and Haynes (1990) state, “ Given an 
unexpected difference, the auditor would consider what error cause might 
explain it. Then the auditor would consider what other readily available 
data would be consistent with the error and determine whether the other 
data is consistent.”  Also, Blocher, Bouwman, and Davis (1992) show from 
a review of the research in learning that both a causal model and clear, 
accurate outcome feedback are necessary for the development of expertise 
through “ learning from experience.”  Moreover, the Accounting Education 
Change Commission, as well as many of the Big Six firms individually and 
together have spoken for the need to develop analytical skills, problem iden­
tification skills, and problem-solving skills in the entrants to the profession. 
We see these analytical skills and causal modeling skills as closely related. 
And the skills are particularly important in performing analytical proce­
dures effectively.
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The development of causal modeling skills is difficult. To begin, we do 
not have good measures of these skills. Thus, it is difficult to identify 
instances of good or poor application of the skills, and similarly, it is diffi­
cult to measure improvement. We suggest that accounting educators and 
researchers investigate the means by which these skills are measured and 
the means by which they are learned. As a starting point, we might consider 
the measure of field independence (Witkin, Oltman, Tashkin, and Karp 
1971), which has been used to measure analytical ability. Also, we might 
consider texts such as The Complete Problem Solver by John R. Hayes
(1989), to aid in developing causal modeling skills.
Recommendations for Research
We are encouraged by the success of prior research in influencing the 
state of standard setting (Loebbecke 1987), and we expect this trend to 
continue. Therefore, in view of what the prior research has and has not 
accomplished and with a look to the observed implementation issues 
regarding SAS No. 56, we find there are some areas wherein research would 
be particularly useful.
First, as noted by Loebbecke (1987), Johnson, Jamal, and Berryman
(1989), and others, there is a need for research to develop a comprehensive 
theory for analytical procedures. A theoretical framework is important in 
that it facilitates orderly research in the area, by focusing research questions 
on relevant areas and aiding in the interpretation of the results of the 
research. A  theoretical framework would assist researchers and auditors in 
understanding and acting on some of the implementation issues noted 
above, for example:
1. What type and level of assurance does an analytical procedure provide? 
How does this differ from that of other audit procedures, particularly 
detail test procedures?
2. What are the steps in performing an analytical procedure, and how 
does the auditor assess the value, or precision, of a procedure?
3. In investigating unexpected differences, what attention does the auditor 
give to error causes and nonerror causes?
4. How does the auditor develop expertise in analytical procedures? What 
is the role of outcome feedback in this regard? How does an auditor 
develop analytical skills, the ability to employ a causal modeling 
approach for analytical procedures?
Second, as noted by Kinney and Haynes (1990) and others, research 
should continue to focus on the question of how effective analytical proce­
dures are in various contexts, for example, fraud detection. We learned a
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good bit from recent research in this regard, but we have far from a full 
understanding of the effectiveness of analytical procedures. A  related 
research issue is to develop a better understanding of how precision is mea­
sured for the different types of analytical procedures. A benefit of regression 
analysis is that it develops its own measure of precision, the standard error 
of the estimate. But, the other procedures do not provide a direct quantita­
tive measure of precision. The auditor would benefit from research that 
would provide guidance in knowing how to determine a quantitative mea­
sure of the precision of a procedure, and how this precision measure is used 
in determining the nature and extent of further audit tests.
Third, we see as an important broad area for research the investigation of 
the nature of auditor expertise in analytical procedures. What is the nature 
of this expertise, and how is it acquired? An important aspect of this 
research will be to determine the nature of auditors’ knowledge structures 
(memory, perception, etc.), the role of outcome feedback, and the develop­
ment of causal models by the individual auditor. Also, the work will need 
to look at the results of prior research on decision biases in analytical proce­
dures, which have by now established a fairly predictable pattern of auditor 
decision response, and follow up this work with studies directed at finding 
effective ways to ameliorate these biases in practical decision settings. A 
related research question is the role and effectiveness of decision support 
techniques such as expert systems in facilitating decision performance or in 
facilitating the learning process.
Fourth, although prior studies have investigated the use of analytical 
procedures by auditors, there is now a need for study of the use of the proce­
dures by internal auditors and controllers. Controllers and, to a lesser extent, 
internal auditors are regular users of financial statement analysis for the 
purpose of understanding and explaining changes in financial performance 
to upper management. Also, internal auditors use analytical procedures to 
identify risk areas. We need to know more about the usage and effectiveness 
of the procedures used by these other professionals, and how the results of 
these procedures might be integrated into audit planning, and perhaps used 
as a substantive test.
Finally, we see a need for education research aimed at developing better 
pedagogy to help students acquire analytical skills—how to develop causal 
models of the relationships affecting an account or item.
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Appendix
Summary of 
Major Research Findings
Questions Addressed Major Findings
Descriptive Studies
Analytical Review in General
Neumann (1974)
What sources of information 
are available to auditors in 
doing analytical procedures?
Felix and Kinney (1982) 
What areas of analytical 
review have researchers 
addressed?
Smith (1983)
What guidance is appropriate 
for practitioners as to the 
nature, extent, and timing of 
analytical procedures?
The sources include corporate directories, 
product directories, investors’ services, 
industry/business index services, industry 
statistics services, and geographical statistics.
Research relating to the auditor’s opinion 
formulation process can be classified by steps 
of the audit process: orientation, forming prior 
probability functions and planning; systems 
evaluation and testing; substantive testing; and 
evidence aggregation and opinion formulation. 
Within each step, it can be further classified as 
state description research, model/theory 
development, or hypothesis testing.
Analytical procedures-related research 
(through 1982) can be found in the first 
three steps in the form of state description 
research, and in substantive testing in 
the form of model/theory development.
The greatest concentration is in this last 
category and relates to the use of structured/ 
statistical techniques.
All practitioners surveyed perform certain 
procedures that fall into the definition of 
analytical procedures; however, there is wide 
diversity in the amount of reliance placed 
on analytical procedures. The practitioners 
allocate 5 to 15 percent of total audit time to 
these activities.
Most practitioners find it difficult to 
determine what constitutes a significant 
fluctuation or variation.
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Akresh, Loebbecke, and Scott 
(1988); Loebbecke (1987)
What areas of analytical 
procedures have researchers 
addressed, and when compared 
to a framework for research in 
analytical procedures, what 
are the gaps in the research?
Use of analytical procedures is a twelve-step
process:
Designing the procedures
1. Define the accounting amount or 
relationship to be reviewed.
2. Define the objectives of the review 
procedures.
3. Determine the examination methods 
to be used.
4. Define a significant fluctuation in 
the amount or relationship being 
investigated.
5. Specify the reliance desired from the 
analytical review procedures.
Comparison of amounts or relationships
identified for review
6. Decide between computer or 
noncomputer comparison of data.
7. Control the nonsampling risk.
8. Ensure audit control.
9. Make the comparison.
Examination of significant fluctuations
10. Identify significant fluctuations.
11. Investigate significant fluctuations.
Evaluation of the results
12. Form the conclusion.
As reported in Akresh, Loebbecke, and
Scott, the Loebbecke paper reviewed
fifty-three books and articles on analytical
procedures, with the following findings:
• Analytical procedures are important 
to auditing.
• Analytical procedures are used extensively, 
but inconsistently.
• Analytical procedures vary in effectiveness.
• SAS No. 56 appears to be consistent with, 
and to have benefited from extant research.
His recommendations included:
• There is a need for a theory of analytical 
procedures.
• There is a need for research on specific 
industries, since the existing research on
(continued)
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Callahan, Jaenicke, and 
Neebes (1988)
What are the objectives of 
SAS No. 56?
Coglitore and Berryman 
(1988)
How effective are analytical 
procedures at detecting 
management fraud?
Whittington (1990)
How and when can analytical 
procedures be relied on 
as substantive?
Blocher (1988)
How can the microcomputer 
be used to facilitate analytical 
procedures?
Kinney and Haynes (1990) 
Are analytical procedures 
subject to certain inherent 
biases that may affect the 
competency of evidence?
commercial and manufacturing companies 
cannot be generalized to others.
• There is a need for research to identify 
the relationship between analytical 
procedures and specific audit objectives.
The authors explain the role of analytical 
procedures in the three phases of the audit 
(planning, substantive test, and review), 
how to document the procedures, and some 
illustrative applications.
A review of court decisions and U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission actions is used to 
demonstrate that simple analytical procedures 
could have detected the massive fraud in 
selected well-known fraud cases. The authors 
argue that analytical procedures should be 
used far more extensively for the detection of 
management fraud.
The paper provides guidance and a few 
illustrative cases to demonstrate the use 
of analytical procedures to reduce other 
substantive tests. The illustrations show the 
effect of the use of analytical procedures on 
the sample sizes used in tests of details.
The paper shows how to use audit software, 
database systems such as dBASE III, and 
spreadsheet systems for more efficient and 
effective analytical procedures.
This paper looks at the competency of 
evidence arising from analytical procedures 
in comparison to evidence from tests of 
details. The paper concludes with a set of 
recommendations for both researchers and 
standard setters to deal with this problem.
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Reneau (1991)
When employing audit 
procedures, should the auditor 
use confirming, disconfirming, 
or random evidence selection 
strategies? What is the 
implication of this result for 
the use of analytical 
procedures?
Analytical Procedures— 
Various
Kinney and Felix (1980) 
What analytical procedures 
methods might be used, and 
what would be their extent 
and timing?
Hylas and Ashton (1982) 
What are the causes of errors 
in financial statements and 
the auditor’s means of 
detecting them?
For Researchers:
1. What is the essential mathematical nature 
of analytical procedures?
2. How reliable are analytical procedures 
used in practice?
3. To what extent do behavioral biases 
affect results of analytical procedures?
For Standard Setters:
1. Change paragraph 21 from a focus on 
nonerror causes to a focus on error causes.
2. The auditor should take a causal approach 
in investigating significant differences.
3. Auditing standards should be designed 
to reduce behavioral biases.
Using a model for the design of hypothesis 
tests that was developed in the psychological 
literature, this paper shows that a “confirming” 
type of evidence selection strategy is most 
effective in many realistic audit settings. This 
result is used to support the desirability of 
using analytical procedures, on the basis that 
the above demonstration shows a favorable 
baseline performance for even the least 
effective analytical procedures.
Analytical procedures can be classified into 
four groups, each having relative advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to effectiveness 
and cost. The groups are: (1) subjective 
evaluation by experts, (2) rules of thumb, (3) 
time trend extrapolation, and (4) structural 
(regression) models.
Analytical procedures signal a large 
proportion of material errors (in this 
empirical study, 27.1 percent).
(continued)
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Arrington, Hillison, and 
Icerman (1983)
What are the results of current 
research on the use of 
analytical procedures models 
in auditing?
Wallace (1983)
What is the nature of potential 
analytical procedures?
Wright and Ashton (1989) 
How effective are three 
procedures—client inquiry, 
expectations based on prior 
years, and analytical 
procedures—in signaling 
material errors?
Research regarding limited trend, regression, 
and time series models was reviewed and 
analyzed. The conclusions of the authors 
reviewed are found valid. In addition, the 
authors conclude:
• Limited trend models may be effective 
where data availability is limited; 
however, where data is available, more 
rigorous models should be considered.
• Regression is generally more effective 
than limited trend, and auditors have 
the ability to select appropriate 
predictor variables.
• Regression appears most appropriate for 
revenues and expenses.
• Use of time series models may be limited in 
terms of current application by auditors.
Analytical procedures vary in effectiveness 
along a continuum from “soft” to “hard.”
A taxonomy demonstrating this is presented.
Most analytical procedures used in practice 
are soft, and not very effective. The potential 
for greater and more effective use of analytical 
procedures is, therefore, very great.
Analytical procedures may be effective 
in situations where detailed tests are not 
effective, particularly with respect to 
discovering fraud.
Reported field experience on five clients of 
one firm indicates that regression analysis is 
an effective analytical procedure that can be 
implemented in practice.
The study is a follow-up of the Hylas and 
Ashton study (1982). Based on a study of 186 
audit engagements of a single Big Six firm, 
this study found evidence confirming the 
results of previous studies, that the three 
procedures signaled about half the material 
errors detected in these engagements.
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Analytical Procedures— 
Specific
Stringer (1975)
How well has regression 
analysis worked in 
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells’ 
audit practice?
Chen and Shimerda (1981) 
How can financial ratios be 
categorized to resolve the 
problem of ratio selection?
Both time-series and cross-sectional 
applications have been found. There were 
over 10,000 applications in 1974.
Independent variables ordinarily consist of 
data from the company’s accounting records 
or other internal sources, or from external 
sources such as industry statistics and general 
economic indicators; sometimes they may 
include an indicator of time and dummy 
variables to indicate the presence or absence 
of conditions that cannot be further quantified.
Independent variables should be plausible 
and have audit significance.
Ordinarily, a base period of three years is 
used in time-series analysis.
The cut-off point for identifying excesses 
should be a function of materiality, reliability 
levels, the standard error of prediction, and 
the most adverse distribution of a material 
amount of error that could occur in the 
dependent variable data. The amounts of 
excesses should determine the extent 
of additional tests of details.
Coefficients of correlation have been very 
high and discriminatory power has been good.
General acceptance has been good, but most 
favorably by young, quantitatively oriented 
staff. The advantages of regression analysis 
include: focus on an overview and insight 
into the business operation; increased 
objectivity and discipline concerning the 
reliance assigned to analytical procedures; 
related reduction in tests of details; and the 
feasibility of tests for understatements in 
areas where tests of details for this purpose 
are difficult to design and apply.
A seven-factor categorization scheme 
captures the information content of the 
financial ratios used in previous studies.
(continued)
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Bao, Lewis, Lin, and 
Manegold (1983)
What research has been done to 
investigate the use of time-series 
techniques (particularly time 
series models) in accounting?
Use of Analytical 
Procedures in Practice
Biggs and Wild (1984) 
What is the auditor’s 
experience with 
analytical procedures?
Daroca and Holder (1985) 
What is the nature and extent 
of use of analytical procedures 
in practice?
The categories are return on investment, 
capital turnover, financial leverage, short-term 
liquidity, position, inventory turnover, and 
receivables turnover.
There are a number of possible difficulties 
in applying such techniques (e.g., the 
availability of data and technical problems). 
Only one paper (Kinney on time series models) 
applies directly to analytical review and auditing.
A high percentage of auditors used judgmental
procedures such as scanning
and ratio analysis in analytical procedures.
The more quantitative procedures such as 
regression and time series tended to be used by 
less experienced auditors.
The findings indicate the significant ability 
of analytical procedures in detecting financial 
statement errors.
There are no significant differences in the 
use of analytical procedures in audits 
versus reviews.
The most frequently applied analytical 
procedures are:
• Working capital
• Current ratio
• Gross margin on sales
• Profit margin on sales
• Comparison of current with previous 
financial statements and their relationships 
with overall totals
Practitioners tend to apply those analytical 
procedures not requiring an extensive 
knowledge of mathematical or statistical 
techniques, and analytical procedures that 
utilize only data contained within the basic 
financial statements.
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Tabor and Willis (1985)
What analytical procedures (Based on a limited sample.) The use
are used on actual audits? of analytical procedures, in planning,
substantive testing, and final review, 
increased significantly from 1978 to 1982, 
and should be expected to continue to 
increase in the future.
The amount of use of analytical procedures 
varied significantly from audit to audit in 
the planning and final review areas, and was 
more consistent for substantive testing.
There was very little use of advanced 
quantitative procedures. Nonquantitative 
procedures were used more than simple 
quantitative procedures in planning and final 
review, with the reverse being true for 
substantive testing. From 1978 to 1982, 
however, a shift from nonquantitative to 
simple quantitative procedures has occurred.
Methods Studies
Various Methods 
Albrecht and McKeown (1976)
What are some arguments 
in favor of developing more 
extended use of statistical 
analytical procedures, 
and how do several 
different statistical 
techniques compare?
Kinney (1979)
What is (1) the distributional 
nature of auditor-initiated
(continued)
The methods considered were trend analysis, 
ratio analysis, regression analysis, and 
Box-Jenkins (B-J) time-series analysis. It was 
concluded that all of the techniques can be 
theoretically subsumed under the comprehensive 
bivariate B-J methods, except for regression 
where the dependent variable is a function 
of more than one exogenous independent 
variable.
It appears that both regression and bivariate 
B-J are appropriate techniques that can be 
used in performing statistical analytical 
reviews. The advantage of using these is 
a more objective basis on which to render 
an audit opinion and also increased 
audit productivity.
Based on a sample of forty-four small firms, 
the basic inventory/cost of sales cycle,
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adjustments, and (2) the 
predictive ability of widely 
applicable analytical procedures 
that use limited and readily 
available information?
Coakley (1982)
What is the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency 
of the analytical procedures 
in use by practicing auditors?
Knechel (1986)
How effective are various 
analytical procedures using 
simulated data?
general and administrative expense, 
and the income tax-related accounts are 
the most adjustment prone; analytical 
procedures are likely to be useful for the 
first two categories.
The simple methods tested appear to be 
fairly effective in predicting errors, when 
information about prior year’s adjustments 
is included.
Practicing auditors use ratio and trend 
techniques most frequently in practice.
In fact, the auditors surveyed did not use 
structural models. The basis for their 
decision rules is either absolute 
differences over time or differences 
relative to materiality.
Analytical procedures should address the 
majority of errors that practicing auditors 
expect to find that would be material.
The analytical procedures tested were 
more sensitive to error distribution than 
to error amount.
The predictive ability of regression-based 
techniques was higher than that of the 
other techniques.
However, most techniques do not adequately 
capture the economic patterns in the financial 
data of the test firms, leading to poor 
performance given the precision intervals 
commonly used.
Analytical procedures (as tested) should be 
used primarily for attention-directing 
purposes, and should not be entirely relied 
on for substantive testing purposes.
Regression approaches tended to have 
fewer type I and type II errors than other 
(nonstatistical) analytical procedures.
All models are affected by error size— 
they are more effective at detecting large 
nonrecurring errors rather than small 
recurring errors.
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Loebbecke and Steinbart (1987) 
Do preliminary analytical 
procedures provide 
substantive evidence, and 
serve as a basis for reducing 
the extent of other, more 
detailed substantive tests?
Kinney (1987)
What is the attention-directing 
effectiveness of analytical 
procedures using selected 
ratios with three decision rules: 
(1) traditional percentage 
change rule, (2) a statistical, 
standardized change rule, 
and (3) a pattern analysis of 
cross-sectional changes in 
several ratios?
Knechel (1988)
What is the effect of various 
analytical procedures 
approaches on overall audit 
effectiveness (i.e., sample size 
and achieved audit risk) using 
simulated data?
Bell, Ribar, and Verchio (1990) 
How useful are logistic 
regression and neural network 
computing in predicting 
the failure of commercial 
banks over a twelve-month 
time horizon.
Coakley and Brown (1991) 
What is the relative 
effectiveness of analytic 
procedures using neural
Preliminary analytical procedures probably 
do not provide a reliable and effective basis 
for reducing the extent of other, more 
detailed substantive tests in most cases, and 
should not be used for that purpose.
The relative size of errors is very important. 
Even an error that is material to the year-end 
financial statements does not lead to a large 
change relative to the natural variation in 
many balances and ratios.
The joint consideration of deviations in 
several ratios (patterns) can be useful in 
identifying a particular type of error that 
might exist.
In developing ratios containing balance sheet 
accounts, use of ending balances (versus 
averages for the year) is desirable from an 
audit perspective because it isolates potential 
errors in ending balances from variation in 
beginning balances.
Regression-based procedures using monthly 
data had the smallest sample sizes of 
those tested.
Most models that used monthly data resulted 
in achieved risk that was less than desired risk.
Many analytical procedures may be effective, 
but some are more efficient than others.
The results show that the two models give 
comparable prediction performance.
This is a simulation study derived using data 
from one company over a four-year period, 
seeded and unseeded with error distributions.
(continued)
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network computing to identify 
unusual fluctuations versus 
conventional ratio and 
regression methods.
Ratio Analysis 
Gupta and Huefner (1972) 
Is there correspondence 
between broad industry- 
group financial ratios and 
underlying characteristics 
of the industry groups?
Trapnell (1977)
Is there information content 
in financial ratios relative to 
the identification of industry 
membership?
Deakin (1979)
Is there normality in the 
distributions of eleven 
commonly used financial 
ratios (using data from 1955 
to 1972)?
The study reaches a tentative conclusion 
that the neural network recognizes 
patterns across financial ratios more 
effectively than either ratio or 
regression methods.
There is high correspondence of financial 
ratios with both the judgmental 
classifications of economists and with 
numerous qualitatively expressed 
economic characteristics of the 
industries involved.
The greater the specialization of the 
assets involved in the ratio, the clearer 
the correspondence.
Since the characteristics are difficult to 
obtain, relevant ratios may be used as 
surrogates for them.
The stratification of firms by industry does 
not necessarily result in groupings of firms 
whose financial ratios are significantly 
different from all other industries.
The ratios that are significant in 
differentiating industries are generally 
balance sheet ratios, particularly relating 
to current assets, total assets, and 
asset turnover.
Assumptions of normality for 
financial accounting ratios would 
not be tenable except in the case of 
Total Debt/Total Assets, and then the 
assumption would not hold for the most 
recent data observations.
It does appear that normality can be 
achieved in certain cases by transforming 
the data.
Financial accounting ratios might be more 
normally distributed within a specific 
industry group.
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Frecka and Hopwood (1983) 
What are the effects of outliers 
on the cross-sectional 
properties of the distributions 
of financial ratios?
Knechel (1988)
How effective are simple 
trend and ratio procedures in 
reducing sample sizes for 
subsequent detail tests and in 
reducing overall detection risk 
when used alone and together 
with dollar unit sampling 
(DUS) techniques?
Wilson and Colbert (1989) 
How effective are simple 
trend models, regression 
models with simple 
investigation rules, and 
regression models with 
statistical decision rules in 
detecting material errors?
Wheeler and Pany (1990)
How effective are simple 
naive models, regression 
models, and time-series 
models in detecting 
material errors?
Regression Analysis
Deakin and Granoff (1973); 
Kinney and Bailey (1976)
How can regression analysis, 
coupled with Bayesian 
statistical procedures, be used 
to provide the auditor with 
assistance in selecting those 
accounts for investigation that
By deleting outliers, normality or 
approximate normality usually can 
be achieved for manufacturing firms 
and specific industry groupings. In 
addition, there is a general reduction 
in relative variances.
The major findings are:
• The trend and ratio procedures combined 
with the DUS strategy can increase audit 
effectiveness relative to an audit approach 
that does not use analytical procedures.
• Using monthly account information in 
analytical review is more effective than 
using annual balances alone, as long as 
the accounting system is minimally reliable.
• The trend and ratio procedures alone are 
not effective in detecting material errors.
Using data from an actual audit engagement, 
and seeding different error patterns, the 
authors found that all the models were 
effective in detecting the seeded error, but 
that the regression model with a statistical 
decision rule provided the most accurate 
predictions and fewest incorrect rejections.
Using a simulation method, quarterly data, 
and introducing different error types, the 
authors found that the time-series model and 
the regression model outperformed the naive 
models, as consistent with prior studies.
Demonstration was provided.
(continued)
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are most likely to result in 
significant audit findings?
Kinney (1977)
What is the conceptual basis 
for integrating the results of 
auditor’s analytical procedures 
using time-series-based 
regression and tests of details 
using a “partitioned”
DUS plan?
Elliott (1978)
Why is regression analysis not 
commonly used in auditing?
Kinney and Salamon (1978) 
What are the effects of errors 
in the independent and 
dependent variables on the 
application of regression 
in auditing?
Neter (1980)
How does regression perform 
in practice, using two case
When looking at monthly data, the presence 
of a material error in a single month is 
relatively easy to detect with analytical 
procedures while an equal or proportionate 
distribution may be virtually impossible to 
detect using analytical procedures alone.
An approach for combining regression-based 
analytical procedures and DUS-based tests 
of details for an income statement account 
is developed analytically and then validated 
with a limited simulation.
There are three general considerations as to 
why regression analysis is not commonly 
used in audits:
High costs 
Training must be extensive.
Model building requires a great deal 
of time.
Data acquisition is generally costly.
Low benefits 
Regression models typically have low 
resolving power compared with audit 
precision requirements.
Technical validity 
There are a number of technical concerns 
that must be dealt with when regression 
analysis is used.
Random measurement error in the independent 
variable does lead to increased type I and 
type II errors, while uncorrected accounting 
errors in the base period leads to reduced 
type I errors but increased type II errors. The 
latter effect is particularly pronounced when 
there are several small uncorrected errors.
In neither of the two cases did the auditor 
appear to have particularly difficult problems
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studies that explore statistical 
issues—one on assessing the 
reasonableness of accounts 
receivable using time-series 
analysis, and one on selecting 
locations to visit using cross- 
sectional analysis?
Questions Addressed Major Findings
Akresh and Wallace (1980) 
How does regression perform 
in practice in limited review 
and audit planning, including 
technical validity, effectiveness, 
and costs?
Collins (1980)
What is the impact of model 
specification errors on the 
effectiveness of stepwise 
regression analysis in auditing?
Kinney and Salamon (1982) 
What is the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of 
the “Stringer” (DH&S)
in identifying potential independent 
variables.
In both cases, variables not included in the 
financial statements were found to be useful 
for explanatory purposes.
The fitting of the regression models and 
examining them for aptness presented no 
major difficulties in either case.
The predictive ability of the regression 
models for the cross-section case tended to be 
better than for the accounts receivable models.
Regression analysis proved to be a useful tool 
for time-series analysis of the revenue-related 
accounts of a public utility. Major advantages 
over nonstatistical techniques were added 
discipline, magnitude as well as direction of 
error, and long-term perspective.
Thirty-six-month models performed well, 
although were improved upon by an eighty- 
four-month model in some cases.
Stepwise analysis can be supported as an aid in 
model building in the initial year, but the auditor 
should specify a logical model after that point.
The major cost was training. Cost savings in 
other procedures, however, result in an overall 
5 percent decline in audit hours (drops in 
sample size approaching 60 percent can be 
anticipated). The use of regression requires 
active partner and manager participation.
Model specification error does occur when 
using the stepwise regression method. The 
specification error results in biased estimates 
of the model parameters and inefficient 
predictions of account balances. The auditor’s 
investigation rule can be framed so as to 
offset the riskiness of these effects.
The DH&S model performed quite well, is 
just as effective as the Kinney model (both 
controlled type II errors at or below the
(continued)
207
investigation rule (monthly 
expected value to monthly 
materiality construct) to the 
“Kinney” investigation rule 
(annual expected value to 
annual materiality construct 
with a monthly “ filter”) in 
the application of regression 
analysis in auditing 
using simulation?
Wilson and Glezen (1989) 
What would be the difference, 
if any, of using the Kinney 
and Salamon (1982) 
regression-based decision 
rules on actual client data, in 
contrast to the simulated data 
used in the prior study?
Questions Addressed Major Findings
nominal level), and more efficient (i.e., fewer 
type I errors).
Using the three regression models 
examined in the prior study, and using 
similar error seedings, the authors 
replicated the prior study on actual client 
data. The findings supported the relative 
effectiveness of the rules as shown in the 
prior study, although there were some 
differences in the number of type I and 
type II errors and number of months 
investigated, due to the greater variability 
of the actual data.
Other Methods 
Kaplan (1978)
How feasible is it and what 
judgments are required to 
build a financial planning 
model that will produce pro 
forma statements of sufficient 
accuracy that they can be used 
by auditors for their analytic 
reviews and perhaps to reduce 
reliance on other audit tests?
A model that used sales as an exogenous 
variable was constructed (based on 
monthly data) that appears promising 
for income statement accounts. The 
model was not sufficiently accurate for 
the balance sheet.
Kinney (1978)
What is the relative performance 
of four statistical and two naive 
procedures for conducting 
analytical reviews that rely on 
substantially different data 
sets (specifically, ordinary 
least squares regression, and 
three sets of time series-
All methods exhibit a slight prediction bias, 
but the time series-based univariate transfer 
function, which requires the largest 
information set and the greatest computation 
effort, yields the smallest mean absolute 
error as well as the smallest prediction bias. 
Regression predictions are second in 
predictive power. Both performed
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based predictions are compared 
with martingale and submartin­
gale predictions for a set of 
monthly accounting series)?
Lev (1980)
How well do index-based 
prediction models work for 
analytical review?
Kinney (1981)
What is the effectiveness of 
specific analytical procedures 
that use information of a group 
of similar companies as a basis 
for comparison to unaudited 
information in the subject 
company (bivariate method)?
Howell, Frazier, and 
Stephenson (1982)
What is the effectiveness 
of using industry data for 
comparisons in evaluating 
small firms?
Willingham and Wright (1984) 
What types of errors are found 
in audits of manufacturing 
firms’ accounts receivable and 
inventory, and to what degree 
can those errors be estimated 
given knowledge of general
substantially better than the naive 
methods.
Time series can be used to estimate an 
independent variable value for use with 
regression, when such values are not 
available on a timely basis.
Time series models seem to be potentially 
useful, but not as generally applicable 
alternative(s) to the more traditional 
time-series regression.
Index models can be useful to auditors in 
generating predictions in analytical review.
Models that incorporate both industry- and 
economy-wide data can be used.
The bivariate method of using paired values 
from industry data as a basis for comparison 
in analytical procedures holds promise as a 
potentially effective method.
Aggregate industry measures of central 
tendency may be highly misleading when 
used as standards of comparison.
A high degree of similarity among the firms 
making up the industry aggregate data 
(including the subject firm) is indispensable.
In industries where significant variations in 
marketing strategy exist, the chances of aggre­
gate industry data being misleading is high.
A moderate degree of explanation of errors in 
accounts receivable and inventory can be 
achieved given information on the magnitude 
of the error (if any) in the previous period 
and information on a few other basic 
characteristics of the company, in particular,
(continued)
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and account-specific company 
characteristics?
Questions Addressed
Wild (1987)
How effective are structural 
models in generating 
predictions for analytical 
procedures?
Major Findings
Wilson, Glezen, and 
Cronan (1988)
Since prior research has 
shown that the Optimal Linear 
Correction (OLC) factor can 
improve the precision of time 
series models, will analytical 
procedures using time series 
models on components of net 
income (sales, cost of sales, 
expenses) be improved by the 
inclusion of the OLC factor?
the quality of the entity’s accounting staff 
and measures of aspects of the quality of 
management.
Using actual data for a large manufacturing 
company, the paper develops and tests a 
twenty-two-equation structural model that 
utilizes the interpendencies among financial 
statement accounts. Comparisons are made 
to univariate time series models. The author 
concludes that the results support the 
development of structural models for 
analytical review. The results are, however, 
not supportive for the aggregate accounts 
(gross margin, expenses, income). Also, 
because the degree of misspecification and 
parameter estimation errors can be significant 
in certain applications, the usefulness of 
the structural model should be assessed in 
each application.
Using actual data, time series models 
(with and without OLC) were developed 
for eighteen data series, with the result 
that OLC provided little improvement in 
the models. The authors conclude that, while 
time series methods are potentially useful for 
analytical review, the OLC factor is not 
necessarily helpful.
Harper, Strawser, and 
Tang (1990)
Can investigation thresholds 
used with analytical procedures 
be established using bivariate 
statistical distributions, and if 
so, will these investigation 
thresholds improve the 
effectiveness of the procedures?
The authors develop a bivariate normal 
distribution model (using the balance 
predicted by analytical procedures and the 
balance determined by detail tests) to model 
the relationship between these audit estimates 
and the recorded amount of the balance. The 
model is used to determine the amount of the 
investigation threshold that optimally controls 
for the two types of audit detection risk.
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Expertise Research
Cognitive Processes 
Libby (1975)
What is the role of prior 
knowledge of financial 
statement errors in the 
generation of initial diagnostic 
hypotheses in preliminary 
analytical procedures, what 
are the knowledge structures 
that underlie the decisions of 
experienced auditors, and 
what is the manner in which 
diagnostic hypotheses are 
generated in analytical 
procedures?
Blocher and Cooper (1988) 
What is the nature of the 
auditor’s predecisional 
behaviors in employing 
analytical procedures?
There appears to be a strong relationship 
between the availability of hypotheses in 
memory and their perceived frequency 
of occurrence.
There appears to be a positive relationship 
between perceived error frequency and actual 
error frequency in practice.
Errors that overstate income or liquidity are 
perceived as more likely to occur than the 
equivalent understatement errors.
There appears to be a positive relationship 
between recency of experience and the 
likelihood of generation of a particular 
hypothesis.
The decision processes of five auditors were 
studied using protocol analysis. There were 
relatively few differences between them. 
However, one was “directed decision maker,” 
who also was the only one who postponed 
his final decision after all information had 
been gathered. The others were “systemic 
decision makers,”  and also made their decision 
at some point as they went along. There was 
also a wide range of decision-making times. 
The directed decision maker took 37 minutes; 
the others took 60 to 106 minutes.
Ratios and trends were used extensively. The 
most frequently used (to search for material 
error in inventory) are gross profit percentage 
ratio, total inventory trend, trend of the gross 
profit percentage ratios, sales trend, and 
inventory turnover ratio.
O f seven decisions, one got four correct, three 
got three correct, and one got one correct.
There was a positive correlation between 
time, directness in decision making, and
(continued)
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Biggs, Mock, and 
Watkins (1988)
How do auditors use analytical 
procedures, what differences 
exist between expert and 
novice auditors, how do they 
represent problems, and what 
is their knowledge base?
Bonner (1990)
How does task-specific 
knowledge affect analytical 
risk assessment?
Heiman (1990)
What is the effect on the 
likelihood assessments 
(of the cause for an unusual 
account change) of differences 
in the number of available 
explanations of unusual 
changes in financial statement 
relationships?
decision maker’s length of experience 
(reflecting the qualities o f an “expert decision 
maker” ). The more experienced decision 
maker had more correct decisions than 
the others.
The subjects apparently relied heavily 
on analytical procedures in making 
their decisions.
Experts seem to have more complete 
memory structures related to the 
audit problem, these memory structures 
seem to allow a more efficient processing 
of case information, and they may have 
made audit program decisions that were 
more cost effective.
Task-specific knowledge is used to study 
the effects o f experience in two audit 
tasks: analytical risk assessment and 
control risk assessment. The findings 
are reported for two dependent measures— 
cue selection and cue weighting, and for 
two participating CPA firms. The results 
for cue selection are not significant for 
Firm 1 and not significant for control 
risk assessment for Firm 2; there is 
significantly higher performance by the 
experienced group for analytical risk 
assessment for Firm 2. However,
Firm 2 uses a decision aid for analytical 
review, whereas Firm 1 does not, 
which could account for the results.
The findings showed a decrease in the 
assessed likelihood of a given hypothesized 
cause when alternative explanations are 
provided to the auditor. Also, varying the 
number of alternative explanations had an 
effect on the likelihood assessments, while 
varying the strength of the alternatives 
had no effect.
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Davis (1991)
What is the impact o f the 
auditor’s knowledge base and 
experience on the ability to 
identify material errors?
Bedard and Biggs (1991)
The study analyzes how 
decision processes, including 
both hypothesis generation 
and pattern recognition, of 
auditors are associated with 
performance in analytical 
procedures. The research 
questions are:
• Are auditors able to 
generate correct 
hypotheses?
• What processes lead to 
correct performance?
• I f  the correct hypothesis 
was not selected, was the 
pattern o f discrepancies 
recognized?
• What specific processes 
of hypothesis generation 
inhibited subjects 
from explaining the 
recognized pattern?
Blocher, Bouwman, and 
Davis (1992)
What is the role of causal 
modeling and outcome 
feedback in learning analytical 
procedures from experience?
Using a protocol approach and experimental 
testing, the author examined the auditor’s 
information search patterns and found no 
apparent experience-related differences in 
the organization of the auditor’s knowledge 
bases. However, an error-sorting task 
revealed experience-related differences in 
the organization of accounting knowledge. 
Also, general audit experience was not found 
to significantly affect the auditors’ ability to 
identify material errors, although there was 
some evidence that formal education in the 
use of analytical procedures was associated 
with better problem identification ability.
The study involved both an experimental 
design and protocol data collection. The 
results showed that of the twenty-one 
auditors, three failed to attend to critical cues 
in the experimental case, and four failed to 
combine these cues properly. O f the fourteen 
auditors who correctly recognized the cue 
pattern, six proposed a hypothesis consistent 
with the pattern. Thus, hypothesis generation 
was the stage of the decision process where 
most errors occurred in this task context.
The authors conclude that the design allowed 
insight into the auditors’ decision processes, 
and provides focus for further research and 
decision aid development.
This paper reports the findings of a review of 
the research in accounting, auditing, clinical 
psychology and learning, and the implications 
of this research for how auditors learn
(continued)
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Selection of Procedures 
Holder (1983)
How do practitioners select 
and apply analytical procedures 
in planning an audit?
analytical procedures from experience. Based 
largely on the research in clinical psychology 
and the psychology of learning, it develops 
a theory for how auditors learn analytical 
procedures from experience. The theory 
posits the necessity of causal models and 
unambiguous outcome feedback for effective 
learning from experience. The implications 
of this theory within the context of the 
current practice of analytical procedures 
is that there is little or no learning from 
experience, since (1) outcome feedback 
regarding the effectiveness of analytical 
procedures is incomplete in the typical 
audit, (2) there is a general lack of causal 
modeling in the analytical procedures used 
today and in the education and training of 
the procedures, and (3) outcome feedback 
regarding the performance of analytical 
procedures is not sufficiently timely to be 
effective for learning. Recommendations 
are presented and discussed: (1) the need for 
greater emphasis on the development of 
causal models in education, training, and 
professional guidance, and (2) the need 
for the development, as part of a firm’s 
quality control program, of a process for 
systematically obtaining relevant perfor­
mance data for analytical procedures.
A  wide range of analytical procedures was 
selected by practitioner-subjects. Extensively 
or frequently used analytical procedures in 
this study are:
• Inventory turnover
• Gross margin ratio
• Accounts receivable aging analysis
• Plant asset level trend
• Inventory level trend
• Accounts receivable level trend
• Current ratio
• Bad debt level trend
• Interest expense to debt
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Blocher, Esposito, and 
Willingham (1983)
What is the nature of the 
auditors’ decision making 
when (1) planning for the use 
of analytical procedures, and 
(2) applying analytical 
procedures to a given set 
of audit circumstances?
Biggs, Mock, and Watkins 
(1988, 1989)
How do experienced and 
inexperienced auditors design 
and conduct analytical 
procedures and revise audit 
programs as a result of 
these procedures?
• Financial statement element 
fluctuation analysis
• Interest expense level trend
• Days outstanding revenue
• Depreciation level trend
The analytical procedures selected focused 
on liquidity and profitability, as well as the 
reasonableness of specific account balances.
There was no significant difference in 
selection based on firm size.
There is considerable variability in auditor 
judgment concerning the allocation of 
budgeted hours between analytical 
procedures and tests of details, reflecting 
different preferences for the approach to use.
Trend analysis was a widely chosen analytical 
procedure. Few chose a reasonableness test 
with operating data, which would have been a 
much more effective test.
In planning, auditors tended to anchor on the 
given audit program, rather than to tailor it.
Use of a checklist of selected analytical 
procedures motivated more analytical 
procedures, but also motivated more detailed 
tests in the same area.
The findings are that both experienced and 
inexperienced auditors identified the crucial 
audit problems embedded in the experimental 
case. However, there was little evidence that the 
auditors used the analytical procedures to reduce 
the extent of other substantive tests, even if the 
results of the procedures were favorable. Also, 
there was evidence that the more senior auditors’ 
decision processes were more systematic and 
focused than that o f the less experienced 
auditors who appeared to “ respond to surface 
features of the problem” and to search less 
efficiently through the case data.
(continued)
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Cohen and Kida (1989)
In a follow-up to the Biggs, 
Mock, and Watkins (1988) 
study, this research looks at 
similar questions:
• Do auditors use the results 
of analytical procedures to 
reduce as well as extend 
audit testing?
• Does the reliability of 
data affect auditors’ 
judgments?
• Does experience affect 
auditors’ judgments?
Generation of 
Expected Values
Biggs and Wild (1985)
What is the nature of the 
judgments made by practicing 
auditors in conducting 
analytical procedures tasks 
(specifically, generating 
expected values and 
noninvestigation intervals)?
Blocher (1985)
What is the auditor’s ability 
to determine subjectively 
expected values and credible 
intervals, based on seven prior 
years’ data?
The findings corroborated those of the prior 
study by Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1988). 
Also, there was evidence that analytical 
procedures were valued more highly by the 
more experienced auditors, while there was 
greater reliance on control risk assessment by 
the less experienced auditors.
Experiment one showed that auditors’ 
judgments were biased in the direction of 
the unaudited information. However, this 
bias was moderated when additional audited 
information was available.
Experiment two showed that the auditors’ 
extrapolations were more accurate for those 
time-series patterns that are more likely to 
be encountered in practice.
The auditors’ predictions were significantly 
too high when no trend was present, and 
significantly too low when a trend was 
present. The predictions were less accurate 
under the high variance condition. Confidence 
bounds were affected by the variance treatment 
in the expected direction.
There appear to be important individual 
differences among auditors and other subjects 
when making predictions and assessing 
confidence bounds. There also appear to 
be strong differences among auditors in 
the nature of the decision process employed 
in making predictions and in setting 
confidence bounds.
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Heintz and White (1989)
The study replicates the prior 
work of Kinney and Uecker 
(1982) and Biggs and Wild 
(1985). Are auditors’ 
predictions in analytical review 
influenced by unaudited 
values? And, does a decreasing 
series of unaudited values 
have a greater or lesser impact 
than an increasing series of 
unaudited values?
Wild and Biggs (1990)
The authors recognize the 
potential problem of bias 
caused by the auditor’s use of 
unaudited book values when 
designing and performing 
analytical procedures. What 
are the audit cost and risk 
consequences of conducting 
the procedures with and 
without unaudited book values?
Use of Decision Aids 
Blocher and Luzi (1987)
What is the effect o f selected 
forms of guidance on auditors’ 
analytical procedures decisions?
Blocher, Krull, Scalf, and 
Yates (1988)
Does a knowledge-based 
decision aid for analytical 
procedures have an effect on 
learning or on the performance 
of these procedures by 
experienced auditors?
The findings for both experimental questions 
corroborate the results of the prior studies:
(1) auditors’ judgments are affected by 
unaudited values, and (2) auditors’ judgments 
are more affected by trend reversals or 
increases. Also, it is shown that a decreasing 
series of unaudited values has a stronger 
influence on auditors’ judgments than a series 
o f increasing values.
The study concludes that the advantages of 
incorporating unaudited book values into 
analytical procedures appear minimal.
With increasing structure, guidance increases 
the proportion of auditors with correct 
models (to develop expected values) and 
decreases the proportion of those having 
computational misspecification.
Guidance treatment did not significantly affect 
the auditors’ testing decisions, except that 
more guidance provided greater confidence 
in analytical procedures, which in turn 
resulted in lower detailed tests.
The decision aid had a positive but 
insignificant effect on performance.
However, there was no effect on learning; 
this was interpreted as being consistent 
with the prior research.
(continued)
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Bankruptcy Prediction
Discriminant Analysis
Beaver (1966)
What is the usefulness of 
financial ratios, and in 
particular, in the prediction 
of business failure?
The ratio distributions of nonfailed firms are 
quite stable throughout the five years before 
failure, whereas the ratio distributions of 
failed firms exhibit a marked deterioration 
as failure approaches.
The cash-flow to total-debt ratio has the 
ability to correctly classify both failed and 
nonfailed firms to a much greater extent than 
would be possible through random prediction. 
This ability exists for at least five years 
before failure.
Although ratio analysis may provide useful 
information, ratios must be used with 
discretion. Not all ratios predict equally 
well, and nonfailed firms can be correctly 
classified to a greater extent than can 
failed firms.
Deakin (1976)
How effective is a discriminant 
analysis-based model using 
the fourteen financial ratios 
from Beaver (1966)?
Altman and McGough (1974) 
How effective is a discriminant 
analysis model in the prediction 
of bankruptcy and the 
evaluation of going concern?
The model developed made accurate 
bankruptcy predictions as far in advance 
as three years before filing for bankruptcy. 
The overall classification error for both 
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy ranged from 
9 to 19 percent.
For commercial and manufacturing 
companies, the model predicted bankruptcy 
in 82 percent of the cases based on the 
latest available financial statements prior to 
bankruptcy, and 58 percent of the cases two 
years prior to failure.
Gambola, Haskins, Ketz, and 
Williams (1987)
This study considers the 
importance of cash flow from 
operations in predicting
The study found that the marginal predictive 
ability of cash flow from operations was 
insignificant, and therefore, that cash flow
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bankruptcy. It includes a review 
of prior relevant studies, and 
then conducts experiments in 
which models were constructed 
from bankrupt firms. These 
models were then tested for 
predictive accuracy with data 
from other firms. Is cash flow 
an important predictor?
Bell, Ribar, and Verchio (1990) 
This paper considers the 
comparative effectiveness of 
two types of models—logistic 
regression and neural network 
—in predicting failure of 
commercial banks. The 
predictor variables used are 
those used by regulators and 
supported by prior studies.
The focus is a one-year 
prediction period, consistent 
with the requirements of SAS 
No. 59. Do the models differ 
significantly in prediction 
performance?
Subjective Prediction 
Libby (1975)
What is the predictive power 
of ratio information and the 
ability of loan officers to 
evaluate that information 
in the business failure 
prediction context?
Kennedy (1975)
What is the effect of four 
financial ratios on subjective 
probability judgments about 
bankruptcy (by bankers) using 
Bayes’ theorem?
from operations is not an important predictor 
of corporate failure.
The study indicates that both types of models 
perform satisfactorily, with neural networks 
performing slightly better for borderline cases.
Bankers using financial ratio information were 
able to make highly accurate and reliable 
predictions of business failure.
The equity to debt ratio is very useful in the 
task. The usefulness of other ratios studied 
(quick, current, and inventory turnover) was 
not clear.
Bankers believe that nonfinancial and financial 
information are equally important, and nonratio 
financial information is significantly more 
important than ratio information in evaluating 
bankruptcy potential.
(continued)
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Casey (1980)
What is the ability of bank 
officers to predict bankruptcy 
using three years’ data, three 
years in advance (the data 
consisted of five common 
solvency-related ratios)?
Predictive accuracy for bankrupt firms is not 
very good (average, four of fifteen).
Individual differences in information-processing 
style and confidence level could explain a 
statistically significant portion of variance in 
subjects’ predictive achievement.
A  composite-judge prediction model did not 
outperform the average subject.
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This study communicates the implications o f  existing research for establish­
ing and implementing auditing standards related to illegal acts by clients 
and proposes some topics fo r future research. To frame the discussion o f  
extant research, the study uses the following broad categories relevant to 
auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts: definition, prevention, 
detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences.
It is fitting that the Expectation Gap Roundtable includes the topic of 
illegal acts. Attempts to reduce the perceived gap between users’ expecta­
tions and professional guidance on auditors’ responsibilities have been 
the catalyst for the origination and evolution of Statements on Auditing 
Standards (SASs) related to illegal acts. A  separate SAS on illegal acts by 
clients was first issued in response to users’ concerns with corporate 
accountability (see SAS No. 17). These concerns in the mid-1970s followed 
investigations that lead to disclosures by large corporations of illegal politi­
cal contributions and questionable payments to domestic and foreign 
government officials (Neebes, Guy, and Whittington 1991). In turn, after a 
period in the early 1980s of major business failures, where some failed 
businesses also had illegal acts, auditors’ responsibilities were revised as 
part of the expectation gap SASs (see SAS No. 54).
The existence of an expectations gap and an inability to eliminate the gap 
is not surprising. As the Cohen Commission stated, “ the expectations of 
users of financial information with respect to the auditor’s detection and 
disclosure of illegal or questionable acts are unclear” (The Commission 
on Auditors’ Responsibilities 1978). In addition to being unclear, users’ 
expectations lack consensus at any point in time and change over time. 
Furthermore, as the Cohen Commission recognized, legislative initiatives
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play a significant role in clarifying users’ expectations (e.g., The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977). These legislative initiatives continue.1 
Finally, assessing users’ expectations becomes complicated when consider­
ing the international environment, where there is likewise concern with 
auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts. The International Auditing 
Practices Committee (IAPC) recently issued an exposure draft titled Illegal 
Acts (December 1, 1991).2
This background provides a context for our charge, which is to communi­
cate the implications of existing research for establishing and implementing 
auditing standards related to illegal acts by clients and to propose topics for 
future research.3 We assume that readers are familiar with past, present, and 
proposed professional standards (i.e., SAS No. 17 and No. 54 and the 
(IAPC Exposure Draft). Although we do not review the provisions of these 
standards, we include in the Appendix the practice and implementation 
issues identified by the SAS No. 54 Guidance Task Force of the Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB) and reported by practitioners to the Auditing 
Standards Division as input for the Roundtable.
To frame our discussion of the research, we developed the following 
broad categories relevant to auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts: 
definition, prevention, detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences. 
Some studies overlap categories, therefore we have, for example, combined 
detection and evaluation in this overview of relevant research. The remaining 
sections of the paper discuss the existing research and provide suggestions 
for future research.
Discussion of Research
In reviewing the literature, we confronted a paucity of theoretical and 
empirical research specifically addressing auditors’ responsibilities regard­
ing illegal acts by clients. Therefore, our discussion also incorporates 
other research involving illegal acts from which we attempt to extrapolate 
implications for auditors.
1 For example, see the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement 
Act of 1991, the proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act (HR 4313), 
and the proposed Federal Insurance Solvency Act of 1992 (HR 4900).
2 Standard-setters in some countries (e.g., Canada and the United Kingdom) are also 
considering the promulgation of new guidance on auditors’ responsibilities regarding 
illegal acts by clients.
3 Although illegal acts and compliance auditing issues interrelate, this paper focuses 
primarily on illegal acts. Past and present standards for compliance auditing include 
SAS No. 63 and No. 68. Holder and Miller (1989) and McNamee, Monk, and Sauter 
(1989) describe the requirements of SAS No. 63.
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Definition
Definitions of illegal acts in the professional literature differ somewhat, 
especially in emphasis. In contrast to SAS No. 54, the IAPC Exposure Draft 
explicitly recognizes that illegal acts may be intentional or unintentional, 
suspected or actual, and that noncompliance with laws and regulations 
encompasses both acts committed and required acts not carried out. The 
IAPC Exposure Draft does not use the SAS No. 54 terms direct and indirect. 
Instead, the Exposure Draft states that illegal acts may affect either recorded 
amounts in the financial statements or footnote disclosures.
The research literature tends not to distinguish between illegal acts using 
either direct-indirect or financial statement-footnote effects. Some studies 
include only intentional illegal acts. Definitions of illegal acts differ among 
studies, however, and these differences require consideration when com­
paring results.
Research studies on illegal acts reflect another definitional problem that 
Goldwasser (1987) anticipated, namely that distinctions between irregulari­
ties and illegal acts (in SAS No. 53 and No. 54) are difficult to maintain in 
practice. According to Goldwasser, “ irregularities and illegal acts are not 
so easily separated, as illegal actions are more often than not accompanied 
by irregularities which frequently are integral parts of the illegal acts.”  This 
problem will resurface in the discussions of both disclosure and conse­
quences research.
At a conceptual level, a research monograph by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
illustrates an approach of working from a definition to establish indepen­
dent auditors’ responsibilities. Although Mautz and Sharaf focus on 
irregularities, not illegal acts,4 their discussion contains concepts evident in 
SAS No. 54. For example, Mautz and Sharaf acknowledge that materiality 
may differ (in both kind and amount) when applied to irregularities as 
opposed to representations regarding financial condition and results of opera­
tions. Mautz and Sharaf recognize that auditors’ responsibilities are limited 
to their areas of expertise. Finally, auditors’ responsibilities may decrease 
in situations where there is no record or evidence of accountability.
Although SAS No. 54 reflects these concepts, Mautz and Sharaf conclude 
that “ the characteristics of irregularities themselves [did not provide] 
any significant clues which permit a precise statement of auditor responsi­
bility for detection.”  This led Mautz and Sharaf to propose a prudent-man 
concept of due care, whereby, “ independent auditors should accept respon­
sibility for the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities which 
the exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally
4 With the exception of Mautz and Sharaf (1961), this paper does not discuss research 
related specifically to errors and irregularities (SAS No. 53), a topic of another 
Roundtable paper.
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uncover.” It seems reasonable to surmise that Mautz and Sharaf would 
support a similar conclusion for illegal acts.
Prevention
The professional literature, including the reports of the Cohen and Tread­
way Commissions, affirms that management has primary responsibility for 
prevention of illegal acts. The IAPC Exposure Draft explicitly states that 
the responsibility for the prevention and detection of illegal acts rests with 
management. Giving management primary responsibility still leaves a 
variety of corporate governance mechanisms for carrying out and monitoring 
this responsibility. These mechanisms include (outside) board membership, 
audit committees, corporate codes of conduct, internal control (including 
internal auditors), and special management reports on compliance. An obvi­
ous research question is the viability of these mechanisms for preventing 
(and detecting) illegal acts.5
A  survey published by the United States Government Accounting Office 
(GAO) in 1991 provides disquieting evidence on the ability of bank audit 
committees to monitor compliance with laws and regulations. The GAO 
studied the audit committees of the largest banks in the United States—those 
with assets of ten billion dollars or more. On the basis of responses from 
forty of forty-seven audit committee chairpersons, the results related to 
illegal acts include:
• Nineteen audit committees (48 percent) had little or no expertise in bank­
ing, although their committees were responsible for approving the bank’s 
response to findings from bank regulatory examinations.
• Thirteen audit committees (33 percent) had no expertise in law and never 
met independently with the bank’s legal counsel, although they were 
responsible for assessing management compliance with banking laws 
and regulations.
We located one study that examines the relation between the number of 
outside directors and illegal acts by Fortune 500 companies. Kesner, Victor, 
and Lamont (1986) find: (1) no relation between the number of outside 
directors and the propensity to commit an illegal act, (2) no relation between 
committing an illegal act and the propensity to then add an outside director 
to the board, and (3) no relation between the propensity to commit an illegal
5 There are some studies on the prevalence of illegal acts. For example, a Fortune survey 
(Ross 1980), using only five types of corporate illegalities (bribery, criminal fraud, 
illegal political contributions, tax evasion, and criminal antitrust violations) from 
1970 to 1980, found that 117 of 1,043 (11 percent) major corporations had at least one 
important illegal act. A GAO report (1989) on twenty-six thrifts, representing the 
largest actual or estimated losses to FSLIC between 1985 and 1987, indicates nineteen 
of the twenty-six (73 percent) had actual or suspected criminal activities.
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act and organizational structure (i.e., having one individual as both the CEO 
and chairman of the board). Several other studies examine additional organi­
zational and operational characteristics associated with corporate involve­
ment in illegal acts. The results of these studies, however, may be interpreted 
as providing guidance to the profession on signals that alert the auditor to 
possible illegal acts. Hence, in the next section, we discuss those studies that 
consider issues related to detection and evaluation rather than prevention.
Before concluding this section, we want to mention that some research 
provides at least indirect support for the use of mechanisms such as internal 
control for the prevention of illegal acts. For example, Kinney, Maher, and 
Wright (1990) propose a broad output-based approach to determining asser­
tions. In turn, “corporate management. . .chooses cost-effective controls 
for their own internal purposes, subject to the constraint that controls be 
adequate to support the implicit and explicit assertions required of manage­
ment by outsiders.” 6
Detection and Evaluation
In this section we discuss several types of detection- and evaluation- 
related research. One type provides insights on organizational variables 
associated with the occurrence of illegal acts. We discuss these studies 
because of their potential relevance in alerting auditors to the possibility of 
illegal acts. Another type of study provides some evidence on disclosures to 
independent auditors of illegal acts detected by internal auditors. This work 
is relevant to the propriety of external auditors relying on the work of internal 
auditors to detect corporate illegal acts.7 Finally, we discuss a study that 
addresses a specific area of illegal acts—environmental liabilities. This study 
proposes that auditors consider environmental acts in planning and risk 
assessment, although SAS No. 54 might characterize such acts as indirect.
An early study by Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) examines the relation 
between scarcity/munificence of organizational environments and the occur­
rence of illegal acts. The study uses a sample of 105 large companies involved 
in trade litigation from 1968 to 1972. Trade litigation includes price fixing, 
reciprocity, mergers and acquisitions in restraint of trade, refusals to deal, 
monopoly, tying arrangements, price discrimination, allocation of markets,
6 This research suggests means to implement requirements such as those in the FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991, whereby
Management will report annually on its responsibility for and assessment of the 
effectiveness of both the institution’s internal control stucture over financial reporting 
and compliance with specified laws and regulations relative to safety and soundness. 
The CPA will report separately on management’s assertions using standards for 
attestation engagements (AICPA/1992).
7 We do not discuss the wide-ranging research literature on whistle-blowing. For some 
discussion of this research, see Arnold and Ponemon (1991) and Graham (1986).
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and activities such as foreclosure of entry, exclusive dealing, and conspiracy.8 
Scarcity/munificence is measured using several financial performance 
statistics (i.e., mean return on equity, mean return on sales over the five 
years preceding a trade complaint, percentage change in sales, and percent­
age change in profits). Comparisons of cited and uncited Fortune 500 
companies reveal that: (1) cited companies perform less well than other 
firms in the Fortune 500 over the five years preceding a trade complaint, 
(2) whereas cited firms perform below the average of all Fortune 500 firms, 
they perform no worse than other firms in their industries, and (3) industries 
in which cited firms operate display performance far below the average for 
all industries.
A  study by Dalton and Kesner (1988) concludes that company size may be 
relevant to the commission and recidivism of illegal acts. Again using a 
sample of Fortune 500 companies (continuously listed on the Fortune 500 
from 1980 to 1984), the authors report that: (1) “ large” companies are three 
times more likely to engage in illegal behavior than “small”  counterparts, 
and (2) “ large” firms are significantly more likely than “small”  firms to 
commit a second illegal act conditional on committing a first act within the 
sample period. The study also found that 74.6 percent of sample companies 
did not engage in a cited illegal act over the period, 11.5 percent committed 
a single act, and the remaining 13.9 percent committed multiple acts.
Baucus and Near (1991) present a more comprehensive examination of the 
association of organizational variables and illegal acts. Their sample includes 
Fortune 500 companies convicted during 1974-1983 of intentional illegal 
acts committed during 1963-1981. The sample consists of 141 violations by 
88 firms where violations include Title VII discrimination (49 percent), 
antitrust (20 percent), product liability (12 percent), and other (19 percent) 
(e.g., violations of consent decrees for securities fraud, willful patent 
infringement [with punitive damages]). The authors summarize their results 
as follows:9
...  [L]arge firms are more likely to commit illegal acts than small 
firms. Although the probability of such wrongdoing increases when 
resources are scarce, it is greatest when resources are plentiful. 
Similarly, illegal behavior is prevalent in fairly stable environments 
but is more probable in dynamic environments. Membership in 
certain industries and a history of repeated wrongdoing are also 
associated with illegal acts.
The study found that, with a single exception, corporate culture is not a 
significant determinant of the propensity to commit an illegal act. The
8 Dalton and Kesner (1988) report that trade case corporate violations account for some 
40 percent of violations of criminal statutes in federal courts.
9 Accounting researchers may find the authors’ proxies for some organizational varia­
bles problematic.
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exception is the finding that firms that have committed at least three viola­
tions are more likely to commit a fourth. The industries found more likely 
to be involved in illegal acts are food, lumber, petroleum and refining, and 
transportation equipment. Finally, variables not found to be significantly 
associated with the commission of illegal acts include organizational 
heterogeneity (degree of diversity within the organization and internal 
competitiveness), poor financial performance (return on assets), and 
organizational slack (quick ratio relative to industry average).
In summary, despite being of limited scope in addressing issues related to 
auditors’ responsibilities (e.g., samples comprise only Fortune 500 compa­
nies and use restricted definitions of illegal acts), these studies do provide 
some insights for auditors. Industry membership consistently appears as an 
important variable. While reinforcing the importance of industry member­
ship, more recent data, using other than Fortune 500 samples, might expand 
the identified industries, in particular, to encompass financial institutions. 
Interestingly, the most recent study finds both weak and strong financial 
performance associated with illegal acts.
An important caveat to this work is recognized by Baucus and Near (1991):
. . .  rather than revealing when illegal behavior is likely to occur, 
the results of our study and of previous studies of corporate illegality 
may instead reveal conditions under which illegal behavior is 
detected, prosecuted, and punished. For example, regulatory agen­
cies are likely to monitor firms previously convicted for illegal 
activities closely. Additionally, regulatory agencies are likely to 
increase enforcement during certain periods, as when the national 
political climate favors enforcement; the latter provides another 
explanation for the infrequency of violations in certain years just 
noted. At this point, little is known about how regulatory agencies 
select firms for investigation or prosecution; thus, researchers need 
to begin to focus on the relationship between enforcement and 
illegal activities.
These comments certainly apply to audit-related research issues on 
illegal acts.10
The preceding discussion focused on the relation between firm-specific 
variables and the propensity to commit illegal acts. Identifying such 
relationships may be useful in directing auditor attention to those clients 
most likely to be involved in illegal acts. A  second area of interest concerns 
the mechanisms by which auditors can effectively become aware of 
such activities. O f course these mechanisms include audit procedures.
10 For example, although not limited to illegal acts, a study by Feroz, Park, and Pastena 
(1991) includes an examination of the types of accounting and auditing problems that 
motivate SEC enforcement actions.
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Regrettably, we could not locate any research that systematically documents 
the frequency with which auditors detect illegal acts, the procedures utilized 
by independent auditors, or the effectiveness of such procedures. These 
remain important areas for future research.
Independent auditors may consider some reliance on internal auditors for 
detecting and evaluating illegal activities. A study by Miceli, Near, and 
Schwenk (1991) examines the effect of a number of perceptual variables on 
internal-auditor reporting of observed wrongdoings by employees and 
managers in their organizations. The reporting by internal auditors includes 
disclosing observed wrongdoing to independent (external) auditors. The 
study uses data from a survey of directors of internal audit in North America 
who were also members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA ) in 1986. 
The study comprises all types of organizations (public, nonpublic, not-for- 
profit, and governmental). Rather than illegal acts, the study examines 
“ wrongdoing,” defined as engaging in theft, abusing organizational posi­
tion to receive special favors, accepting bribes or kickbacks, giving unfair 
advantage to vendors or contractors, tolerating a situation that endangers 
public health or safety (including product development), wasting corporate 
assets, covering up poor performance, making false projections of future 
performance, and committing serious violations of company policy or other 
illegal acts.
Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) received 1,046 useable responses, of 
which 756 (72 percent) observed evidence of wrongdoing in the past twelve 
months. Of these 756, sixty-five (9 percent) did not report the wrongdoing 
to anyone; 419 (55 percent) reported it only to someone within the 
organization (e.g., to department heads, boards of directors, and to audit 
committees), 164 (22 percent) reported it to the external auditor but did not 
report it to any other external agency (all but two of these also reported it 
internally); and 108 (14 percent) reported it to an external agency (e.g., the 
media, a government agency, the IIA; all but thirteen of these also reported 
it internally). The authors summarize the factors associated with the report­
ing of wrongdoing as follows:
Survey responses of Directors of Internal Auditing who observed 
what they perceived to be incidents of wrongdoing show that they 
were less likely to report these incidents when they did not feel 
compelled morally or by role prescription to do so, when they 
evaluated their job performance as below average, or when they 
were employed by highly bureaucratic organizations. Also, the 
Directors of Internal Auditing were more likely to report incidents 
to external agencies (i.e., external auditors, the media, government 
agencies) when they felt that the public or their co-workers were 
harmed by the wrongdoing, the wrongdoing involved theft by rela­
tively low-level workers, there were few other observers, or the 
organization was highly regulated.
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A number of extensions to this line of research could be of relevance to 
auditing standard setters. An interesting follow-up would be to determine 
the portion of the 419 (and sixty-five) that the external auditor learned from 
other sources, as well as the portion that he or she never learned about. 
Other extensions include exploring which wrongdoings external auditors 
should be expected to detect and determining any differences in expectation 
for detection among auditors’ constituencies (e.g., management, audit 
committees, investors, and regulators).
Finally, the study of most explicit relevance to considering auditors’ 
responsibilities regarding illegal acts is by Roussey (1992). Roussey reviews 
a series of relevant environmental laws and regulations; reviews the existing 
accounting and auditing guidance including generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), SEC, 
and AICPA Audit Risk Alert; and discusses the accounting measurement 
and disclosure problems, and auditing issues including reporting issues.11 
In attempting to apply the guidance of SAS No. 54 to this area of illegal acts, 
Roussey concludes that viewing environmental acts as indirect illegal acts 
would be incomplete. Roussey argues that auditors need to consider 
environmental acts in risk assessment and planning and he proposes 
extended auditing procedures if the client is identified as being at risk for 
environmental liabilities.
Disclosure
Regulatory and international events suggest increased pressures on 
independent auditors for disclosing illegal acts. The FDIC Improvement Act 
of 1991 contains provisions for disclosure of illegal acts by independent 
auditor attestation to management assertions of compliance with specified 
laws and regulations relative to the safety and soundness of financial insti­
tutions. The proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act 
(HR 4313) would require independent auditors to respond in certain circum­
stances when senior management-boards of directors fail to take remedial 
action with respect to illegal acts and where such failure is reasonably 
expected to warrant modified reporting or auditor resignation. The ultimate 
outcome of these situations is notification of the SEC by the client or the 
auditor. Internationally, the events surrounding the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) have resulted in public discussions of 
auditors’ responsibilities for disclosing illegal acts (see Cowan 1991).
Public companies and specific industries such as financial services and 
insurance tend to be the focus of recent proposals or actual revisions in
11 Two recent studies in the Journal of Accountancy provide guidance to auditors 
(Zuber and Berry 1992) and survey current corporate practices (Surma and Vondra 
1992) in accounting and reporting environmental activities.
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auditors’ disclosure requirements of illegal acts. Currently a disclosure 
mechanism for public companies exists in conjunction with auditor-client 
disagreements in the context of auditor change. In this regard, Goldwasser 
(1987) expresses concern that SAS No. 54 does not specify precisely when 
auditor change (resignation) in conjunction with illegal acts results in a 
reportable disagreement on Form 8-K.
For nonpublic companies, not subject to specific industry regulations, 
there may be a tendency to assume in conjunction with auditor change that 
the predecessor-successor auditor communication will alert potential 
successors and actual successor auditors to the possibility of illegal acts 
by clients. However, a number of studies (e.g., Hull and Mitehem 1987, Niles 
and Palmrose 1989, and Lambert, Lambert, and Calderon 1991) provide 
consistent evidence that these communications do not always occur, 
irrespective of client permission considerations.
Consequences
Empirical research provides evidence on two types of consequences— 
litigation and auditor change—related to auditors’ responsibilities for illegal 
acts. Legal liability might be expected as a major concern of illegal acts by 
clients. Although we did not locate any studies providing direct systematic 
evidence on auditors’ legal liability of illegal acts, Palmrose (1987) provides 
some indirect evidence. In a sample of 472 observations involving audit- 
related litigation during 1960-1985 for the largest fifteen or so audit firms, 
seven (1 percent) observations involve only illegal acts (i.e., illegal acts not 
in conjunction with other errors or irregularities). Most of the seven obser­
vations consist of illegal political contributions and foreign payments 
(before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977). Palmrose 
reports resolution information for a few of the seven observations; all are 
resolved by courts dismissing auditors or by auditors declining to contribute 
to settlement funds.
In using litigation evidence to examine auditors’ responsibilities, including 
changes over time in responsibilities, it is important to consider auditor 
litigation relative to the overall level of litigation in the particular area. For 
example, not only does litigation relating exclusively to illegal political and 
foreign payments represent a small subset of auditor litigation, auditors do 
not appear to be defendants in a major portion of the overall litigation that 
occurred in this area. Olson (1982) reports that more than 200 companies 
had foreign and domestic bribes and kickbacks in the early 1970s. Although 
he does not report the number of companies that also had shareholder class 
and derivative actions over these matters, the number likely includes a 
majority of the 200; a number much greater than the number of auditor 
legal actions. What appears to be a low level of auditor involvement in this 
area of litigation represents an issue for further research. It also suggests
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the possibility that clients’ corporate governance structures are important 
(ex-post) for risk sharing, as well as (ex-ante) for prevention of illegal acts. 
Further research is also required to assess the nature and extent of auditor 
involvement in other types of illegal act litigation, as Roussey (1992) 
suggests with respect to environmental acts.
Before completing this discussion of litigation, we want to mention that 
one of the authors’ casual reviews of a data base expanded from that in 
Palmrose (1987) does not substantially change the evidence reported. The 
data base consists of about 900 audit-related litigation observations from 
1960 to 1992 for the largest audit firms. Perhaps ten observations relate to 
illegal foreign and political payments. Considering all types of illegal acts, 
there appears to be an important industry component associated with illegal 
acts. For example, litigation involves clients in financial service industries 
including brokerages and insurance, utilities, waste disposal, and govern­
ment contracting. A  few municipalities have auditor litigation in connection 
with violations of investment regulations. In the expanded data base, there 
are a few instances of relatively substantial settlement payments by auditors 
in connection with illegal acts by clients.
Furthermore, the expanded data base supports Goldwasser’s (1987) 
comments. Most illegal acts appear together with other irregularities such 
as management fraud. Therefore, in assessing litigation consequences, it is 
necessary to identify the impact of various types of claims. For example, 
allegations against auditors for failure to detect and disclose clients’ illegal 
activities may be deleted in amended complaints or dismissed by courts. If  
so, such allegations have little impact on outcomes when litigation continues 
against auditors for other allegations, although the illegal act claims still 
entail some defense costs. On the other hand, illegal act-related claims may 
substantially affect legal negotiations and outcomes even when such claims 
occur along with claims for failure to detect and disclose client irregularities. 
Finally, some clients’ illegal activities, whether alone or together with 
irregularities, have secondary impacts. They affect other entities. These 
effects may likewise produce auditor litigation. Secondary impacts appear 
most prevalent for clients in financial services industries (e.g., Penn Square 
and ESM). When secondary impacts occur, regulatory pressures on auditors 
may increase.
A  study in progress by Christensen and Byington (1992) pursues the 
issue of auditor change in connection with illegal acts. Unfortunately, the 
authors define illegal acts quite broadly. Their sample includes as illegal 
acts any mention of litigation in corporate annual reports (i.e., in the fin­
ancial statements, footnotes, president’s report, or audit report). O f the 
11,788 companies listed on Compact Disclosure, 1,923 (16.3 percent) have 
some type of litigation disclosure (by definition an illegal act) and 305 
(2.6 percent) changed auditors. Using the authors’ data, we computed the 
following proportions:
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Percentage of Auditor Changes With Litigation 
Disclosures (80 of 305) 26.2 percent
Percentage of No Auditor Changes With Litigation 
Disclosures (1,843 of 11,483) 16.0 percent
Percentage of Companies With Litigation Disclosures 
That Changed Auditors (80 of 1,923) 4.2 percent
Percentage of Companies With No Litigation 
Disclosures That Changed Auditors (225 of 9,865) 2.3 percent
Since the study is preliminary, it does not provide any evidence after 
controlling for confounding events. Also, the authors note that the study 
does not determine who initiated the change, the auditor or the client.
Future Research
In our discussion of extant research related to the definition, prevention, 
detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences of auditors’ responsibili­
ties regarding illegal acts by clients, we made a number of suggestions for 
future research. We conclude with some additional suggestions based on 
the effectiveness of SAS No. 54 and issues that arise from its implementation.
Some of the issues come from our discussions with colleagues and 
practitioners. This does not imply unanimity that SAS No. 54 needs to 
be reconsidered. Some believe it does not. This belief was supported, 
for example, by arguing a paucity of significant auditor litigation involving 
illegal acts. Yet, some perceive a lack of agreement on what should be 
or is the auditor’s responsibility for detecting and revealing illegal acts 
by clients.
In considering SAS No. 54, there is a fundamental question. Why continue 
to have a separate SAS for illegal acts? Determining the nature of the demand 
for a separate SAS and understanding changes in the demand since promul­
gation of SAS No. 17 and No. 54 may alter or eliminate current guidance.
The most frequently identified difficulty with SAS No. 54 is in classifying 
a law or regulation as direct or indirect. Since this classification determines 
the auditor’s responsibilities, any difficulty is worrisome. If, indeed, the 
direct/indirect categorization is problematic, alternatives should be pro­
posed and discussed. For example, Roussey suggested the following alternate 
structure to us and we include his suggestion as an illustration:
• Calculation of financial statement amounts (such as under tax laws and 
government contracts)
• Accrual of loss contingencies (such as for uncertainties where a loss 
contingency can be estimated for environmental or other requirements)
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• Disclosure of loss contingencies (such as for asserted or unasserted 
claims or assessments for job discrimination or health and welfare laws 
and regulations)
Left unspecified is the auditor’s responsibilities within each category. 
Yet, it is both the classification scheme for laws and regulations and the 
auditor’s responsibilities under any such scheme that involve unresolved 
controversy. While current GAAS limit auditors’ responsibilities, in partic­
ular, for indirect illegal acts, not all proposed schemes would provide either 
similar or any limitations on auditors’ responsibilities for detecting and 
revealing material illegal acts.
Irrespective of the categorization of laws and regulations, empirical 
evidence on the efficacy of audit procedures in detecting illegal acts is 
required. This evidence is particularly important under the procedural 
approach used in SAS No. 54 to delineate auditors’ responsibilities for 
indirect illegal acts. Future research can help assess whether procedures 
designated in SAS No. 54 are effective or optimal.
We discussed the continuing emphasis in regulatory initiatives for auditors 
to externally disclose clients’ illegal acts. This emphasis reinforces the need 
to examine the viability and implications of such reliance on independent 
auditors. For example, the profession has expressed concern that any 
expanded responsibility for independent auditors to report publicly on illegal 
acts will inhibit traditional, and important, communications between audi­
tors and clients (Neebes, Guy, and Whittington 1991).
Although disclosure discussions focus on external disclosures, there are 
also internal disclosure issues. For example, perhaps consensus is lacking 
on auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts. I f  so, it may be useful for 
auditors to explicitly communicate audit scope-related matters to clients 
and their audit committees.
There are legal and market concerns in addition to the issues already dis­
cussed. For example, what are the implications of a proliferation outside 
GAAS to the auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts under the due 
care standard? Do differential requirements that exist outside GAAS pose 
the risk that any non-GAAS requirements will be extended, ex post, to 
GAAS engagements? Since illegal act issues pervade all clients, this seems 
possible, although the possibility may be mitigated by auditors internally 
communicating scope-related matters.
On the other hand, Guy and Whittington (1990) comment on potential 
benefits from expanding the auditor’s detection responsibility outside of 
GAAS by legal requirements for audit reports on the application of agreed- 
upon compliance procedures. From a research standpoint, they suggest that 
these requirements provide a new setting to examine contracting for audit 
services and to explore the demand for assurances regarding compliance 
with laws and regulations.
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These are just a few suggestions for future research. Considering the 
importance of the issues and the paucity of research specific to auditors, we 
hope that this study motivates additional research on auditor’s responsibili­
ties regarding illegal acts by clients.
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Appendix
Practice and 
Implementation Issues
SAS No. 54 Guidance Task Force 
(AICPA File Reference No. 3035, May 8, 1991)
1. Should the definition of illegal acts in SAS No. 54 be changed?
2. Should the term and focus of SAS No. 54 be changed from “ illegal acts” to 
compliance with laws and regulations? (Illegal acts covers both intentional and 
unintentional violations of laws and regulations; however, regulators and 
others misunderstand the term to cover only intentional violations.)
3. Should the direct versus indirect approach be clarified or amended (e.g., should 
a procedural approach be followed)?
4. Should the implication that direct-effect illegal acts may involve any of the five 
financial statement assertions be clarified? (SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, lists 
five assertions that are embodied in financial statement components; however, 
direct-effect illegal acts may affect only some of these assertions.)
5. Should the auditor’s responsibility for detecting illegal acts having a direct and 
material financial statement effect be discussed in SAS No. 54 rather than be 
cross-referenced to SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and 
Report Errors and Irregularities?
6. Should SAS No. 54 be amended to recognize compliance tests that auditors 
perform (e.g., capital adequacy tests in financial institutions), which are not 
tests for direct-effect illegal acts?
Practitioner Comments
1. Is additional guidance needed to differentiate between illegal acts and instances 
of noncompliance that are not illegal?
2. Should there be specific limitations with respect to the types of data to which 
a practitioner may attest regarding compliance when compliance does not have 
a financial statement effect?
3. Are the components of the audit risk model applicable to compliance attestation?
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Auditor Attestation 
to Management Reports 
on Internal Control— 
Should It Be Required?
William F. Messier, Jr., Price Waterhouse Professor,
University of Florida
O. Ray Whittington, Professor of Accounting,
San Diego State University
This paper debates whether auditors should be required to attest to manage­
ment reports on internal control. It sets a stage fo r the debate by providing 
a brief history o f  the proposals for issuance o f managment reports on 
internal control and auditor attestation to those reports. Arguments for  
auditor attestation are presented based on the demand for the service and 
the public interest argument. The demand fo r  the service also provides a 
basis for arguments against auditor attestation, as well as the cost and 
benefits o f the service.
The question of whether management should be required to issue reports 
on internal control that are attested to by auditors has been debated for a 
number of years. Congress, the SEC, and various commissions have 
proposed such requirements in the past for all public companies, but none 
has been adopted. Recently, legislation has been enacted that will require 
management of large financial institutions to issue reports annually that 
include management’s assessment of the institution’s internal control 
over financial reporting. The legislation also requires management to 
engage an auditor to attest to the reports. In this paper, we debate the issue 
of auditor attestation of management reports on internal control, providing 
arguments for and against, and leaving the reader with the obligation to 
draw a conclusion on the issue. Our debate centers around the issue of 
whether it is desirable to require companies to issue reports on internal 
control to regulators or the investing public, or both, that are attested to 
by independent auditors.
This paper begins with a history of the proposals for management reports 
on internal control and auditor attestation. A  discussion of prior research is
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presented next. This is followed by two sections that discuss the arguments 
for and against auditor attestation of these reports. The last section contains 
concluding comments.
The History
The first formal proposal for management reports on internal control came 
in 1978 and was included in The Report o f the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission). The Cohen Commission recom­
mended that audited financial statements be accompanied by a report by 
management that included, among other assertions, an assessment of the 
company’s accounting system and controls over it (The Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities 1978). The Cohen Commission also recom­
mended that auditors expand the study and the evaluation of internal control 
performed as part of the audit of a company’s financial statements to 
form a conclusion on the functioning of the internal accounting control 
system. Under the Cohen Commission’s recommendations the auditor’s 
report on the financial statements would be expanded to express a conclusion 
about whether the management’s report disclosed all material weaknesses in 
the internal accounting control system. Underlying these recommendations 
was a belief that “users of financial information have a legitimate interest in 
the condition of the controls over the accounting system and management’s 
response to the suggestions of the auditors for corrections of weaknesses.”
In 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued its first 
proposal for reports by management. This proposal would have made asser­
tions about the effectiveness of the company’s internal accounting control 
a mandatory part of the report by management. It also called for auditor 
attestation of the assertions made by management. The proposed rule 
suggested that information and assurances about the effectiveness of a 
company’s internal accounting control system are necessary to enable 
investors to better evaluate management’s performance of its stewardship 
responsibilities and the reliability of interim and other unaudited financial 
information. The SEC’s proposed rule was criticized sharply primarily 
because of the irrelevance of the information contained in the reports and 
the cost of auditor attestation (Wallace 1981).
The SEC returned to the topic of reporting on internal control in 1988 
by issuing a proposed rule that would require a report by management 
containing the following assertions:
1. Management’s assessment of the entity’s internal control structure over 
financial reporting
2. A  description of management’s response to significant recommenda­
tions of internal and independent auditors about the internal control 
structure
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3. An acknowledgment of management’s responsibility for preparing the 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), and establishing and maintaining a system of 
internal control over financial reporting
The SEC also solicited comments on whether an attestation to the 
management’s report by the independent auditor would be desirable, but 
that requirement was not included in the proposed rule.
Once again, the proposal for auditor attestation of management’s report 
was met with overwhelming opposition (Solomon and Cooper 1990). 
Although there was strong support for an acknowledgment of manage­
ment’s responsibility for the financial statements and the system of internal 
control, most of the respondents did not support inclusion of management’s 
assessment of internal control or management’s response to recommenda­
tions for improvement in internal control.
Proposed legislation has also contained requirements for auditor attesta­
tion of management reports on internal control. As early as 1985, legislative 
initiatives were proposed that included requirements for management 
reports on a company’s internal accounting control and auditor attestation 
to the reports. More recently, Representatives Wyden and Dingell 
introduced legislation that would have required management to report on 
the effectiveness of their company’s internal control over financial reporting 
and mandated a report by the independent auditor on the management’s 
report. This 1990 proposed legislation was not adopted.
In December 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Improvement Act of 1991 (PL 102-242) was signed into law (Moraglio and 
Green 1992). This legislation, which applies to financial institutions with 
total assets of $150 million or more, mandates an annual report by manage­
ment that includes an assessment of the institution’s internal control over 
financial reporting. The law also includes a requirement for a report by the 
institution’s auditor attesting to management’s assertions about internal 
control. These new requirements are effective for fiscal years ending 
December 31, 1993. This represents the first legislation requiring any type 
of entity to provide periodic reports on its internal control over financial 
reporting that are attested to by the entity’s auditor.
Recent recommendations about reports on internal control have also 
come from the accounting profession. In 1985, the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission or COSO) was 
created to identify causal factors that lead to fraudulent financial reporting 
and to make recommendations to reduce its incidence.1 As one of its recom­
mendations, the Treadway Commission called for an SEC rule that would
1 The Treadway Commission was jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, American Accounting Association, Financial Executives 
Institute, Institute of Internal Auditors, and Institute of Management Accountants.
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require all public companies to include in their annual reports a management 
report containing an acknowledgment of management’s responsibilities for 
the financial statements and internal control, a discussion of how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and management’s assessment of the effec­
tiveness of the company’s internal control. The recommendation indicated 
that management’s assessment should encompass the entire system of inter­
nal control, and it called on the organizations sponsoring the commission 
to cooperate in developing “ integrated guidance”  on internal control. 
Although the Treadway Commission did not recommend an auditor’s 
attestation to the management’s report, it did state that the Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB) should provide guidance for the auditor when he or 
she disagrees with management’s assessment on the basis of information 
gained in the course of the audit of the financial statements.
A  project to develop integrated guidance on internal control is being 
completed by Coopers & Lybrand under the supervision of a committee of 
the sponsoring organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). A  
revised exposure draft, Internal Control— Integrated Framework (COSO 
1992), has been issued and includes criteria that can be used to assess the 
effectiveness of an entity’s internal control structure. The following five 
components serve as criteria for assessing internal control structure:
1. Control environment
2. Risk assessment
3. Control activities
4. Information and communication
5. Monitoring
The exposure draft does not take a position on whether management 
reports on the effectiveness of internal control should be required or 
whether auditors should attest to those reports. It does recommend, 
however, that where such reports are issued they should be restricted to 
internal control over the preparation o f  published financial statements.
To provide guidance to an independent auditor who is engaged to attest to 
management’s assertions about internal control over financial reporting, the 
ASB has recently issued an exposure draft of a Proposed Statement on 
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) titled, Reporting on an 
Entity’s Internal Control Structure Over Financial Reporting (AICPA 
1992). This proposed attestation standard defines an entity’s internal 
control over financial reporting as “ those policies and procedures that 
pertain to an entity’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report 
financial data consistent with the assertions embodied in either annual 
financial statements, interim financial statements, or both.”
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) also has under­
taken a project to develop criteria for internal control to be used by auditors, 
management, and regulators. In August 1991, the CICA released a paper
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titled, Assessing the Effectiveness o f Management Control—A  Systems 
Perspective (C IC A  1991) as an exploratory step toward examining the poten­
tial of the systems perspective for assessing the effectiveness of internal 
control. Similar to the COSO project, the objective of the CICA project is 
to develop comprehensive internal control criteria.
Prior Research
Only a few studies have examined issues related to management reports 
on internal control and auditor attestation of such reports. Wallace (1981) 
reports that there were 950 negative responses to the SEC’s 1979 proposal 
for a management report on internal control. She provides an analysis of the 
SEC’s position through literature citations, market evidence, and survey 
findings. Wallace’s analysis points out that there are two major flaws in the 
position of the SEC on the value of reporting on internal control: (1) reliable 
financial statements are possible in spite of inadequate controls, and
(2) evidence exists that the cost of such reporting exceeds the benefits.
The first flaw points out that the SEC’s contention that an effective system 
of internal accounting control is necessary to produce reliable financial 
statements is contrary to current auditing practice. Under current auditing 
standards the auditor is not required to audit the entity’s internal control 
structure. The auditor can choose not to rely on internal control and per­
form a substantive audit. Wallace (1981) points out that a review of filings 
with the SEC showed only ten companies receiving qualified opinions or 
disclaimers for inadequate internal control systems.
Second, the evidence indicates that the costs of management reports 
on internal control accompanied by auditor attestation is likely to exceed 
the benefits. Wallace (1981) reports that market forces have led to attesta­
tion reports in only two public companies’ annual reports. This suggests 
that there is little demand (i.e., benefits) for such reports. Wallace (1981) 
also suggests that the SEC’s focus on actual costs excludes a number of 
relevant cost factors. She reports elsewhere that preparers and users believe 
that audit costs will increase by 30 percent if such reporting is required 
(Wallace 1982b).
Wallace (1982a) surveyed a number of user and preparer groups regarding 
internal control disclosure policies including issues related to reporting on 
internal control. In general, there were a number of significant differences 
between the user and preparer groups regarding control policies judged to be 
material weaknesses. For example, the producer group judged the absence 
of adequate bonding of employees to be more negative than the user group.
The groups were also asked to rank their preference for the form of inter­
nal control reports. There were considerable differences in the groups’ 
preferences. Two examples will illustrate the differences. First, commercial
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lending officers preferred an opinion on internal control with materiality 
limits more than the other user groups. Similarly, CPAs were the group 
most opposed to an auditor’s report on internal controls without materiality 
limits. Second, mutual fund officers and commercial lending officers 
preferred the use of a management letter-type disclosure, whereas boards of 
directors, CPAs, and controllers were opposed to this form of reporting. On 
the basis of the analyses of the survey data and written comments by the 
respondents, Wallace (1982a) concluded there was a general attitude that 
reports on internal control should not be made available.
Auditor Attestation to Management Reports 
on Internal Control
The Pro Side
There may be potential benefits to auditors from attesting to management 
reports on internal control. This section attempts to outline arguments that 
support auditor attestation. This type of service is new to the profession and 
auditors may be reluctant to consider the potential favorable outcomes from 
providing such services.
The D em a n d  for Auditor Attestation. On the basis of initiatives of 
Congress, the SEC, and some members of the accounting profession, an 
argument can be made that each of these groups sees merit in management 
reports on internal control. In 1989, 25 percent of all public companies and 
60 percent of the Fortune 500 companies included management reports in 
their annual reports to stockholders (COSO 1992). The majority of these 
published management reports addressed management’s responsibility for 
internal controls over external financial reporting, along with a number of 
other assertions.
The initiatives for auditor attestation of management reports, however, 
are mixed. As described earlier, the Cohen Commission and the SEC’s 
1979 proposal called for auditor attestation of management reports. The 
SEC’s 1988 proposal did not include a requirement for auditor attestation 
but requested comments on its desirability. The FDIC Improvement Act 
requires that the auditor attest to management’s report on the financial insti­
tution’s internal control system. Finally, the current COSO document does 
not take a position on whether management reports or auditor attestation of 
those reports should be required.
In the absence of a regulatory requirement for auditor attestation of 
management reports, why would a company see a need for such services? 
One possible reason is that the auditor’s attestation will add value to 
management’s assertions about internal control. From an investor point of
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view, the auditor’s attestation provides an opinion about the reliability of the 
process that generated the financial information. This can be viewed as an 
extension of the auditor’s monitoring of the agency relationship that exists 
between the managers and the absentee owners of the company.
The Public  Interest A rgum ent. Currently, generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) do not require an auditor to test the reliability of a com­
pany’s internal control structure. Under Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal Control Structure in a Finan­
cial Statement Audit, the auditor needs only an understanding of the internal 
control structure sufficient to plan the audit. The remaining audit effort can 
focus on testing the ending financial statement balances.
Hooten and Landsittel (1991) have argued that this focus on financial 
results, and not the process that generated the results, does not meet the 
public’s interest. They argue that the public wants more information on 
“early warning signals” of potential business problems, and that controls 
are critical indicators of a business’s future success. Hooten and Landsittel 
(1991) further claim that investors are interested in knowing whether 
companies are in control or not. It might be argued that many of the 
recent financial scandals (e.g., Miniscribe, ZZZZ Best, and the S&Ls) 
are examples of companies that were out of control. Auditors can add value 
by helping to identify increased business risks that are present in poorly 
controlled companies.
C lien t and U ser  Expectations. One reason why there may be a lack 
of demand for reports on internal control is the client and user assumption 
that they are receiving assurances from the auditor on the entity’s internal 
control structure. One of the primary motivations for revising the standard 
auditor’s report was to clarify what an audit involves. Note that the scope 
paragraph makes no mention of the extent of work performed on the client’s 
internal control structure. As a result, it is possible that clients and users 
assume that an audit provides assurance on the reliability of the entity’s 
internal control structure. As an example of such an interpretation, one of 
the board of director respondents in Wallace’s (1982a) study commented 
that “The auditor’s certificate is all the reassurance needed.”
The Con Side
There may be some benefits derived from auditor attestation to manage­
ment reports on internal control. This is not sufficient reason, however, 
to endorse broad proposals without considering the usefulness of the infor­
mation to users, and the relationship between the cost and benefits of 
attestation. This section presents arguments against auditor attestation 
of management reports on internal control.
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The D em a n d  for Auditor Attestation. It is difficult to evaluate the 
demand and, thus, the usefulness of a service that is not currently being 
provided on a broad scale; however, one important indicator of usefulness 
is the existing demand for that service. For example, before the passage of 
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, most public companies were issuing 
audited financial statements. According to M oody ’s Manuals, 82 percent of 
the firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange were audited by CPAs in 
1926 (Benston 1969).
The demand for auditor attestation to reports on internal control has not 
paralleled the demand for attestation to financial statements, despite the fac t 
that a framework for attesting to internal control has existed for some time. 
SAS No. 30, Reporting on Internal Accounting Control (AICPA 1980), 
established a framework for auditor attestation to internal accounting con­
trol (i.e., those controls with the broad objectives of providing management 
with reasonable but not absolute, assurance that assets are safeguarded 
from unauthorized use or disposition and that financial records are reliable 
to permit the preparation of financial statements). The first Statement on 
Standards for Attestation Engagements, Attestation Standards (AICPA 
1986), issued in March, expanded the SAS No. 30 framework. This state­
ment provides a broad framework for expansion of attest services beyond 
the expression of opinions on financial statements. Under this standard, the 
auditor may express an opinion on management’s assertions about internal 
control using any appropriate concept provided that—
• The auditor has adequate knowledge in the subject matter of the assertion.
• The assertion is capable of evaluation against reasonable criteria that 
have either been established by a recognized body or are stated in the 
presentation of the assertion in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive 
manner for a knowledgeable reader to be able to understand them.
• The assertion is capable of reasonably consistent estimation or measure­
ment against the criteria.
Despite the existence of these standards, there has been little demand for 
auditor attestation to reports on internal control. Reports on internal 
accounting control prepared in accordance with SAS No. 30 are rarely 
encountered. One might argue that this lack of demand is related to the lack 
of a well-developed criteria for evaluating internal controls beyond those 
related to financial reporting. However, it would be hard to argue that 
generally accepted accounting principles were very well developed as 
criteria for financial statements in the 1920s.
Generally, the demand for reports on internal control has come from 
regulators, and the reports primarily cover only a segment of the entity’s 
internal control structure. Examples include reports on internal control over:
• Safeguarding customers’ cash and securities by broker/dealers and stock 
clearing companies.
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• Managing federal financial assistance programs by entities that receive
federal financial assistance.
• Financial reporting by large financial institutions.
Some of these reports are based on the work performed in auditing the 
entity’s financial statements with no additional testing of internal controls 
required. Others are based on special studies requiring the performance of 
additional procedures.
What creates this demand for auditor attestation to reports on internal 
control for regulators? Regulators have an oversight function that allows 
them to influence directly the entities under their jurisdiction. If  regulators 
believe the entity’s internal control system is deficient, they may take 
steps to compel management to improve the system. Regulators may with­
hold funding, apply sanctions, or even cause the entity to cease operations. 
The information and assurances provided in auditors’ reports on internal 
control assist the regulators in meeting their responsibilities. Such assur­
ances cannot be derived from the auditors’ reports on financial statements. 
Also, attestation requirements designed for regulators, by regulators, are 
likely to be cost effective, because they can be tailored to the regulator’s 
specific needs.
The C o s t  and Benefits o f  Auditor Attestation. In considering a 
requirement for auditor attestation to management reports on internal con­
trol for the investing public, it is important to examine what will 
be achieved (i.e., benefits) by the assurances provided by the reports.2 
A  traditional argument for requiring attestation of management reports on 
internal control is that this service will encourage businesses to improve 
their internal control structure, resulting in increased reliability of the 
annual and interim financial reports of the companies. However, auditors 
already directly attest to annual financial statements. I f  additional assurance 
is needed about the reliability of interim financial information, auditors 
could be required to attest to that information. Providing assurances about 
the output of a system would appear to be more cost effective than providing 
assurances about the process used to generate that output.
Another argument for auditor attestation to management reports on 
internal control in this setting stems from a belief that such reports would 
provide an “early warning system” for the financial health of businesses. 
Underlying this argument is a presumed association between the financial
2 Consideration of the cost and benefits of additional reporting requirements is 
especially important given the status of international securities markets. The high 
cost of complying with the SEC filing requirements has already been identified as a 
factor that has diminished the ability of the United States to compete as a capital 
market (Fleming 1991).
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health of a business and its system of internal control. I f  a broad concept 
of internal control that includes both financial and operational controls 
is considered, the presumption of an association is reasonable. However, 
it is doubtful that this association is close to perfect; it is difficult to believe 
that a control system, no matter how comprehensive, could completely 
eliminate bad business judgments. If  only financial reporting controls are 
considered, it becomes more difficult to argue a strong association between 
the quality of internal control and financial health of the business. Without 
a strong association between the internal control structure and the financial 
health of the business, attestation by auditors could create an expectations 
gap that will far surpass any that the profession has experienced to this date.
Individuals (Hooten and Landsittel 1991) who advocate reporting on 
internal control as an early warning system really appear to be advocating 
it as a way to communicate information about business or investment risk. 
Again, management reports appear to be an indirect method of communi­
cating this risk. I f  financial reporting is deficient in this respect it may be 
better to improve the disclosures of business risks and uncertainties in 
financial statements.3 Financial forecasts could even be required, and the 
auditor could attest to any of this information directly.
Another issue that arises when considering a requirement for auditor 
attestation to management reports on internal control is the user’s ability to 
use the information provided by management reports. An important factor 
that will affect the usefulness of the information is the form of the report. 
If the reports are standard in form and assert that no high-level control 
weakness (e.g., material weakness) exists, it is doubtful that there will 
be much information content in the reports. For example, consider the 
communications that were required under SAS No. 20, Required Communi­
cation o f  Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control (AICPA 
1977). That SAS required auditors to communicate to boards of directors or 
audit committees deficiencies in internal control that were considered to be 
material weaknesses. Because the information content of such reports was 
considered to be inadequate, the ASB issued SAS No. 60, Communication 
o f Internal Control Structure Related Matters Noted in an Audit (AICPA 
1988), which requires communication of reportable conditions, a lower- 
threshold weakness in internal control. The fact that a material weakness in 
internal accounting control constitutes a violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act further complicates the use of that threshold of reporting. 
Finally, if the reports cover both financial and operating controls, there is
3 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) recently formed a 
special committee on financial reporting to suggest ways to improve the nature and 
extent of information provided to users of financial statements. A part of this 
committee’s charge is to evaluate the range of information and assurances that could 
be made available (AICPA 1991).
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the problem of defining the concept of a material weakness for controls that 
do not relate directly to financial reporting.
I f  management reports on internal control are of a “ free form,” similar 
to Management’s Discussion and Analysis required in filings with the 
SEC, the reports may have additional information content. But how will an 
investor use this information? Presumably, management will have some 
rationale for deciding to accept certain weaknesses in internal control. For 
example, management may decide to invest available funds in research and 
development as opposed to internal control. Management should be in the 
best position to assess the risks and uncertainties of the business and make 
cost-benefit judgments about the nature and extent of appropriate internal 
controls for the business. Investors do not have the options available to regu­
lators; they cannot directly influence management. Investors can only make 
buy or sell decisions based on the information about investment risk and 
return that is available to them. It is hard to believe that investors can effec­
tively factor information about weaknesses in internal control into their 
investment risk assessments. Therefore, management reports on internal 
control in any form would be of questionable value to typical financial 
statement users.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, we reviewed the history of management reports on internal 
control and auditor attestation to those reports. We cited arguments both for 
and against auditor attestation of management reports. Regardless of the 
reader’s point of view on this issue, we feel that some systematic research 
effort should be undertaken to examine the issues raised in this paper. Based 
on the recent FDIC legislation, it seems likely that further legislative or 
regulatory actions are possible. The profession can best react to these 
demands if  all the issues are properly understood based on objective 
consideration and relevant research findings.
254
References
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1991. “News Report.” 
Journal of Accountancy (September), 27.
______ 1977. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20, Required Communication
of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control. New York: AICPA.
_____ . 1980. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 30, Reporting on Internal
Accounting Control. New York: AICPA.
_____ . 1988. Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial
Statement Audit. New York: AICPA.
______ 1988. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 60, Communication of Internal
Control Structure Related Matters Noted in an Audit. New York: AICPA.
______ 1986. Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements, Attestation
Standards. New York: AICPA.
______ 1992. Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements—Exposure
Draft, Reporting on an Entity’s Internal Control Structure Over Financial 
Reporting. New York: AICPA, 5.
Benston, G.J. 1969. “The Value of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements.” 
The Accounting Review (July), 515-532.
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). 1991. Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Management Control— A Systems Perspective. Toronto: CICA.
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (Cohen Commission). 1978. 
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, 60-76.
COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission). 
1992. Internal Control—Integrated Framework, Revised Draft (February).
Hooten, J.G. and D.L. Landsittel. 1991. “Addressing ‘Early Warning’ and the 
Public Interest: Auditor Involvement With Internal Control.” The CPA Journal 
(June), 10-13.
Fleming, P.D. 1991. “The Growing Importance of International Accounting 
Standards.” Journal of Accountancy (September), 100-106.
Moraglio, J.F. and J.F. Green. 1992. “The FDIC Improvement Act: A Precedent for 
Expanded CPA Reporting?” Journal of Accountancy (April), 63-71.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 1987. Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (October).
Solomon, M.B. and J.R. Cooper. 1990. “Reporting on Internal Controls: The 
SEC’s Proposed Rules.” Journal of Accountancy (June), 56-63.
Wallace, W. A. 1981. “ Internal Control Reporting—950 Negative Responses.” The 
CPA Journal (January), 33-38.
______ 1982a. “How Not To Communicate Material and Immaterial Weaknesses
in Accounting Controls.” In D.R. Nichols and H.F. Stettler, Auditing Sympo­
sium VI. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 42.
_____ . 1982b. “Should CPAs’ Reports on Internal Control Be Required? Survey
Evidence on the Effects of Such a Requirement.” Akron Business and Economic 
Review (Spring), 20-23.
255
Illegal Acts— 
The Current Position 
of the United Kingdom
David J. Hatherly, Professor, University of Edinburgh 
Robert Charlesworth, Secretary, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales
An exposure draft on “ The auditor’s responsibility in relation to illegal 
acts”  was issued in the United Kingdom in October 1990. Responses from  
the profession indicated concern that the draft might extend the auditor’s 
responsibility too far. The new Auditing Practices Board (formed in April 
1991) is now considering how to proceed with this topic. Issues include the 
auditor’s responsibility fo r considering—
• The entity’s compliance with certain laws and regulations.
• The impact o f potential illegal acts on the true and fair view.
An important feature is the auditor’s common law right in the U.K. 
(which is also, in certain circumstances, a statutory right) to report directly 
to third parties where matters o f public interest are involved.
Introduction
In 1991 the Auditing Practice Committee (APC) of the United Kingdom 
was replaced by an Auditing Practices Board (APB). The significance 
of the change is that nonpractitioners became a major influence— 
previously, 100 percent of the APC’s voting members were auditing 
practitioners; this percentage has now been reduced to 50 percent. In 
October 1990 the “old” APC had issued an exposure draft, The Auditor’s 
Responsibility in Relation to Illegal Acts. Concern has been expressed 
at this roundtable that the U.K. exposure draft might take the auditor’s 
responsibility too far. Similar concern was expressed in the comments 
on the exposure draft received from professional firms. However, it remains 
to be seen how the “ new” APB responds to these practitioner concerns 
now that it is responsible for developing the auditing standard on 
illegal acts.
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Audits generally contain a compliance element assuring that the auditee 
follows certain laws and regulations, and a qualitative element, which in a 
U.K. company audit setting requires the auditor’s judgment on the true 
and fair view given by the financial statements. The U.K. exposure draft 
on illegal acts followed this distinction by addressing separately illegal 
acts that the auditor is concerned with on grounds of compliance alone 
and those where the auditor is concerned by the effect on the true and fair 
view. However, it should be remembered that the two categories are not 
mutually exclusive and some illegal acts may require consideration under 
both headings.
Compliance
Dealing with the compliance issue, the U.K. exposure draft set out the 
following detection standard. The auditor must properly plan, perform, 
and evaluate the audit so that he or she has a reasonable expectation of iden­
tifying noncompliance with—
1. Laws and regulations relating to the preparation of the financial 
statements.
2. Laws and regulations (e.g., the requirement to keep proper accounting 
records) where the auditor has a legal responsibility to report breaches.
3. Laws and regulations (e.g., relating to dividends and directors’ loans) 
that govern the management of the financial operations of the business.
Other laws, such as those concerned with the environment and with 
health and safety at work, are not considered sufficiently proximate to the 
financial records and financial control systems to require the auditor to plan 
for detection of breaches as part of a compliance audit.
A  highly controversial aspect of the exposure draft, particularly in respect 
to category 3, was a requirement on auditors not only to report details of the 
breach (unless adequately disclosed in the financial statements), but also to 
report the fact that the transaction concerned was, or might be, illegal. 
Thus, for example, the auditor might highlight the illegality of a loan to a 
director. Most of the professional firms, in their comments on the exposure 
draft, argued that judging the legality of such a transaction was a matter for 
the courts and not the auditors to decide. It is probable that the APB will 
accept the arguments of the professional firms on this matter.
The True and Fair View
In the exposure draft, it was stated that the auditor’s responsibility with 
respect to illegal acts that could have consequences material to the true and
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fair view was to be aware of laws and regulations having a fundamental 
effect on the entity’s operations and to design the audit to give a reasonable 
basis for concluding that there are no material misstatements in the financial 
statements as a result of breaches. The exposure draft explained that 
the auditor assesses the risk of any material misstatements arising from 
an illegal act and designs the audit work accordingly. Thus, the audit 
is designed to provide positive rather than negative assurance based on 
set procedures.
Illegal acts that could have consequences to the true and fair view include 
breaches that have a material affect on financial statement numbers or that 
establish a material contingency. For example, failure to observe planning 
consents could affect the valuation of a property development, whereas 
failure to observe environmental laws could establish a contingent liability. 
Comments on the exposure draft expressed concern that such breaches, 
although creating contingencies material to the true and fair view, might be 
isolated events not capable of detection without extensive audit work. 
Serious doubts were expressed as to whether such audit work was justified 
in cost-benefit terms.
The exposure draft also required the auditor to consider illegal acts that 
are “ significant to an understanding of how the entity is managed.” The 
concern here was to detect and disclose situations where breaching the law 
is part of the strategic thinking of management so as to gain a commercial 
advantage over law-abiding competitors, or is deemed necessary to keep up 
with non-law-abiding competitors or foreign competitors not subject to the 
same restrictions. Once again this requirement was objected to by profes­
sional firm commentators. Nevertheless, if the true and fair view is about 
understanding the financial performance and position of the business, a key 
question is whether financial performance can be understood properly 
without an appreciation that a material amount of the profit derives from or 
is conditional on, activity that breaches the law. The exposure draft was 
uncompromising on this issue. Where the true and fair view is affected, the 
auditor should not refrain from qualifying the report because of potential 
adverse consequences to the client’s business as a result of disclosure.
Public Interest Reporting
Public interest reporting has existed in the United Kingdom for a long 
time, but it is understood that there is no parallel in the United States and 
it, therefore, may be of interest to the roundtable. Confidentiality is an 
implied term of the auditor’s contract but it is not an absolute requirement 
if there are serious matters of public interest. The exposure draft clarified 
the matters to be considered by the auditor when deciding whether or not 
to disclose an illegal act in the public interest. Primarily the auditor needs to
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weigh the public interest in confidentiality against the public interest in 
disclosure to a proper authority. The detailed considerations set out in the 
exposure draft include:
• The relative size of the amounts involved and the extent of the likely 
financial damage.
• The extent to which the illegal act is likely to affect members of the 
public.
• The extent to which the nondisclosure of the illegal act is likely to enable 
it to be repeated with impunity.
• The gravity of the matter.
• Whether there is a general management ethos within the entity of 
disregarding the law and regulations.
• The weight of evidence and the degree of the auditor’s suspicion that an 
illegal act has been committed.
It should be noted that reporting in the public interest is ad hoc and 
at the auditor’s initiative. The auditor receives the protection of qualified 
privilege (he or she cannot be sued) provided the report is in good faith and 
to a proper authority. There is no requirement for the auditor to report 
in the public interest. It is an option that the auditor may use. Of course, 
if the auditor does not use the facility he or she may have to justify this 
decision at a future time, if the problem surfaces in the public domain.
The principle of public interest reporting is recognized within U.K. 
common law and appears to be accepted by practitioners in the United 
Kingdom, but there is little evidence as to how often, and for what purpose 
the facility is being used. As far as the other issues discussed in this paper 
are concerned, the APB has yet to decide how to respond to the objections 
of practitioners to the exposure draft.
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Special Reports on Regulated 
Financial Institutions
Frank J. Kelly, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board,
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Donald E. Jeffreys, Assistant Director, Auditing Standards Board,
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Appropriate auditor responsibility fo r  evaluating and reporting on uncer­
tainties, including the going concern status o f a client, has long been 
debated. Most recently, Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) No. 58 
and No. 59 were issued and deal with this area. In this paper we discuss the 
historical development o f auditor responsibility for reporting on uncertain­
ties, summarize relevant research, discuss implementation issues, and 
suggest future research.
In summary, our historical review reveals the increasing extent o f  formal­
ization o f  standards on uncertainties in the United States, especially those 
relating to a client’s going concern status. Consistent with the auditing 
profession’s attention to the topic, several studies seem to indicate that 
investors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. Yet 
especially in the area o f  going-concern uncertainties, many companies 
continue to receive a report not modifed for going-concern status the year 
prior to filing for bankruptcy. In addition, terminology used in the standards 
(for example, going concern and substantial doubt) may currently be inter­
preted in various ways by CPAs. Also, a number o f  difficulties involved in 
implementing the new standards are presented.
Introduction
Since late 1989, the Auditing Standards Board (AuSB) of The Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has had a Task Force on Auditor 
Communication with Regulators. The Board has just released its first 
specific guidance in this area—a guideline entitled “ Special Reports on 
Regulated Financial Institutions.” 1
1 Auditing and Related Services Guideline: “Special Reports on Regulated Financial 
Institutions,” CICA Handbook. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, May 1992.
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The objective for this presentation is an overview of the guideline and the 
events leading up to it, which is organized as follows:
• Some history and background to put the guideline into context
• The major features of a “derivative reporting engagement”
• Some contentious issues
• Plans for further work
History and Background
Regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework in Canada includes—
• Corporations legislation (provincial and federal).
• Securities legislation (provincial only).
• Financial institutions legislation (provincial and federal).
Focus in AuSB work 
Our focus has been the federal legislation and regulation that governs 
financial institutions. The institutions subject to federal requirements 
include—
• Banks, all of which are federally chartered and regulated.
• Insurance companies.
• Loan and trust companies, which are similar to S&Ls in some respects. 
Legislation and regulations that include various provisions—
• Requiring an auditor to report certain matters to the regulator as a result 
of the audit of financial statments.
• Providing for the auditor to carry out specified procedures and report to 
the regulator.
Events
For many years, there has been a provision in the Bank Act for an auditor 
to report matters affecting the well-being of a bank. But the failure of 
some financial institutions (especially two Western Canadian banks) in 
the mid-1980s focused attention on legislation and regulators and, in turn, 
focused the attention of regulators on what the auditor could or should do 
to help the regulator.
The CICA Commission to Study the Public’s Expectation of Auditors, June 
1988, identified a perception on the part of the public and regulators that—
• Auditors know a lot about an entity (financial health, operations, quality 
of management) that is not reflected in the statements.
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• Auditors should tell them what they know (based on a GAAS audit—no 
expectation of extending the auditor’s work beyond this).
These expectations are now being reflected in legislation and regulations 
as they are revised and brought up-to-date. Auditors had (and have) real 
concerns about this type of reporting.
The guideline is only a first step and—
• Highlights the special reporting responsibilities for auditors and makes 
auditors aware of the implications of these responsibilities.
• Provides general purpose guidance (not a case-by-case approach) and 
encourages consistency in the approach taken by auditors.
• Provides a focus for continuing discussion between the CICA, auditors, 
and regulators.
CICA Guideline, May 1992—Special Reports 
on Regulated Financial Institutions
The guideline deals with two types of reporting: derivative and non­
derivative.
Derivative reporting is described in the guideline as circumstances 
in which—
• There is a requirement in legislation for the auditor to communicate in 
writing transactions or conditions relevant to the matters specified in 
legislation that come to the auditor’s attention.
• The auditor does not have a responsibility to carry out procedures to 
search out relevant transactions or conditions. It is a “ by-product”  of the 
financial statement audit.
• The auditor is not required to provide any form of assurance on the 
matters specified in legislation.
Matters on which derivative reports are required include—
— Any situations or transactions leading the auditor to believe that the 
financial institution has not adhered to sound financial practices
— A situation where the auditor has reasonable grounds to believe that 
the circumstances of the financial institution have changed, are 
changing, or are likely to change in a way that does, or might, materi­
ally and adversely affect the viability of the financial institution
— Any transactions or conditions affecting the well-being of the finan­
cial institution that, in the auditor’s opinion, are not satisfactory and 
require rectification
In contrast, a nonderivative reporting responsibility is described in the 
guideline as—
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• A reporting engagement separate from the audit of the financial statements.
• The requirement that the auditor carry out procedures relating to matters 
specified in legislation or by a regulator pursuant to a statutory provision 
enabling the regulator to require such a report.
• Procedures in addition to those carried out to form an opinion on 
the statements.
Nonderivative reporting responsibilities can include the following 
characteristics:
• The auditor may be required to provide an opinion on specific matters, 
without an assertion from management.
• The auditor may be required to report directly to the regulator.
• The matters are often subjective and, thus, open to different interpreta­
tions, and the auditor may not have generally accepted criteria against 
which to evaluate the matters.
The remainder of the presentation deals with “derivative reporting.”
Derivative Reporting Engagement
Some Characteristics
1. The auditor would not perform auditing procedures in addition to those 
carried out in the normal course of the financial statement audit. For 
example, the auditor would normally not be required to make separate 
inquiries of management or obtain additional representations specifi­
cally relating to the matters on which derivative reports are required.
2. However, the auditor will need to take additional time in carrying out 
a financial statement audit to—
• Understand the derivative reporting responsibility.
• Assess the likelihood that transactions or conditions relevant to the 
matters will be encountered during the financial statement audit.
• Assess whether transactions or conditions encountered should be 
included in a derivative report.
• Discuss findings with appropriate levels of management.
• Prepare the derivative report.
3. The auditor’s objective is to—
• Understand and clarify the derivative reporting responsibility.
• Make all the relevant parties aware of it.
• Issue a report if any reportable transactions or conditions are 
encountered.
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4. General and subjective terms are often used in legislation. This may 
lead to varying interpretations of the matters specified in legislation 
and thus, to inconsistencies in the types of transactions or conditions 
identified and reported by auditors.
5. Until guidance is developed on reportable transactions or conditions 
for derivative reports, each auditor will need to—
• Obtain an understanding of the types of transactions or conditions 
that may be of interest to the regulator.
• Assist the regulator in understanding what can be reasonably 
expected from a derivative report.
6. To obtain this understanding, the auditor should determine whether 
the regulator has interpreted, or is willing to interpret, the matters 
specified in legislation. The auditor should consider discussing the 
matters specified in legislation with the regulator to determine if 
agreement on their interpretation can be obtained. I f  this is not 
practicable, the auditor should interpret the matters by referring 
to the CICA Handbook, other available guidance, knowledge of 
industry practice, and experience gained with the particular finan­
cial institution.
7. Clearly, there are limitations in the usefulness of derivative reports:
• The auditor cannot conclude that all relevant transactions or condi­
tions were encountered during the financial statement audit.
• When there is no comprehensive and precise interpretation of the 
matters on which derivative reports are required, there will likely be 
inconsistencies with respect to the types of transactions or condi­
tions identified and reported by different auditors.
• In certain instances the nature of the matters on which derivative 
reports are required may lead the auditor to conclude it is unlikely 
that relevant transactions or conditions will be encountered because 
a financial statement audit is not designed to address such matters.
The Report by the Auditor
The report by the auditor is titled, “ Derivative Report by the Auditor,”
and is addressed to the party specified in the legislation. It would require
the auditor to do the following:
• State that an audit of the financial statements was carried out.
• State the purpose of the report.
• Identify any interpretation of the matters specified in legislation.
• Describe the transactions or conditions encountered, or state that no rele­
vant transactions or conditions were encountered.
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• State that no additional procedures have been carried out in addition to 
those necessary to form an opinion on the financial statements.
• When applicable, say it is unlikely that transactions or conditions 
relevant to the matters would be encountered because a financial state­
ment audit is not designed to address such matters.
• When transactions or conditions are reported, state that—
— They have been discussed with management.
— No attempt has been made to determine whether other transactions 
or conditions of this nature have occurred.
Timing for reporting could vary according to the legislation. For example, 
it may be required without undue delay after identification of a relevant item 
or may be required after completion of the audit.
For an example of a derivative report, see the Appendix.
Contentious Issues
The following are contentious issues:
• The fact that no additional auditing procedures are necessary
• How to express the limitations in the usefulness of the report without—
— Casting doubt on the value of a financial statement audit
— Making the report so negative that it appears to be useless
• Auditor difficulty in identifying matters and transactions that should 
be reported
• An auditor’s dilemma—if the auditor reports significant matters to the 
regulator, what are his or her responsibilities to the shareholders?
— Financial regulator: tell me what you know and I ’ll “ manage” the 
situation
— Securities regulators: the shareholders (and the market) have a right 
to full, true and plain disclosure
Action Now
The CICA Auditing Standards Board identifies appropriate criteria 
for matters to be reported in a derivative reporting engagement (released 
in November 1992). The key here is the concept of “ matters affecting 
the well-being of the financial institution.”  The Board addresses one partic­
ular nonderivative reporting requirement in a piece of provincial legislation 
(released late in 1992). The Task Force on Auditor Communication 
with Regulators will maintain contact and continue discussions with 
the regulators.
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Appendix
Examples of situations in which derivative reports are issued:
1. Legislation specifies the report is to be addressed to the chief executive officer 
of the financial institution and a copy is to be sent to the regulator.
2. The auditor has interpreted the matters.
3. The auditor has concluded it is likely that transactions or conditions relevant to 
the matter would be encountered during the financial statement audit.
4. There are no transactions or conditions to be reported.
DERIVATIVE REPORT BY THE AUDITOR
To the Chief Executive Officer of X Financial Institution:
I have audited the financial statements of X Financial Institution as at December 31, 
19X1 and for the year ended, and reported thereon under date of February 19, 19X2.
Pursuant to the requirements of Section XXX of the Y Act (the Act), I am required 
to report to you any transactions or conditions encountered during the aforemen­
tioned audit that (describe matters specified in legislation). For the purposes of 
understanding the types of transactions or conditions that (describe matters speci­
fied in legislation), I have used the following interpretations developed from the 
following sources:
[Describe the interpretations used and the sources of such interpretations.]
During the course of the aforementioned audit, based on the interpretations referred 
to above, I encountered no relevant transactions or conditions.
No procedures have been carried out in addition to those necessary to form an 
opinion on the financial statements.
This report has been prepared in accordance with the applicable Auditing and 
Related Services Guideline issued by The Canadian Institute of Chartered Account­
ants, and is to be used soley to satisfy the requirements of Section XXX of the Act 
and should not be referred to or used for any other purpose.
City
Date (signed)__________________
Chartered Accountant
cc: Superintendent of Financial Institutions
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